Gary LaMoshi, Denpasar – History will judge the cataclysmic earthquake and tsunami that devastated Aceh last month as the defining event of Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono's first 100 days as Indonesia's president. That verdict reflects not just the enormous proportions of this tragedy that likely killed more than 200,000 Indonesians and uprooted millions; it underscores the inability of Indonesia's first directly elected president to exploit his popular mandate to turn the political tide.
To paraphrase US President George W Bush after his re-election, Yudhoyono accumulated political capital with his landslide win at the polls, but he has shown little inclination to spend it. Rather than earning interest, that capital dwindles as Yudhoyono fails to face down foes his victory supposedly vanquished.
At first Yudhoyono pledged to attack a number of Indonesia's most pressing problems in his first 100 days, including corruption, terrorism, and the hangover from the 1997 economic tsunami: slow growth, unemployment and low foreign investment. That pledge was quickly scaled back to having ministers formulate plans to address those problems. The December 26 catastrophe overwhelmed those plans and most other initiatives.
Business as usual
Since the tsunami, the government has rightly focused on relief and reconstruction in Aceh province. That focus excuses the president from delivering on promises for his first three months in office. But even before the tragedy, Yudhoyono's government didn't produce the promised "shock treatment" for the economy or other signature proposals, taking a business-as-usual approach.
Despite the symbolic importance of his democratic election, Yudhoyono and his vice president, businessman Jusuf Kalla, weren't destined to bring revolutionary change. Both were ranking ministers in the cabinet of president Megawati Sukarnoputri, and Yudhoyono also served in the cabinet of another former president, Abdurrahman Wahid. The retired general's rise to the top circle of the military came under disgraced former president Suharto's authoritarian New Order.
Yudhoyono's cabinet choices in October reflected his new team's establishment pedigree and the customary political balancing – even though Yudhoyono came to power in opposition to the major parties and largely free of political debts – rather than a clean break with the past. Notably, he didn't reach outside the system to distinguished academics or reformers that would signal, and perhaps produce, significant change.
Yudhoyono has tried to change the presidential tone, from the regal detachment of his predecessor Megawati to a more engaged style. The tsunami struck while Yudhoyono was spending Christmas with victims of an earlier earthquake in Papua. He has visited Aceh repeatedly since its devastation. He has frequently pledged to crack down on corruption, vowing he'll personally lead the fight against the leading scourge of Indonesia's economy and democracy. At a summit on infrastructure development last week offering US$22.5 billion in projects to private investors, Yudhoyono promised representatives of 500 companies from around the globe "a new partnership" with the government to ensure adequate returns, fair administration and legal certainty.
Words, not deeds
But the president's deeds haven't begun to live up to his words. After his assurances on infrastructure projects last week, this week Yudhoyono himself reportedly vetoed a proposed settlement of the government's long-running dispute with Mexican cement multinational Cemex, one of the few foreign investors brave enough to take a chance on Indonesia in 1998. The new government had prioritized settling the four-year dispute over Cemex's option to buy a controlling stake in Semen Gresik during its first 100 days, one of the few goals it is aimed to meet. Opposition to the settlement comes from entrenched Semen Gresik management and their local political backers who hope to keep milking the state-owned company. Instead of facing down these decidedly minor-league foes, Yudhoyono chose to let the dispute fester, leaving Indonesia vulnerable to a potential $500 million judgment and sending a far more costly signal to foreign capital.
On corruption, there's been one high-profile arrest, ironically of the governor of Aceh, and some rumblings about new investigations. But there has been no plan for meaningful progress to change the culture of corruption. In addition to stricter law enforcement, fighting corruption in Indonesia requires legislation to criminalize common practices that would be considered conflicts of interest in other countries, such as officials and their families doing business with the government. It also requires overhauling the judicial system, where prosecutors and judges too often respond to the highest bidder.
