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Why Ganjar-Mahfud were beaten on their own turf but PDI-P survived

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Fulcrum - February 20, 2024

Made Supriatma – A post-election analysis of Ganjar Pranowo's poor showing in last week's presidential election requires examining what went on behind the scenes and at the grassroots level, including on his home turf, Central Java.

The performance of Ganjar Pranowo-Mahfud MD in Indonesia's 2024 presidential election (PE) matched the dismal polling numbers for their electability going into last week's vote. According to "Quick Count" (unofficial) results from reputable survey institutions and news outlets, Ganjar-Mahfud secured around 16-17 per cent of the national vote. This pales in comparison to the second-placed Anies Baswedan-Muhaimin Iskandar (Team AMIN) pair, who garnered approximately 24-25 per cent, and the winning pair of Prabowo Subianto-Gibran Rakabuming Raka. The latter received 57-59 per cent, exceeding even Joko Widodo's (Jokowi) results when he won against Prabowo in PE2019.

Perhaps the greatest hurt is that Ganjar-Mahfud underperformed significantly even in Central Java, where Ganjar served as governor for two terms (2013-2023). In his 2018 gubernatorial re-election, Ganjar had secured an impressive 58.78 per cent of the vote. However, his hometown support for PE2024 dwindled to only 33-34 per cent (against Prabowo's 52.7 per cent).

Even though they were backed by the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI-P), the party that emerged top in the general elections (GE) vote, Ganjar-Mahfud were defeated in nearly all Central Java districts, including Yogyakarta. Prabowo-Gibran dominated except in Boyolali and Wonogiri. Remarkably, Ganjar even lost in Karanganyar, his birthplace.

When the official vote count is ready on 20 March 2024, it is likely to show that there was a seeming absence or reduction of the "coattail" (or down ballot) effect. This describes the connection between votes for a presidential candidate and voters' choices in national and provincial or local legislative elections.

The votes from Central Java and Yogyakarta, as key provinces supporting PDI-P, showcase this disconnect. PDI-P's GE vote share was relatively unaffected despite Ganjar-Mahfud's PE loss: PDI-P is projected to win around 17 per cent of the national vote, just slightly less than the 19 per cent it received in 2019.

How did Ganjar-Mahfud perform so poorly on their home turf?

In this author's view, Ganjar-Mahfud became the primary target of the Prabowo-Gibran campaign, which had the tacit support of President Jokowi. The media has highlighted instances where Jokowi seemed to shadow Ganjar during the latter's electoral campaign. Moreover, Jokowi actively 'campaigned' in PDI-P strongholds, spending nine days in January 2024 visiting parts of Central Java and Yogyakarta. During this period, he inaugurated events and provided social assistance to impoverished communities.

Within PDI-P, however, some perceived Jokowi's actions as part of a more systematic operation to sway Ganjar-Mahfud's natural voter base. Through private conversations, the present author heard recurrent stories alleging that government employees were being compelled to vote for "Candidate 02" (the ballot number for Prabowo-Gibran). The operation also targeted regents affiliated with the PDI-P, who were allegedly subject to intimidation if they supported Ganjar's camp.

This reportedly extended its reach to village heads (lurah). In November 2023, the regional police summoned all of Karanganyar's lurah, ostensibly for an investigation into the misuse of aid funds from the national budget. This summoning of village heads in Ganjar's hometown was interpreted by some as a signal to other regions, implying that compliance with supporting candidate 02 was expected.

The implied threat of corruption investigations to secure backing from bureaucrats and politicians might have been another tactic. Coincidentally or not, Governor of East Java Khofifah Indar Parawansa publicly endorsed Prabowo-Gibran mere days after the Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK) searched her office for evidence related to the alleged misappropriation of state funds. Harta Mudhlor, regent of Sidoarjo, East Java, supported Prabowo-Gibran a day after being questioned by the KPK.

Initially, many believed that Prabowo-Gibran and Jokowi's strategy involved bundling the presidential and legislative elections. Aside from boosting Prabowo-Gibran, Jokowi aimed to propel the Indonesian Solidarity Party (PSI) led by his youngest son Kaesang Pengarep since October 2023, into parliament. (Editor's note: PSI does not appear to qualify for any parliamentary seats as it has fallen below the four per cent voting threshold.) However, the talk is that this plan was abandoned due to the perceived risk of clashing with PDI-P stalwarts on their turf. The fallout from the 2019 election, when Prabowo tried to confront Jokowi in PDI-P strongholds and suffered a significant defeat, might have influenced this shift. (In 2019, candidate Prabowo received only 22.7 per cent of the vote in Central Java, a substantial decline from the 33.3 per cent he won in 2014.)

The Prabowo-Gibran campaign then switched to decoupling the vote for the presidential and legislative elections, focusing on splitting votes for Ganjar from the PDI-P's. According to someone involved in Prabowo's campaign, PDI-P supporters were directed to vote for Prabowo-Gibran but not explicitly asked to vote for PSI. This was reportedly done through door-to-door requests, accompanied by pressure or influence by the state apparatus (read: local authorities, sometimes). To the PDI-P grassroots, the message was "We are PDI-P, We are Jokowi, We are Prabowo", which proved to be highly effective.

Through this quiet and extensive mobilisation, Ganjar-Mahfud emerged as a liability for PDI-P legislative candidates across all levels. While the Ganjar-Mahfud campaign distributed thousands of campaign materials (like posters and T-shirts) intended for use by PDI-P legislative candidates, these allegedly remained untouched. One PDI-P legislative candidate the author spoke to said, "If I were to display those campaign materials, it would jeopardise my votes". In certain instances, PDI-P's legislative candidates even engaged in quiet campaigns for Prabowo-Gibran.

A different approach was taken towards the Anies-Muhaimin (Team AMIN) camp. Prabowo-Gibran seemingly did not perceive Anies as an obstacle to victory since electability polls consistently indicated that Anies' support did not surpass a quarter of the electorate. Team AMIN primarily drew support from conservative Muslim voters aligned with the Prosperous Justice Party (PKS), part of the Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) base associated with the National Awakening Party (PKB), and NasDem (National Democrats).

In contrast, Ganjar-Mahfud's nationalist and moderate voter segments overlapped with Prabowo-Gibran's. It was thus logical for Prabowo-Gibran and Jokowi to target Ganjar-Mahfud voters, recognising that a combination of votes from their own camp (that is, Golkar, Prabowo's Gerindra, the National Mandate Party (PAN), and the Democrat Party) plus any PDI-P voters they managed to sway would pave their way to the presidential palace.

Examining the Prabowo-Gibran campaign in Central Java, this author believes that Prabowo-Gibran employed strategies reminiscent of Suharto's New Order to secure victory. This included leveraging personal loyalty to Jokowi, elements of the state's bureaucracy, and implementing populist social assistance programmes.

However, the 2024 election has not dismantled the foundations of political parties. Nationally, the distribution of votes among the parties appears to closely mirror that of 2019. Post-election, Prabowo might anticipate that the parties will resume conventional negotiations to reach a new power-sharing agreement. Despite the intense competition, most of the parties will return to a semblance of "business as usual".

[Made Supriatma is a Visiting Fellow in the Indonesia Studies Programme, ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute. Made's research focus is on Indonesian politics, civil-military relations, and ethnic/identity politics and he is also a freelance journalist.]

Source: https://fulcrum.sg/why-ganjar-mahfud-were-beaten-on-their-own-turf-but-pdi-p-survived

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