Yance Arizona – Two years after taking office on October 20, 2024, President Prabowo Subianto's administration has fallen short of expectations. At the heart of its problems is a paradox.
On the one hand, the government aggressively promotes a narrative of fiscal efficiency to fund populist programs for the people. In doing so, the government implements austerity policy by cutting public spending across ministries and regional governments. On the other hand, the savings from this austerity policy are being redirected to finance a bloated ministerial structure and a series of 'mega-projects' that have proven to be inefficient and corrupt.
But the most glaring paradox lies in the composition of the executive branch itself.
President Prabowo has assembled the largest cabinet in Indonesia's post-Reformasi (Reformation) history. In total, the number of ministers, deputy ministers, and heads of ministerial-level agencies has swelled to 106 persons. This is compounded by the addition of 26 members to the Presidential Advisory Council, which previously consisted of only 9.
President Prabowo argues that Indonesia's vast territory, comparable in scale to the entire European continent, requires a large number of ministers. But this rhetoric fails under comparative scrutiny. The United States, with its vast territory and population, operates with just 15 federal departments, India has 21 ministries, and China maintains a much leaner structure with 29 ministries.
In reality, there is no defensible technocratic justification for this bloated cabinet. It is purely the result of political bargaining designed to secure political support both within and outside the national legislature (the DPR).
To control the DPR, President Prabowo appointed five chairpersons of political parties to coordinating ministerial posts as a means of securimg their compliance and loyalty. Many ministerial positions have also been filled by figures who lack the necessary competence, their appointments being based on loyalty rather than merit.
The resulting poor cabinet performance has prompted Prabowo to conduct as many as eight cabinet reshuffles in just his first two years in office. This amounts to replacing ministers once every three months.
How did he get away with all this policy chaos?
A dysfunctional parliament and the politics of accommodation
By forming a huge cabinet representing nearly all political factions in parliament, Prabowo has a virtually unconditional support from the DPR.
This seemingly boundless politics of accommodation has crippled the core function of the legislature, where political parties are represented. The governing coalition controls approximately 81% of the parliament, with the PDI-P standing alone as an openly declared 'balancing' party (but not an opposition).
To make matters worse, the legislature is underperforming. The number of laws enacted has fallen far short of the targets set in the National Legislation Program (Program Legislasi Nasional, Prolegnas). Moreover, in substance, the limited legislation passed has largely expanded executive power and restricted accountability.
For example, Law 18 of 2023 on the State-Owned Enterprises (SOE) was amended twice in 2025 to establish a sovereign wealth fund, Danantara, effectively separating SOE finances from state finances, thereby removing them from the scope of corruption law.
Likewise, Law 4 of 2026 on the Development and Strengthening of the Financial Sector (UU P2SK) grants impunity to purchasers of 'patriot bonds' from criminal prosecution, including for tax offences, and civil claims, while barring transaction data from being used for tax assessment or as evidence in court.
Meanwhile, proposed amendments to Law 31 of 1999 on Corruption Eradication have sparked controversy over the redefinition of corruption. The government, for example, has proposed removing state losses as an element of corruption. By narrowing criminal liability for abuses of state finance, the government is expanding impunity for corrupt practices.
DPR oversight of development programmes is now virtually absent. The legislature has instead become a rubber stamp for government policies, legitimising wasteful and corrupt government programmes such as Free Nutritious Meals and Red and White Village Cooperatives.
This legislative dysfunction has left a void in formal political opposition in Indonesia. The state operates without effective checks and balances, allowing regulations that undermine the public interest to pass without meaningful resistance – and, often, without even meaningful debate.
As a result, public trust in the government plunged from 81.2% in November 2025 to 44.5% in October 2026, according to an SMRC survey.
The shadow cabinet experiment
The failure of institutional oversight through the DPR prompted civil society groups, academics, and activists to launch a 'Shadow Cabinet.'
The shadow cabinet is an established model in parliamentary systems, such as those in Europe and Australia, where parties that lose elections become the parliamentary opposition and form a shadow cabinet as a 'government-in-waiting'. In Indonesia, where there is no legislative opposition, the Shadow Cabinet has, instead, been established by civil society groups.
Composed of individuals under the age of 50, drawn from academic scholars and NGO activists, this 15-member cabinet was formed to contrast with the bloated structure of the Prabowo-Gibran cabinet. The message is simple: the establishment of a ministerial cabinet should be lean and based on competence.
Since its inception in July 2026, the Shadow Cabinet has brought a fresh perspective to scrutinising problematic government programs through focused criticism and rational policy alternatives.
In collaboration with the Centre of Economic and Law Studies (CELIOS), the Shadow Cabinet conducted a survey assessing Prabowo Subianto's two-year administration. The findings revealed that 75% of respondents felt stressed by Prabowo's policies, while 67% felt stressed by his behaviour.
The Shadow Cabinet has also demonstrated its commitment through direct action on the ground. When an earthquake struck East Nusa Tenggara (NTT) in August 2026, government agencies were slow to respond, hampered by administrative procedures. But the Shadow Cabinet's team immediately mobilised to distribute aid and assess the needs of the affected residents. This intervention starkly exposed the government's negligence and indecisiveness in supporting disaster survivors' recovery.
Shadow Cabinet members also actively participate in discussions across sectors, engaging particularly with Generation Z, whose members are increasingly anxious about policies made by a government dominated by Baby Boomers who fail to understand their needs for the future. The objective is to amplify public grievances, encompassing the concerns of labourers, teachers, farmers, ride-hailing drivers, and victims of past gross human rights violations.
The 'Shadow Cabinet' experiment is not purely a 'government-in-waiting', but also a mirror for the government and part of a broader social ecosystem aiming to hold the government accountable.
Keeping hope for change alive
The Prabowo administration is currently consolidating power in the absence of any significant counterbalancing force.
Many structural problems remain unresolved and have worsened under this administration. Corruption has become institutionalised through the Free Nutritious Meals and Red and White Village Cooperatives programmes. The rupiah has fallen to its lowest level in history, the Indonesia Stock Exchange Index has plummeted, and ordinary people face mounting hardship. Adding to these problems is an environmental crisis driven by massive forest fires in Kalimantan, Sumatra, and Papua, as well as deforestation for oil palm expansion.
Various indices, including those from the Economist Intelligence Unit and V-Dem, point to a democratic decline and electoral autocracy in Indonesia. Similarly, the Rule of Law Index has reached its lowest score in the last decade.
Meanwhile, public unrest is increasingly being voiced on the streets. Students, farmers, labourers, women, ride-hailing drivers, and football supporters have started to mobilise. Their message is clear: This madness must be stopped!
However, a solid set of alternative visions and programs has not yet fully taken shape. It is at this juncture that the youth in the Shadow Cabinet seek to contribute by offering alternatives for a better future for Indonesia. Something is emerging, even if it is still waiting to take full shape.
The situation is dire, but we refuse to lose hope.
