Ahmad Syarif Syechbubakr – On Sunday, 6 April 2025, the Governor of Bengkulu rushed to the airport after receiving a sudden report that the presidential aircraft would be landing at Fatmawati Soekarno Airport. The visit came without prior notice – the governor had not been informed in advance. With regional army and police chiefs, he scrambled to prepare the necessary protocol arrangements to receive the president at short notice.
But the president never disembarked. The purpose of the landing was not, in fact, an official visit, but to pick up Agung Surahman, one of President Prabowo's personal assistants. Due to the Idul Fitri holiday rush, Agung had been unable to secure a flight to Jakarta or Kuala Lumpur, where he was scheduled to join the president's delegation to Malaysia. So, the president instead arranged for his plane to stop and pick him up.
In protocol-heavy and semi-militaristic Indonesia, if a personal assistant failed to get a flight to join the presidential delegation to Kuala Lumpur, he'd usually be expected to swim to Malaysia before inconveniencing the head of state. Few, if any, other presidents would extend such a personal favor to a mere assistant.
What may seem like a trivial incident, in fact, reveals the deeper complexity of how emotion and personal preferences shape the president's treatment of his inner circle – and how that inner circle may, in turn, hinder his overall capacity to govern.
Introducing Prabowo's inner circle
In this context, the 'inner circle' refers to a group of individuals who, on a daily basis, advise the president, manage his schedule, handle memos and information flows, and ensure that both his state and political affairs are well coordinated.
Besides the special assistants, who focus primarily on technical matters, the president's core inner circle includes key figures within formal institutions such as the State Secretariat (Setneg), led by Prasetyo Hadi; the Cabinet Secretariat (Setkab), headed by Teddy Indra Wijaya; and the Presidential Staff Office (KSP), led by A.M. Putranto.
This circle also extends to an informal group – individuals who may not hold official positions within the presidential office but have privileged access to the president – such as Foreign Minister Sugiono, Vice Minister of Communication and Digital Affairs Angga Raka Prabowo, and Vice Minister of Agriculture Sudaryono.
These individuals often accompany the president from his residence in Hambalang, West Java, to the State Palace in Jakarta. They travel with him, join official state visits, and take part in both small and large cabinet meetings.
The role of the institutional inner circle (KSP, Setneg, and Setkab) alongside the informal inner circle is often overlooked. Yet these actors are crucial. They manage talking points, schedule meetings, prepare memos on key issues, and serve as the first line of advice, providing essential context before the president engages with specific matters.
But how exactly does this inner circle shape the president's governing system – and why is that crucial for understanding President Prabowo's leadership style? Just as importantly, how do they differ from the president's other, more politically seasoned, advisors?
The young loyalist groupthink
Except for A.M. Putranto, all members of President Prabowo's core advisory team are relatively young: Prasetyo Hadi is 45, Teddy Indra Wijaya is 35, Sudaryono is 40, Sugiono is 46, and Angga Raka is 35.
They share several common traits. Most are alumni of Taruna Nusantara, the elite semi-military high school that Prabowo helped establish in 1990 – including Sugiono, Sudaryono, Teddy, and Prasetyo Hadi. Several also have formal military backgrounds, notably Sugiono, Teddy, and A.M. Putranto. Angga Raka is the only member who does not fall into either category. However, all – except for Teddy – are cadres of Gerindra, the president's political party.
Under President Jokowi, key inner-circle institutions were led by senior and influential politicians. Pramono Anung, senior PDIP cadre and now Jakarta's governor, served as Cabinet Secretary (2015-2024), while Pratikno, a Gadjah Mada University professor, was State Secretary for two periods; he is now the Coordinating Minister for Human Development and Cultural Affairs. Former military chief Moeldoko led the Presidential Staff Office (KSP), and Luhut Binsar Panjaitan was the chief of KSP from August 2015 to July 2016.
In 2014, Jokowi initially appointed Andi Widjajanto as Cabinet Secretary at age 42, but due to inexperience, he was reshuffled after just one year. The Widjajanto case shows how crucial it is for that position to be filled by experienced and well-connected technocrats or politicians.
