Ignas Kleden, Jakarta – A political party is there, first of all, to transpose the needs and aspirations of its constituents into a political program. This is a minimum rationale for its existence.
How this transposition is done depends to a large extent on the way a political party understands itself: What it actually is and what it should be like. You may call it party ideology, but if the term is not convenient, call it party platform.
For most of the 34 political parties that have been verified by the National Election Commission (KPU) and the four political parties that became eligible through their appeal to the Administrative Court, the platform still is a serious problem. If we test them by asking probing questions, it is very likely we will only receive indistinctive answers that will hardly enable us to guess which party one belongs to.
Ask them what is their official stand on matters pertaining to market economy, globalization, minority groups, women's political participation, corruption and social justice, environmental depreciation, educational reform, inter-ethnic conflicts, territorial and social integration and parliamentary or presidential system – and you will receive answers which might be very general at best and very vague at worst.
The lack of a clear party platform has resulted in at least two situations.
First, a party member can easily quit his or her party and join another party without much conflict. It does not matter if someone changes his/her party membership, because there are no basic differences between parties in terms of their platforms.
Second, a party can easily change its coalition ally to help a candidate win an executive position. In a direct election of a regent/mayor or governor, the coalition building is very fluid. Party A, for example, joins party B in the election at the district level, but this coalition can change in the election of a governor at the provincial level.
If we ask the said parties why they changed their coalition the answer is that what matters for them is primarily the prospect of a winning candidate. If Mr X is most likely to win in district D, this owing to the dominant support of party A, parties B or C tend to make a coalition with party A.
In contrast to that, if in province P candidate Y is more likely to win because of strong political support from party S – which happens to be the rival of party A – it is very predictable that party B or C will join party S to help the candidate win hence beating party A – but party A may become their ally at the district level election.
The question may arise as to whether or not there is an ideological conflict in having one party as partner in the coalition at the district level while fighting against this same party at the provincial level. If one poses this question to the parties that are involved in the changing coalitions, one might get an answer that has something to do with two related, but yet different topics.
The first pertains to why a party decides to support a candidate for the position of regent or governor. In the second matter, what are the criteria with which to join another political party in the struggle for a winning candidate?
In reality no serious attention is given to the reasoning for joining one party or another in the effort to help a candidate win. The most decisive consideration seems to be whether or not a candidate has a real opportunity to win. This means a party is more inclined to campaign for a candidate who may win versus working to help their chosen candidate whom they originally believed was the one worthy of their political support.
This is the case with the direct executive election. In the case of legislative elections there are more complications. In the first place the whole election procedure is designed for party election and not for figure election. The campaign is to be conducted by political parties, for political parties.
But now three political parties (National Mandate Party, Golkar and the Democratic Party) have decided to implement majority rule in the sense that people who receive the most votes will win. The question is how should a candidate campaign for himself/herself, while he/she is obliged to campaign for the party?
Besides that, one cannot rule out the party list of candidates, because the KPU will accept only the party list. The trouble is what criteria is used in deciding which names to include on the list? If it is based on numerical or alphabetical order the rank and file will tend to choose the top names.
The second major problem is the number of candidates a party can propose for an electoral district. According to Election Law 10/2008, a party can have up to 120 percent of the seats allocated to an electoral district. If there are 10 seats available, the candidates from all parties for that particular electoral district will be 38 x 12.
For parties that stick to the party list it is easier to select the would-be candidates. For parties that apply majority rule it will become more difficult because the candidates will fight in a double front.
On the one hand they have to fight for the victory of their party over other parties, while at the same time each candidate has to engage in an internal battle within the party to persuade his or her fellow party members.
To make a long story short: The proportional elections should not give leeway to the aspirations of district elections and vice versa, otherwise there will only be unnecessary disorientation.
[The writer, sociologist, is Chairman of Indonesian Community for Democracy (KID).]