There have been public relations slip-ups, too. Yudhoyono first promised then backed away from an independent investigation of the murder of human-rights activist Munir Said Thalib, a campaigner against military and police abuses who died on a flight from Jakarta to Amsterdam on national carrier Garuda in September. The massive amount of arsenic in Munir's stomach indicated he was poisoned on board. The murder is a chilling reminder of the New Order and its lingering power. As a compromise, an independent body is overseeing the police investigation that's in its fourth month with no apparent progress.
The toll in Aceh
Declaring a March 26 deadline for foreign troops on humanitarian missions to leave Aceh became an international PR fiasco, painting Indonesians as a bunch of xenophobic ingrates, even after the deadline was softened to a target. If Yudhoyono wanted to suggest that overseas forces leave by that date, he could have couched it as a test for the Indonesian army, Tentara Nasional Indonesia or TNI, to be ready to assume the foreigners' duties. That would have been better international diplomacy, but more risky at home.
TNI pride is still smarting from its lackluster initial response to the disaster, which may have reflected large-scale, undisclosed losses among its forces. Openly challenging Indonesia's armed forces to replace foreign troops within three months might have offended TNI, already wounded by the influx of foreigners it had previously barred from Aceh while waging a sometimes dirty war against separatist Free Aceh Movement (GAM) forces in the province.
The military has tried to reclaim face by claiming that GAM poses a threat to aid workers and journalists to justify travel restrictions as well as continuing military operations against the rebels, even though GAM declared a unilateral ceasefire. Yudhoyono, a leading actor in the last serious Aceh peace initiative in 2003, has backed new peace talks with GAM to clarify the ceasefire and perhaps discuss a wider settlement. If talks scheduled for this weekend in Helsinki, Finland, succeed and Yudhoyono can bring the military on board, that could be a major success for the president. Similarly, if relief and reconstruction of Aceh are seen as free of corruption, as well as political and military meddling, that will show things have changed.
No fear of Yudhoyono
Unfortunately, there's no evidence that Yudhoyono has the clout to impose his will on key government institutions. Maybe that's a result of his election without major political party backing. Maybe it's a product of reformasi diminishing the powers of the presidency. Or maybe it's a function of Yudhoyono's renowned caution. Despite her public aloofness, former president Megawati was a bare-knuckled political infighter with a troop of feared hatchet men. Whatever the case, it's clear that no one is afraid of Yudhoyono.
Insiders say that ministers regularly announce policies without presidential approval, confident Yudhoyono won't dare contradict them. (The Aceh withdrawal deadline may have been an example.) Even before Yudhoyono took office, defeated political parties announced an opposition coalition seeking to block his legislative initiatives. That coalition dissolved in December when Vice President Kalla unseated Akbar Tanjung as chairman of Golkar, the largest party in the legislature and the former ruling vehicle of Suharto's New Order that still harbors many of its acolytes.
Even this apparent triumph for Yudhoyono may wind up as a defeat. Kalla's victory brought political capital to him, but not necessarily to the administration. It's yet to be seen how Kalla will use his power over legislators and the party, because the tsunami hit barely a week after his Golkar win. But the vice president's staff has been slapped twice this month for overstepping its bounds and issuing orders to the government on presidential matters. Yudhoyono publicly criticized the Aceh relief effort under Kalla's command. Rivalries within the cabinet are nothing new for Indonesia, even at the highest levels – Megawati was a hostile vice president under Wahid, whom she eventually replaced. Voters may have hoped for something different and better from Yudhoyono's administration, but it's unlikely that they'll get it.
Yudhoyono brings to mind John Goodman or Gene Hackman, competent players capable of outstanding performances. But these fine actors are miscast as leading men. The good news for Yudhoyono is that after 100 days, he has more than 1,800 left to repaint this picture.
[Gary LaMoshi has worked as a broadcast producer and print journalist in the US and Asia. Longtime editor of investor rights advocate eRaider.com, he's also a contributor to Slate and Salon.com.]