The primary political patron for Prabowo's young loyalists is the president himself. Unlike their predecessors or other senior advisors, they are yet to build independent political networks. As a result, their political capital and institutional access are limited. This makes it difficult for them to push back or offer critical advice to the president, and it weakens their ability to coordinate effectively with powerful ministries led by seasoned political figures, such as Zulkifli Hasan (Coordinating Minister for Food), Bahlil Lahadalia (Minister of Energy), or Airlangga Hartarto (Coordinating Minister for Economic Affairs).
This dynamic has led to a culture of groupthink within the president's inner circle, where young loyalists tend to endorse the president's agenda and political views without offering meaningful input.
As a result, after six months in the office, the president seems not well informed or advised on a range of important issues, including the execution of LPG policies, interministerial disputes on the sea fence, the foreign policies mismatch, and how to manage protests during the revision of Military law.
A recent interview of the president by six senior journalists is the latest evidence of these problems. Angga Raka, Sugiono and Teddy were in the room. While an unscripted interview had been agreed in advance, the president seemed not well advised on potential questions the journalists might ask or how to answer them diplomatically.
Senior advisors and the groupthink loyalists
Of course, the young loyalist groupthink are not Prabowo's only advisors. Another group consists of senior, well-connected figures with strong political interests and independent networks.
This group includes Minister of Defense Sjafrie Shamsoeddin (72), Prabowo's military academy classmate and longtime best friend; Hashim Djojohadikusumo (70), Prabowo's younger brother, a businessman and Gerindra's main donor; and Sufmi Dasco Ahmad (57), vice speaker of the national legislature (the DPR) and Executive Chair of Gerindra, who serves as Prabowo's key political operator, liaising with other political parties and actors.
Unlike those in the inner circle, these figures are not part of the president's daily advisory team, and are usually not with him on daily basis. Instead, they hold cabinet or political roles that limit direct interaction with him.
Prabowo relies on these figures to implement key initiatives, manage political tensions, and maintain coalition stability. For example, he frequently turns to Dasco to handle relations with the DPR, assigns Hasyim to engage with business communities and investors, and depends on Sjafrie for military and security affairs.
Beyond being under-advised, the real risk of having strong senior advisors on the outside and a much weaker and young groupthink-prone inner circle is that the flow of information and coordination to the presidential office becomes limited.
Do senior cabinet politicians genuinely view Teddy as someone they can trust with strategic details – or merely as a scheduler managing the president's calendar? Does the inner circle have the authority to access critical information from other ministries to keep the president fully informed?
While there is no active power struggle between the two groups, the imbalance of power has benefited senior advisors, allowing them to operate with minimal oversight by, or intervention from, the president's inner circle.
This uneven distribution of power between the inner circle and senior advisors weakens inter-ministerial coordination and limits the president's situational awareness. A similar dynamic was evident during President Jokowi's early administration, when a lack of coordination under Cabinet Secretary Andi Widjajanto led to his replacement by Pramono Anung. While President Prabowo's term is still in its early months, the question remains whether he will make a similar adjustment. For context, it took Jokowi nearly a year to reshuffle his Cabinet Secretariat.
Signs of dysfunction?
But the situation also raises another question. Are the advisors the real issue – or is it a reflection of the president's own character?
Some might argue that the problem lies with the president himself – that Prabowo is simply difficult to advise. But his transformation since joining Jokowi's cabinet in 2019, culminating in his lighthearted "dancing grandpa" persona during the 2024 campaign, suggests otherwise. There is evidence that President Prabowo can take advice and act on it.
It is clear that President Prabowo is comfortable with his inner circle and treats them well. However, signs of dysfunction – such as poor coordination, weak strategic advice, and a growing power imbalance between senior advisors and his inner circle – may soon begin to disrupt his governing capacity. When that reality sets in, it will reveal whether the president's personal preferences outweigh rational decision-making.