Abdul Khalik, Jakarta – While some observers say there has been significant progress in the professionalism of the Indonesian military (TNI), many others think military reform has been too slow and half-hearted in the past decade following the authoritarian era.

The military has been praised for its willingness to formally rid itself of civilian politics by quitting the House of Representatives (DPR) and the People's Consultative Assembly (MPR) in 2004.

The New Order regime allocated 100 House seats for the military in every general election during president Soeharto's 32-year tenure.

The TNI proved its commitment to step away from politics when it mandated that military officers were to resign or retire before running for president, governor, regent or mayor.

Lawmaker Andreas Pareira of the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI-P) said 10 years of military reform had ensured TNI members could not legally participate in civilian politics, as stated in the 2002 law on state defense and the 2004 law on the TNI.

"The regulation clearly shows the military's commitment to stay away from civilian politics. We should acknowledge the TNI's success with its internal reform," said Andreas, a member of the House Commission I on security, defense and foreign affairs.

He said the TNI's decision not to use its members' voting rights in the 2009 general elections was proof of its commitment to quit politics.

The TNI's partition from the police force in 2000 was an additional significant achievement in military-police relations reform. By law, the police force is now responsible for handling internal security while the TNI is authorized to deal with external threats.

However, Andreas and military expert Kusnanto Anggoro of the Centre for Strategic and International Studies agreed reforms in other sectors have been stagnant since 2004.

They pointed out the resolution of military business issues, territorial commands, military tribunal and impunity of soldiers from human rights prosecutions were slow and half-hearted.

Kusnanto said there was discontinuity of reform efforts inside the military itself and civilian figures failed to take initiative by pushing for reform from the outside. civilian can't just sit back and hope the military will carry out the reform. They must take the lead and push for quick reform," he said.

Kusnanto, also a University of Indonesia lecturer, said another factor hindering internal reform was military culture, which had not changed since the fall of Soeharto in 1998.

"They have the same mentality of resisting change and new political conditions. These factors have worked against reformation," he added.

Andreas blamed the TNI's reluctance to hand over its businesses to the government on the insufficient military budget, leaving the TNI unable to procure new equipment and enhance the quality if its services.

"The transfer of military assets to the state has been delayed. We must push for it to go through until it is completed," he said.

After four years of uncertainty, a national team established by the President tried last month to begin transferring TNI business assets to the state, even though some experts dismissed the process as a sham.

Established under a presidential decree, the team of 10 officials and businesspeople has the authority to assess and value all military business assets.

It is to issue recommendations for the President on TNI assets and companies that should be transferred to the state before the deadline on Oct. 16, 2009. "We will wait but we need assurance all revenue from assets will be returned to the soldiers," Kusnanto said.

Currently, the TNI has approximately 398,000 personnel, including the Army, which has 300,000 personnel, the Navy, with 69,000 and the Air Force, with 29,000. However, almost half of them receive a monthly salary ranging from Rp 1 million to Rp 1.5 million (US$110 to $165).

Almost 70 percent of the TNI's annual budget is sourced from its diversified business activities. This year's defense budget is set at Rp 36.4 trillion ($4.04 billion), up from Rp 28 trillion in 2007, Rp 27 trillion in 2006 and Rp 25 trillion in 2005.

Regarding the issue of territorial commands, both Kusnanto and Andreas said their numbers should be reduced or pushed to cover the country's borderlines. The government must immediately start reducing the number of territorial commands as mandated in the 2004 law. The move also depends on the readiness of civilian and local administrations," Kusnanto said.

The Army has been criticized for its spending on territorial commands, which in the past helped the Soeharto regime retain its power for 32 years.

The most sensitive issue regarding military reform is military officers' impunity from past human rights abuses.

Usman Hamid, coordinator of the Commission for Missing Persons and Victims of Violence (Kontras), criticized the government for allowing the military to maintain legal impunity for its officers from past rights violations.

Under the presidencies of Abdurrahman "GusWahid and Megawati Soekarnoputri, two gross human rights cases involving the militarythe 1999 violence in light of the independence vote in East Timor and the 1984 Tanjung Priok massacre – were brought to ad hoc rights tribunals.

However, all the charged civilians and military perpetrators eventually walked free. Former Army generals implicated in the two cases found themselves subsequently promoted to higher ranks.

Also remaining unresolved are many other major cases, including the Trisakti and Semanggi shootings in 1998 and 1999, the Wasior and Wamena clashes and the brutality and sexual abuse against ethnic Chinese women in May 1998.

The National Commission on Human Rights (Komnas HAM) is investigating the 1989 shooting incident in Talangsari village, Lampung province.

However Defense Minister Juwono Sudarsono advised military generals implicated in the case to defy summonses from the Komnas HAM. "I think the only way to solve all these cases is to compromise, find out the truth and focus on restitution for the victims," Kusnanto said.