On Friday 22nd March Prabowo Subianto was confirmed as President-elect of Indonesia at the third time attempt (after losses in 2014 and 2019), with 58.59 per cent of the vote. Challenges to the confirmed result notwithstanding, Prabowo will take office on 20th October. Two possible paths for human rights and democracy in Indonesia could eventuate, both of which are profoundly negative.
The first is that Prabowo will continue with the policies of Joko Widodo's ('Jokowi') government. It is Jokowi's time in office that has enabled the possibility of a Prabowo presidency, with its increasing focus on development to the detriment of human rights. The second, even worse possibility, is that Prabowo could strike out on a more authoritarian path, and make military power and impunity much greater than it already is.
The election was a family affair for Jokowi with his own son, 36-year old Gibran Rakabuming Raka, elected as Prabowo's vice-president.1 While Prabowo did benefit from association with his popular predecessor (a 'Jokowi effect'), his campaign spent enormous sums, apparently much higher than either of his main competitors, and may also have used state resources to campaign.
Jokowi's first election in 2014 was initially hailed as a positive development for human rights by many Indonesians, because he was not connected with the New Order, as Prabowo was, and had indicated that he could be willing to acknowledge the 1960s anti-leftist massacres. But after that election, it became clear that Jokowi did not intend to offer real alternatives to the status quo. Instead, he brought as many opponents into his administration's fold as possible, including many retired military figures. These individuals characterised attempts to secure better human rights and justice as a foreign imposition, further undermining already weak reforms. A series of government initiatives followed, regarded by civil society and survivors of the 1960s massacres as inadequate and even harmful to securing justice.2 Military leaders even publicly stated that democracy was incompatible with Pancasila, Indonesia's state ideology.3
By midway through his second term in office, Widodo faced very little opposition. Parties that together commanded most of the votes cast in 2019 sat in a 'big tent' coalition in parliament. Leading civil society figures were bought off with posts in ministries, and government-controlled cooperatives and foundations. Many civil society figures who opposed Suharto have been co-opted by political elites. Even those who had previously been harassed, arrested and tortured by Prabowo's unit have supported him in his presidential ambitions.4 Prabowo himself is well aware that this support has given him an unparalleled sense of legitimacy and credibility, and uses it as a shield against any criticism, as happened during the first presidential debate.5
Prabowo proved to be the most notorious example of a previous opponent being appointed to Jokowi's administration, when he was appointed Minister of Defence after his second defeat by Jokowi in 2019. Prabowo's record in many ways speaks for itself: Kopassus, the special forces unit that he commanded, stands accused of committing war crimes and crimes against humanity in East Timor; he has admitted his unit's involvement – but not his own – in the disappearance of protestors in Jakarta in 1998, whose remains have never been found, to the continuing anguish of their families. Following a period in exile, he has faced further ignominy with travel bans, including to the United States, which earlier in his career provided military training and support to Kopassus. This ban was quietly lifted, paving the way for his 2020 visit to Washington.
If Prabowo could once be written off as having been 'put in his place' as Minister of Defence, with expensive military hardware and an important-sounding role, he is now in charge, showing a second possible path. There are significant problems with militarisation which could be compounded by Prabowo's presidency. Reform of the security forces by civilian politicians stalled 15 years ago. The military enjoys largely unchecked access to West Papua's natural resources and its business interests are legion. Its territorial command structure (Koter), whereby the military are positioned in towns and villages throughout the country, continues to expand with the creation of each new province and district. Prabowo has encouraged the expansion of the Koter and military figures have accused critical observers of 'military phobia'.6 The military have had new powers under anti-terror legislation, which built on laws passed after the 2018 Surabaya terrorist attacks. They have used this to do further operations in West Papua. The security forces obviously do not favour outside scrutiny of West Papua, a trend which continues with the government's failure by the government to grant the UN a visit, while foreign journalists face being trailed and harassed by intelligence agencies.
The election of Prabowo shows that Indonesia does not need a military coup for human rights, justice and democracy to be thrown into a reverse gear, which has been happening anyway for more than 10 years under Jokowi. All it has taken is the indifference and acquiescence of a generation of politicians and several former civil society figures, who have come to accept the military as almost literally part of Indonesia's landscape. The question now is: how far will they continue to remain silent as the most tainted president of the last 25 years takes office?
1. How Gibran came to be Prabowo's running mate is shrouded in questionable legality. The Indonesian Election Act Article 169 Section Q stipulates that 40 years old is the minimum age for presidential and vice-presidential candidates; Gibran is 36. However, in a widely contentious ruling, the Constitutional Court, headed by Anwar Usman, Jokowi's brother-in-law, allowed an exception to those who had been elected regional leaders, paving the way for Gibran's candidature[candidacy?], as he had been Mayor of Surakarta [2021-2024]. Usman was soon after removed as head of the Constitutional Court, and is under investigation for ethics code violations regarding that decision.
2. K. McGregor and K. Setiawan 'Shifting from International to "Indonesian" Justice Measures: Two Decades of Addressing Past Human Rights Violations' Journal of Contemporary Asia, 49:5, 837-861 2019. A 'Reconciliation Committee' set up under the Attorney General's office to hear testimonies of survivors of the 1960s massacres, had several alleged human rights abusers on its board and offered non-judicial solutions, with the president offering an apology to the public, not to survivors. An International People's Tribunal (IPT), set up by survivors and civil society organisations, by contrast, encouraged the state to establish both judicial and non-judicial mechanisms, but was derided by ex-military figures associated with the government as foreign inspired.
3. U. Hadi 'Panglima TNI: Demokrasi Kita Tidak Sesuai Lagi dengan Pancasila' 5 June 2017 https://apps.detik.com/detik/https://news.detik.com/berita/d-3519988/panglima-tni-demokrasi-kita-tidak-sesuai-lagi-dengan-pancasila
4. Former political prisoner Budiman Sudjatmiko, who founded the Democratic People's Party (Party Rakyat Demokratik, PRD), one of the most vociferous groups critical of Suharto in the latter stages of his presidency, now supports Prabowo.
5. Kompas.com, "Debat Perdana, Jawaban Prabowo soal Pelanggaran HAM Berat hingga Penanganan Konflik di Papua" 13 December 2023, https://nasional.kompas.com/read/2023/12/13/08382061/debat-perdana-jawaban-prabowo-soal-pelanggaran-ham-berat-hingga-penanganan?page=all. Receiving a question on his human rights record, he stated: "Truly, the people who I arrested before, political prisoners who said I kidnapped them, right now are on my side, defending me"
6. BBC News Mengapa rencana penambahan Kodam 'dicurigai' untuk kepentingan Prabowo Subianto di Pilpres 2024? Kemenhan: 'Jangan fobia militer' 23 May 2023 https://www.bbc.com/indonesia/articles/cyxk729044zo
Source: https://www.tapol.org/article/third-time-unlucky-indonesia-prabowo-subianto-elected-presiden