Max Lane – ASEAN faces an intriguing test of its own decision-making procedures, as consensus might be elusive given the apparent obstruction of one member to the full accession of its eleventh member.
On 2 July 2025, media reports claimed that Myanmar's State Administration Council (SAC) officially informed Malaysia, the ASEAN Chair, that the SAC will not support Timor-Leste's accession to the regional grouping in October. The reports stated that Naypyidaw's official position was that Timor-Leste has failed to adhere to the principle of non-interference in internal affairs, as enshrined in the ASEAN Charter. According to the reports, Naypyidaw has claimed that Timor-Leste has had official engagement with the National Unity Government (NUG), the government in exile – sometimes termed the "parallel government" – and resistance forces now fighting the military junta.
Both the UN and ASEAN have taken the position that there is a crisis of governance in Myanmar.
As early as 2022, soon after his election as President, Ramos-Horta and other officials of the Timor-Leste government called on the international community to continue undertaking every effort to contribute to the return of democratic order in Myanmar through dialogue with all parties. At that time, they issued an official statement commending the ASEAN Chair and the United Nations Security Council for their "deep concern" at the state of emergency the SAC imposed on 1 February 2021 and condemnation of the execution of Myanmar's democracy activists in July 2022 (among other things).
To date, President Horta has prioritised engagement with actors for democratic governance and has not met representatives of the SAC government, although he did meet the Myanmar Foreign Minister of a much earlier military government, back in 2010.
On 18 June 2024, Ramos-Horta had met Daw Zin Mar Aung, Minister of Foreign Affairs for the NUG, at the Presidential Palace in Dili. Mar Aung stated that the meeting aimed to strengthen ties between the two nations. This prompted Naypyidaw to expel Timor-Leste's diplomats.
On 22 January 2025, Ramos-Horta met Julie Bishop, the United Nations Secretary-General's Special Representative for Myanmar, at the World Economic Forum.
The Malaysian Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim had a May 2025 meeting with leaders of the NUG, including Prime Minister Mahn Winn Khaing Thann, likely to balance his meeting with SAC Chairman Senior General Min Aung Hlaing in Bangkok to discuss humanitarian assistance and extending the ceasefire as part of the peace process in Myanmar.
ASEAN's official rules state that any new member seeking admission must receive unanimous support of all members before being accepted as a full member. The Irrawaddy recently reported that the Director-General of the ASEAN Department in Naypyidaw's Ministry of Foreign Affairs urged the ASEAN Chair and Secretariat to "suspend all related procedural considerations until Timor-Leste revises its approach and demonstrates a clear commitment to rectifying its policy towards Myanmar".
However, whether Myanmar's opposition to Timor-Leste's membership will act as an automatic barrier to Timor-Leste being accepted is in a grey area. Since October 2021, ASEAN has adopted the stance of not inviting the SAC Chair and his appointed minister to ASEAN Summits. This was continued in 2022, when Myanmar was not invited to send political representatives and thus abstained from ASEAN's Foreign Ministers' Meetings (AMM), Summits, and the ASEAN Plus Three and East Asia Summit meetings.
It was not clear whether Naypyidaw's letter to the ASEAN Chair constitutes a de facto veto or whether the ASEAN members will need to review the letter's status in the light of the sanctions they have imposed on Myanmar. However, at last week's ASEAN meetings in Kuala Lumpur, the region's foreign ministers' focus was on how to respond to the US' latest salvos in its 'tariff war'. What more, PM Anwar asked all AMS to support Timor-Leste's entry as its eleventh member, in his opening speech.
A complicating factor may be Anwar Ibrahim's attempts to get the Myanmar junta government and the NUG speaking. In May, Anwar claimed that "in Myanmar... we are able to engage with all parties, number one. Number two, we are able to secure a ceasefire. And... to ensure that all humanitarian aid can go to any sub-region, regardless of which group controls it." His position is one of seeking some kind of reconciliatory engagement between the two conflicting parties.
It may be that Naypyidaw is attempting to leverage the different approaches taken by Anwar and Ramos-Horta. Historically, however, Ramos-Horta has generally supported reconciliation around the world where possible (and where it would lead to democratisation).
Myanmar's stated opposition to Timor-Leste's entry, whether ultimately effective or not, will be a test of the level of consensus-making among AMS. This is about the sensitive question of democratic governance versus military junta rule, and whether ASEAN can withstand attempts of its members "weaponising their own rules". A decision to refuse Timor-Leste's membership would mean reversing a decision already formally made at the 46th ASEAN Summit on 26-27 May (as clause 124 of the Chairman's Statement indicates). After all, the May decision was made with full knowledge of Timor-Leste's stance on Myanmar.
[Max Lane is a Visiting Senior Fellow at the ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute. He has been an academic at the University of Sydney, Victoria University (Melbourne), Murdoch University and the National University of Singapore and has lectured at universities in Southeast Asia, Europe and the United States.]
Source: https://fulcrum.sg/myanmars-opposition-to-timor-lestes-asean-membership