The International Crisis Group's Southeast Asia project is analyzing recent developments of terrorism in Indonesia, which most recently saw a bomb explosion kill seven people in Central Sulawesi on New Year's Eve. The project's director Sidney Jones outlined conflicts in the area, and offered suggestions for resolving the crisis with The Jakarta Post's Duncan Wilson and Tiarma Siboro.

Question: Why do terrorists seem to target Central Sulawesi?

Answer: Because Poso (the conflict-ridden town in Central Sulawesi), like Ambon, was seen as an area where the conflict produced new recruits for their movement. They think these regions could be developed into a qoidah aminah (secure area) where residents can live by Islamic principles and Islamic law.

But I think also maybe because there are still many unresolved issues about the conflict regarding corruption of funds, distribution of land, and also perhaps, the perpetrators believe they can get away with it.

Do you believe that terror training camps are still active in Sulawesi?

I believe they exist. There may not be formal camps, say with obstacle courses or particular structures, but I'm sure there's still backroom training in somebody's bengkel (garage) or backyard because all you need is space for five people to plan how to make bombs.

Do you agree with accusations of political or military involvement in acts of terror?

Certain local NGOs (non-government organizations) sometimes assert that corrupt politicians may be involved, such as their assertion over the Tentena bombing. But there is no evidence linking acts of violence to corruption, and nor have I seen any hard evidence that links individual members of the military to acts of violence in Poso and Tentena. There are assumptions but there is no evidence.

These assumptions are based on past experiences. For instance, in Ambon in mid-2001 a small group of soldiers from TNI (Indonesian Military) provided basic military training to Laskar Jihad, a Java-based fundamentalist militia, and supplied them with modern weapons. And when Poso erupted in 1998 the initial outbreak of violence involved political interests.

So for some locals, earlier corruption-related violence feeds into these theories of military or political responsibility for acts of terrorism. But these assertions are often unable to be followed logically, and have not yet been backed by any hard evidence.

There have been concerns over the questionable acquittals and inadequate sentences dispensed by the judicial system. Has this improved?

There was a kind of culture of impunity in Poso and Maluku from 1999 to 2003, in which perpetrators of violence went unpunished or received only light sentences. Just as the government has assigned a special police team to Poso they should also install a team of prosecutors to put together decent cases that carry relevant evidence. For instance, in the current trial regarding the 2004 killing of the prosecutor, the judge was presented with three 'witnesses' who had nothing to do with the case. What does that say about the ability of the prosecution? You can also get sympathetic sentences from judges that think the terrorist law and the American led 'war on terror' has been politically motivated. If they were sentenced under (regular) criminal charges they would get heavier sentences.

So what is the way forward to peace in Indonesia and success against terror groups?

If politicians are serious in understanding terrorism and why it occurs, they will find there is no silver bullet. We need better coordination between intelligence agencies to prevent attacks and serious punishments for serious crimes.

We need to treat acts of violence linked to jihadist groups as serious crimes, to be treated as such: by putting top level officers and prosecutors into it and ensuring that you have a good, impartial judicial system. Understanding the local differences and motivations in terrorism is also critical.

And while I believe that people should get sentences proportional to the severity of their acts of violence, once they have served their time there should be rehabilitative and social programs that ensure these ex-combatants and imprisoned mujahidin do not rejoin former networks.

While I've spoken of Indonesia's 'new breed' of terrorist as fresh, battle-hardened and well-connected, I think that many of the local mujahiddin, who fought in Poso for example, suffered losses to themselves or their families from the conflict. They're not ideologues in the sense that others are ideologues. There is more of a likelihood that they can be integrated back into the community. It could also help to address broader justice issues. Perhaps such a range of approaches could begin a way forward, to peace for Indonesia.