The election campaign of the United Development Party (PPP) of the 14 May, 1997 succeeded in mobilising the critical masses on a broad scale. [Estimated at 1.5 million in Jakarta.] This campaign action was also characterised by the participation of supporters of the Megawati-PDI. The elements participated in the PPP campaign carrying banners and placards reading: A democratic coalition of Mega-Bintang-the People for Democracy.
The May 14 rally showed that the mass participation was no longer 100% spontaneous and confined to enjoying the 1997 "festival of democracy". The people understood the risks involved in joining the rally. This is especially the case after the Armed Forces had carried out exercises right in front of the nose of the people in the middle of Jakarta just a few weeks before. The demands that the masses chanted and the posters they carried were themselves reminders of the risks involved in participating in that day's rally: the need for a coalition to oppose the Soeharto regime repeal of the 5 Political Laws end the dual role of the Armed Forces [i.e. in politics as well as defence] end corruption, monopolies and collusion raise wages and lower the prices of basic necessities investigate the wealth of the presidential family and other high officials
None of this stopped the people of Jakarta from joining the campaign rally. The increasing size of the march with every step forward of the ranks shows how a genuine consciousness among the masses to reject the continuation of the Soeharto regime has developed. This is an aspect of the objective situation that cannot be denied any more.
Yet, as regards in which direction these political actions should go, there remains a yawning gap. The question of where the movement should go is an essential question. Even the mobilisation of millions of people will mean nothing if it brings no fundamental change for the people, only more votes for the non-Golkar parties (in this case the PPP) in the elections.
In a situation where there is a gap between the progressive consciousness of the masses and their political actions, a political leadership capable of taking advantage of the openings that emerge. In the preceding months, these openings could only have been seized by the Megawati.-PDI. But the absence of any clear statement b Megawati, as a person in a position to lead politically, has meant that the potential of the PDI-Megawati to respond to the objective conditions created over the preceding several months has not been realised (if we don't actually want to say failed.) In this uncertain situation, the majority of Megawati;s supporters as well as many other critical minded masses have sought there own way forward. They found their way to the PPP. In these times of rapidly changing conditions, the PP is now filling this golden opening, separate from the question of whether the PPP leadership is doing this consciously or not. The structure/vehicles that are useful for mobilisations have increased in number/have opened up again. Indeed they are even more open now with "Mega-Bintang" as a result of the spontaneous PDI masses and the local committees of the PPP. This is not based on any consensus among the national elite of the PPP or PDI-Mega. In other words, there has been no discussion of a formal coalition between the party leaderships that would hasten and broaden the national mass mobilisations. In fact such mobilisations could be lead further to an overthrow of the regime, if there was the will. The lack of a political will on this is a problem for the Indonesian opposition as a whole. This coalition may only be able increase the votes of the PPP, perhaps to defeat GOLKAR. But it must remembered that the effort to increase the anti-GOLAR vote is not unrelated to the struggle to overthrow the regime. This itself - the issue of ending the "single majority of GOLKAR "1 - is also a practical issue which can take the masses' actions closer to overthrowing the regime.
So the emphasis of our propaganda now must aim to take the masses' actions further (propagandise about strategy and tactics). In other words, our emphasis should not now be on agitating about the negative character of the Suharto regime (because the consciousness/sentiment on overthrowing the regime is genuinely widespread among the masses).
So that the slogan Mega-Bintang is not enough. This must be pushed to be extended to: Mega-Bintang-the People, to emphasise the need for a broader and stronger coalition. Because there will be two clearly defined blocks: the regime vs the people.
And the stages in the actions that go with this slogan are defined by different moments:
1. during the campaign. In the fifth round of campaigning in Jakarta, the Mega-Bintang was able to mobilise one million people; in Solo 100,000 just from the Mega forces, seeping through the boundaries on the campaign areas2. This can be directed by Mega-Bintang-the People to end the "single majority". But if the divisions between the geographical areas can be penetrated and centralisation of the masses can be realised, then there is no other way to go than to take things to the next stage, namely, the overthrow the corrupt Soeharto regime..
