Rizal Sukma, Jakarta – On Sunday, Oct. 5, the Indonesian Military (TNI) celebrated its 63rd anniversary, although its official commemoration will be held on Oct. 14 in Surabaya.

For the greater part of its history – when it was still called ABRI (Armed Forces the Republic of Indonesia) under Soeharto's 32-year reign – the TNI functioned more as a political than a defense force. It has only been over the past 10 years that the TNI has finally tried to reform and become a professional military.

The move toward military reform started with the collapse of the New Order's authoritarian rule in May 1998. Demands by pro-democracy forces at that time forced the military to issue its own internal guidelines for reform on the same year.

Indonesia began a long and arduous process of military reform. Now, after 10 years, it is time to reflect on the issue.

In the first stage of military reform, there have been many significant progresses. For one, the main demand of reformasi – that the military relinquish its dwifungsi (dual function) role – has been fulfilled. The TNI today is hardly a national political force. Reserved seats in parliament for TNI representatives have been scrapped, all socio-political offices within the TNI have been liquidated, its involvement in practical politics has been terminated, the appointment of a civilian as the minister of defense has become an established practice acceptable to top military brass and the democratic control of the military through civilian oversight by the parliament has been put in place.

The two defense-related laws, No. 3/2002 on State Defense and No. 34/2004 on TNI, might not be perfect, but they do provide a strong basis for the emergence of a professional military within a democratic order and for the implementation of a civilian supremacy principle.

With such progress, we can say that the first generation of military reform – the disengagement of the military from politics – is almost complete. True, some generals do still have a habit of making public political statements and judgments.

There are still many scholars and civilians who tend to glorify and exaggerate the role of the military in politics. For example, these civilians still fantasize that it is only a matter of time before the TNI intervenes again in politics if the civilian government continues to be weak.

There is no denying, however, that there is still some unfinished business. There is still the ongoing problem of military justice. For example, the revision of the military tribunal law – which will allow civilian courts to try soldiers involved in nonmilitary offenses – has not been completed and the culture of impunity remains a serious problem. Moreover, the government has not yet officially taken over military businesses as mandated by Law No. 24/2004. But we can expect that these two problems will be resolved early in 2009.

The problem really lies in the second generation of reform.

First, there is still the problem of developing a defense posture enabling the TNI to undertake its main function: external defense. For this, a minimum deterrence capability is imperative, and that could start with the commitment to fill the gap between the minimum essential force and defense requirements. In the long run, if we are really serious about implementing the layered defense strategy, the plan to rebuild a TNI capable of deterring foreign military intrusion and infiltration from our territory has to be in place.

Second, there is the problem of defining the appropriate missions for the TNI to carry out within the next five to 10 years. Here, considering the challenges and threats facing Indonesia over the next 10 years, the defense development should enable the TNI to carry out at least four key missions: stability support operations, maritime security, humanitarian and emergency relief operations and peacekeeping operations.

Third, the state is still struggling to find ways to compensate its soldiers properly and decently. We cannot expect soldiers to perform professionally with a payment of around Rp 1.5 million a month (US$160). The problem of welfare needs to be given priority in future defense planning.

Fourth, discipline still needs serious attention. There have been too many cases where soldiers get involved in physical clashes with police personnel. Education and training should ensure that soldiers uphold military codes and ethics more firmly.

If the government can focus on these items, then the TNI could be proud as a professional defense force capable of defending the nation and its people through modern fighting capability based on technology and modern strategy, not through the mobilization of civilians for a people's war.