Organizing a massive movement of people for quite a long period of time with complex human relations and managerial problems, like the 40-day-long Indonesian haj pilgrimage, is indeed not an easy task for the government – in this case the Religious Affairs Ministry.
Add to that minimum transparency and bureaucratic procedures that create loopholes in the haj organization system, the annual Islamic ritual to Mecca, Saudi Arabia, is therefore prone to abuse and corrupt practices by the ministry officials.
It was Busyro Muqoddas who uncovered the alleged misuse of the massive haj fund, accumulated from 1.4 million prospective pilgrims, by the ministry. Addressing a hearing with the House of Representatives' Commission VIII on religious, social and women affairs on Tuesday, the deputy chairman of the Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK) said there were irregularities in the use of interest proceeds worth Rp 1.7 trillion (US$188 million) from the management of the haj fund, which was worth Rp 32 trillion.
The interest proceeds allegedly derive from the deposited funds of numerous pilgrim candidates on the waiting list. "The longer the waiting list, the bigger the chance of misusing the money collected from pilgrims, as it might surpass their actual pilgrim expenses," Busyro told the Commission members.
He added that the anticorruption commission had found that pilgrims had suffered losses from their haj deposits as the Haj Management Agency had eventually refused to refund them for overpaying or to pay the interest generated from pilgrims' initial bank deposits. These funds are believed to be unaccounted for, with no officials ever attempting to clarify where the funds are going.
The revelation by Busyro only confirmed the public perception survey by the KPK last year, which ranked the Religious Affairs Ministry as the most corrupt institution in the country.
Another example of alleged corrupt practices in the haj organization was the unclear distribution of the extra 10,000 seats granted by the Saudi government last year from the original 201,000 seats. Many have alleged that the larger number of the extra seats had been granted to premium haj service participants, instead of the regular ones.
Apart from the haj funds management, the Religious Affairs Ministry has been under severe criticism for its inability to reduce the pilgrimage duration for the regular haj service of 40 days, unlike the private sector-run premium "ONH Plus" haj service which lasts three weeks only. A shorter pilgrimage time would thus reduce the cost of the haj service, particularly the regular one.
It is true that the cost for the premium haj service at least doubles – some even triples – the ordinary haj service. But, it is wrong to say that higher service cost would necessarily mean an efficient and effective haj service. The problem apparently rests with the management of pilgrims' transportation to and from Saudi Arabia's entry point of Jeddah airport.
It is obvious that Indonesia, despite sending the largest number of pilgrims annually, has been treated equally with other countries which send much smaller numbers of pilgrims – each country is allocated one slot at the Jeddah airport. It remains unclear whether Indonesia has negotiated for one or more extra slots with the Saudi authorities in order to help smooth the flow of our massive number of pilgrims and thus reduce their length of stay in the kingdom, which in the end would reduce the overall cost of the haj.
The problems surrounding the haj management are obvious. And the recipes to tackle the chronic problems are equally observable. The question now is the willingness to settle them.