2. The next openings is at the time of voting and after the counting of votes (with the Golkar victory, of course). The vehicles for gathering together the masses will be the Election Monitoring Command Posts, that will be directed towards rejection of the election/the election results (i.e. boycott), but with taking into account how this gathering together of the masses can be mobilised for overthrowing the regime. The main problem of this moment is how to awaken the peasants. It is in the villages where GOLKAR will get some real votes, they may be prepared to give up their votes in the cities and towns.
The PRD's position should be to propagandise among the masses about the real possibilities (the necessity) and the appropriate time for boycott actions and actions aimed at overthrowing the regime. This must be done right in the midst of the masses, while never mentioning the PRD. Although the PRD will also need to issue statements in its name on this. Our next problem, both short and long term, is to form as many and as broad a number of legal organisations to make it easier to organise and mobilise the spontaneous masses that will join the struggle. It does not matter how reformist (in program) these are (because, in reality, mass consciousness is genuinely at the stage of wanting to overthrow the regime). The history of the overthrow of Marcos and Soekarno, for example, provide lessons about how various mass organisations, with various interests and characters (from moderate to radical) can be centralised, directed, for the overthrow of a power - but always on the basis that the consciousness needed to overthrow the regime is already widespread.
Besides this, we need to make sure that in the coming period (should we not be able to overthrow the regime now), if we recover the momentum, then the masses will not be so easily mislead by the political elites, for example, just used to get an increase in votes. Or, another way of saying it, the mass mobilisations must pressure/force the PPP and PDI-Mega leadership to run in the direction of overthrowing the regime.
It is difficult to guess at conditions after the campaign or the elections. All we can do is sketch out the scenarios above. The important thing for us now is to work out and implement our short term strategy and tactics, based on assessments of the objective conditions and the results of our work in maximising our propaganda and political instruments. Especially given that the quality of our opposition forces is lower than that in Nepal, India or Latin America. We can see: the offer of a Mega-Bintang alliance from the Solo PPP committee directly to Megawati was only answered with a SMILE. Can we call this the SMILE Coalition. Is it proper for the genuine wishes of the masses be answered with just a smile?
The legality of the campaign makes it possible t mobilise the masses onto the streets, what about after the elections?
At the moment there is no way to determine for sure the longer term strategy/tactics, except for the scenarios about possible openings that have been mentioned. Not that its necessarily wrong to have such long term strategy, but it is not a part of fulfilling the criteria of the vanguard which is to respond as quickly as possible to the short term openings that arise. The voting period and afterwards will produce nothing if the people do not stay in the streets. We can only determine the strategy and tactics after the voting, after we see the results of the period that has just preceded. We can perhaps imagine what will happen, but all such things can only be carried out if we maximise our political instruments.
So, for now, we must win the masses to the idea of a democratic coalition. This can also hold back the conservative tendencies of the PPP. If the PP is let run off by itself, it could be dangerous.
So the priority in political instruments are the legal organisations/ committees/election command posts must be mobilised to launch actions supporting the Mega-Bintang-Rakyat coalition. The addition of PEOPLE is to give a perspective a broadening struggle that can develop to the level of de-legitimising the elections and overthrowing the regime. We must start popularising the Mega-Bintang-People through all means possible.
The fact that there is only one week left of the campaign is not a major matter. Even with little time left, the opening must be maximalised. The gathering together of the people and propaganda must no stop. The gathering of mass support for the Mega-Bintang-People coalition must head towards ending the GOLKAR "single majority".
If defeated in the elections, the organ, such as the election monitoring command posts will work to reject/delegitimise the elections, and push things towards overthrowing the regime. Especially as the proof of cheating is already available.
Endnotes
- "Majoritas tunggal" - literally single majority, referring to the monopoly of dominance by GOLKAR in all representative institutions.
- Campaign regulations confine electoral activities to specific geographic areas
[Translated by ASIET]