Damien Kingsbury, Melbourne – Since Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono assumed the presidency, there has been growing talk about the possibility of moving towards a resolution of the conflict in Aceh. Susilo said it was a goal of his presidency to find peace in Aceh, even if his initial proposal of the Free Aceh Movement effectively surrendering was not a meaningful contribution.

But there is a glimmer of hope for peace. To be realized, it will take real negotiations and real compromise on both sides. And both the Tentara Nasional Aceh (TNA), or GAM army, the Indonesian military (TNI), will have be brought fully under the control of their respective civilian leadership.

While there is talk about the need to find peace, there has been no contact between the two sides since the declaration of martial law in May 2003. What there has been, however, is attempts by the Indonesian government to stifle the capacity of the GAM leadership and its advisers.

Apart from the continued jailing of the GAM negotiating team, this tactic has effectively failed, with the Swedish courts saying there was insufficient evidence to convict the GAM leadership living in Sweden of criminal behavior.

The listing of advisers, too, with Interpol, on charges on alleged gun-running, has made little impact. Some travel has been restricted, but global communications are such that these limitations are effectively meaningless. As for the gun-running charges, they are serious, but in this case being unconnected to reality, make the Indonesian government look desperate, rather than in control.

What the Indonesian government also seems not to realize is that opposition to Jakarta's authority in Aceh is not just from a handful of men in Stockholm and misguided idealists in Aceh. It is keenly felt by an overwhelming majority of Acehnese.

This explains why, although GAM has suffered some losses over the past 18 months, it has been able to draw on a large reservoir of volunteers waiting to step up and fight. Martial law might have been intended to crush GAM, but as many predicted, it has not significantly diminished GAM's military capacity, and has only hardened the resolve of Aceh's population against the TNI and the government it represents.

So, too, with the leadership in Stockholm. When they were arrested earlier this year, the military leadership of GAM simply regarded this as a further possible loss in a wider battle. As with losses in the field, there was – and remains – a plan in place to elect a new political leadership. On this, the Indonesian government is probably better off negotiating with the political leadership it knows, rather than finding itself facing a new, unknown and potentially more hostile leadership.

Now, trapped by the TNI-backed demands that GAM fighters surrender and accept special autonomy as a precursor to peace, the Indonesian government has imposed preconditions that make peace talks impossible. GAM similarly had an extensive list of preconditions, many of which the Indonesian government would have found difficult to accept.

However, GAM has now dropped its preconditions, recognizing that its claims will have to be negotiated. This is, after all, what talks are meant to be about. It is time for the Indonesian government to also drop its preconditions, and to enter a genuinely open dialogue in good faith.

Given the recent distance between the two sides, there will probably need to be unofficial, second track diplomacy to arrange mutually acceptable circumstances for renewing talks. That is, first contact will probably have to be between parties representing either side but in an unofficial capacity. It should be noted here that the breakaway Majelis Pemerintah-GAM or government selected NGOs would not qualify in this capacity.

The next step is to find an external mediator. The Japanese government would seem to be best placed for this, although others such as the Norwegian or Canadian governments would also be suitably neutral.

If it is possible to construct an open, unconditional forum for talks, the first item to be considered will have to be a truce, leading to conditions that will allow a more regularized ceasefire. In this, there will have to be considerable good will, and recognition of where both sides previously erred, which caused the previous Cessation of Hostilities Agreement to be undermined.

If a ceasefire can be established, this will then have to become regularized, so that conditions of trust can be firmly established to allow talks about moving towards more concrete steps towards peace.

TNI demands that GAM surrender its weapons, as opposed to place them in cantonment, are unlikely to produce results. Similarly, completely removing the TNI from Aceh is also not likely, at least in the short to medium term. However, a "return to barracks" for both sides could provide space for genuine dialogue about a political solution.

Realistically, even if it started now, the time-frame for such a process will be years, not months. And even beginning to talk about final solutions at this stage will do nothing but undermine the first, tentative steps. One must learn to walk before on can run.

In this process, even if all that is achieved is a ceasefire that can be held in place over the longer term, that alone must be seen as a positive outcome. And if it can allow the rebuilding of trust, which is now in such short supply, then it may be that a solution to the Aceh problem is eventually possible.

[The writer is senior lecturer in international development at Deakin University, Melbourne.]