Yoes C Kenawas and Amalinda Savirani – The proposal to replace direct popular regional head elections (pilkada langsung) with indirect selection (pilkada tidak langsung) by the regional legislative councils (DPRDs) is gaining traction. Political parties within President Prabowo Subianto's huge ruling coalition support it, saying that appointment by DPRDs will resolve a myriad of issues they believe are caused by direct local elections.
One criticism of direct pilkada is that they have contributed to a proliferation of political dynasties at the local level, and there is some truth in this. However, we doubt that transitioning from direct elections to appointment by the DPRDs is the solution to the problem of dynastic politics. In fact, we think it will only exacerbate it.
Direct pilkada and the rise of dynastic politics
Certainly, subnational political dynasties became a prominent feature of Indonesia's political landscape after the introduction of direct local elections. Our study shows the number of dynastic candidates has continually increased each election cycle.
In the local elections held between 2015 and 2018, only 202 dynastic candidates, or 6% of the total of 3,402 candidates, appeared on the ballots. In the 2020 simultaneous local elections, 159 dynastic candidates, or 18.66% of the total 852 contenders, competed for power in 270 regions. The number rose sharply in the 2024 nationwide local elections, with 659 dynastic candidates, or about 21.26% of the total 3,100 candidates.
But while the number of dynastic candidates continues to increase, they are becoming less likely to win elections. In fact, the winning ratio of dynastic candidates has declined. Between 2015 and 2018, 67.8% of dynastic regional head candidates were elected. The figure dropped to 41.12% in the 2020 simultaneous elections and then 39.91% in the 2024 simultaneous elections.
These findings suggest that as long as the political arena at the local level remains open and competitive, voters have the opportunity to not vote for dynastic candidates. Although candidates with dynastic backgrounds do possess superior political capital, this certainly does not guarantee they will win.
Why indirect pilkada may boost political dynasties
Ironically, ending direct regional head elections may lead to the renewed proliferation of subnational political dynasties.
The reason is simple: appointment by a DPRD hugely concentrates power in the hands of regional legislators. Local politicians who want to prolong their power through dynastic politics would need to win the support of far fewer actors to increase the likelihood of success.
In direct elections, aspiring dynasty builders must mobilise the support of hundreds of thousands, or even millions, of voters (depending on the number of voters and candidates in a subnational unit). If direct elections are scrapped, dynasts might only need the support of a few dozen legislators.
This change in the local elections system will drastically alter the principal-agent problem in contemporary Indonesia's electoral politics, from one that initially worked against aspiring dynasts to one that will benefit them. The key relationship will no longer be between politicians and voters, but between politicians seeking regional head positions and their fellow politicians sitting in DPRDs.
Politicians who aspire to build political dynasties will only need to maintain the loyalty of a winning coalition. Fewer 'clients' to monitor means it will be easier to maintain support and manage potential defections. As the political process unfolds, the expectations of the principals (aspiring dynasts) and the agent (DPRD members) will gradually crystalise, and deals will be done. Dynasts will offer more targeted benefits – legitimate or corrupt – to each DPRD member.
In other words, in an indirect local election system, vote buying will not decrease, it will just become more 'efficient'.
A better solution: stronger party institutionalisation
Indonesian democracy benefits from direct local elections. First, local politics can serve as a training ground for future national leaders. Indonesia would not have had Joko Widodo, Gamawan Fauzi, Ganjar Pranowo, Anies Baswedan, Basuki Tjahaja Purnama, and other high-calibre regional heads without direct local elections. Returning to appointment through the DPRDs would reduce and weaken the supply of national leadership by limiting it to national-level elites.
Second, policies issued by local leaders can often inspire the adoption of a similar policy at the national level. The National Health Care System (Jamkesmas), for instance, was inspired by a program in Jembrana District, Bali, under Gede Winasa's leadership from 2000 to 2010.
Third, direct local elections forced local leaders to create policies that benefited citizens, in order to get re-elected. This is a form of populism, but in local elections it is also a form of vertical accountability that makes local leaders accountable to their voters. The idea of decentralisation as a means to bring government closer to the people means nothing without direct elections.
The proposal to end direct pilkada masks the real problem in Indonesian democracy: Indonesian political parties are dysfunctional. Parties do not function well in Indonesian democracy except during elections. Basic functions such as grooming future leaders, political communication, and aggregating interests – all functions that connect voters to policymaking – are notoriously absent.
Political parties have become a family affair, too. Very few parties are not led by 'blue blood' politicians. Many scholars studying democratisation in Indonesia have pointed out that political parties lack commitment to institutionalise themselves and implement merit-based, tiered party regeneration.
The emergence of political dynasties at the subnational level should be seen as one of many problems stemming from the poor institutionalisation of political parties, not direct elections. Instead of pulling down the direct pilkada system, political parties should reform themselves and engage voters more through ideas, engagement and socially-responsive programs.