Michael Vatikiotis – A suicide bomber attacks a church in Solo, a homemade bomb is found near another church in Ambon, more bombs are hurled at police posts in South Sulawesi and two men are stabbed to death in Jakarta in an apparent intra-communal slaying. It's been a violent week in Indonesia, a country not generally known for its addiction to guns or affliction with goons, unlike some neighboring countries where daily violence is endemic.

What worries many observers is that much of this violence is deliberately engineered, often as a tool of political machination. In a country as diverse as Indonesia, manipulation of ethnic or religious differences is all too easily the resort of those with huge ambition but little imagination or patience. Why bother to win votes honestly when you can intimidate people into supporting you so easily? Sadly, this recalls the cynical manipulation of social forces by colonial rulers – divide and rule.

The weakest aspect of Indonesia's remarkable democratic transition since 1998 has been its inability to prevent the rise of extremist elements bent on undermining the generally tolerant nature of Indonesian society.

Often this has been interpreted as a sign of growing prejudice and the inability of Indonesians to coexist in peace. However, while there is no doubt that marginal elements in society are inclined toward intolerance and are ready to commit acts of violence, it would seem that they also need the encouragement and resources to operate. The question is, what forces in the Indonesian political spectrum are irresponsible enough to fuel this kind of madness, and why can't anyone stop them?

Part of the answer is that democracy is hard work, and Indonesia's politicians are a lazy lot. It costs a lot to organize and win elections across the sprawling archipelago. Political parties demand huge up-front payments from candidates before they allow them to run under their banners. Shortcuts are attractive because they burn less money, and fear and intimidation have always been relatively cheap and effective political tools. In the mid-1960s fear and intimidation destroyed the largest mass-based communist party in Asia after China. There was no need for politicians to persuade people with policy platforms and rhetoric; it took just a few months of bloody violence that remains largely unaccounted for and killed at least half a million people.

Indonesia has advanced in the intervening years. A military that once saw its job as keeping a lid on social mass mobilization has lost its political role and internal security is now a police matter; the network of intelligence operatives who once cultivated religious extremists because they could be deployed usefully against opponents of the state has largely gone.

But sadly old habits die hard. It's all too tempting for politicians to seek advantage from conflict. Why else have vulnerable minorities like the Ahmadis been unable to obtain the protection they are granted under the Constitution? How else could the Islamic Defenders Front (FPI) be allowed to intimidate officials into introducing stringent statutes and bylaws that chip away at Indonesia's pluralistic moorings? Why does the Indonesian Council of Ulema (MUI) have to act to stop men from East Java flocking to lynch Christians in faraway Ambon?

To be sure the government is quick to condemn violence and act against it. But often missing is a firm restatement of the constitutional rights of minorities. All too often Indonesians are urged to respect the majority, which is not comforting if you are a Christian, or a minority Muslim sect. The reason for this meekness is that politicians fear upsetting their base.

The debate about how to resolve these issues mostly revolves around reinforcing the mechanisms of pluralism. There's the need for better education, more responsible guidelines for preachers and the like. But perhaps there's nothing all that wrong with Indonesian society, and the solution is to fix the politics. For how else could the failure to sanction those responsible for fueling communal violence be explained, other than as a failure of political leadership?

There's nothing all that wrong with Indonesian society. Indonesians know who they are and have a much greater sense of national self-awareness and identity than many people in the region. Sadly, they are poorly served by their politicians, who have largely failed to build responsible political parties and sensible policy platforms. The truth is that it's a lot easier to win votes on the margins of society than cultivate the middle ground. Freaks and fanatics are cheaper to fund and have more impact than well-organized networks of party workers and proper branch offices.

As bombings and mob violence continue to plague Indonesia, it is important to renew and reinforce political reform efforts so that politicians fully understand and serve the Constitution they have pledged to uphold.

[Michael Vatikiotis is Asia regional director at the Henry Dunant Center for Humanitarian Dialogue in Singapore.]