Kusnanto Anggoro, Jakarta – There are quite a few positive sides to the territorial structure of the Indonesian Military (TNI), as ID Nugroho and Netty Dharma Somba wrote in this newspaper on August 6.
True, on the positive side, an example can be made of how the presence of the TNI throughout the country can contribute positively to the lives of locals. One should not dispute that besides monitoring borders with neighboring countries, TNI personnel may be tasked with providing health services, teaching and other services for local residents.
Nevertheless, it should be clear from the very beginning that the primary role of the military can only be for waging war, in which the military may fulfill combat, intelligence or territorial responsibilities.
The last two are meant only to strengthen the combat capability of the military. The territorial function, in this regard, has little to do with the community, other than, perhaps, providing military training to reservists.
The positive sides of the territorial structure that Nugroho and Netty identified are part of the secondary role of the military. These roles include stability operations, humanitarian assistance, search and rescue, and other services to the community.
None of these strengthen the combat capability of the military and, more importantly, fall into the category of support to civilian government.
It is important to note that territorial structure must not be confused with territorial functions. The territorial structure relates to modes of force deployment, command organization and logistical support that enables the TNI to perform its military tasks, such as successful military operations. The military regional command is just one of the possible structures in defending state territory and sovereignty as well as safeguarding the nation.
Geographic realities, threat assessment and technology are factors that must be taken into account in designing the nerve and bone of future territorial structure.
Meanwhile, territorial functions relate to the preparation and use of national wealth as defense resources and, in the end, of course, military assets (such as soldiers, weaponry and logistics).
One cannot have a successful military operation without the support of good roads, airports and sea ports and patriotic citizens. However, the military institutions should have no direct control over any of these.
It is the role of civilian institutions to transform a reasonable part of national resources into defense resources, and finally into military resources. In this context, the Department of Defense should decide how much, when, and where defense resources be developed from national resources.
The role of the armed forces in this context is limited to making recommendations to the minister of defense on required capability.
The territorial function, as we know it today, has less to do with territorial structure. The military will still be able to conduct its secondary role, even if the government opts to transform the existing territorial command into a different (territorial) structure.
At the same time, an abusive territorial function of the military may still prevail unless we have clear regulations on how, when and where to use the military.
As I mentioned in a discourse (The Jakarta Post August 6), the TNI bill provides no significant foundation to develop a professional armed force.
The absence of a strategic defense review, lack of authority for the defense ministry and a rigid orthodoxy in the current military leadership may even hamper enhancement of the military's competence.
As a legal instrument, the bill fails to clarify the unresolved complexity that emerges from MPR Decree No. VII/2000 and the defense bill.
More importantly, formulations of "territorial functions" as a role of the armed forces stem from an erroneous conception. Article 8, for example, considers such a function a distinct task, alongside military operations for war and military operations other than war.
The article reflects not only a misconception about the primary and secondary roles, but also mixes up the roles and tasks of the military.
It is just like a journalist saying that his role is reporting, writing and interviewing.
The "territorial function" should be part of either "operations for war" or "other than war". Within the context of "operation for war", the territorial function could be derived into more specific tasks and there is a possibility for the military to use local potential to strengthen its combat and intelligence capability.
Nevertheless, this "military-related territorial function" would still require authorization from the government.
Within the context of military operations "other than war", tasks of the military may include fighting armed insurgencies and separatists, combating terrorism, rescuing noncombatants from war zones, supporting civilian agencies in the "war on drugs," rendering humanitarian assistance, as well as disaster relief, peacekeeping operations and a myriad other tasks.
The essence of this is that support relates to "nonmilitary-related" territorial function. The problem is that there is no clue what the bill means by "territorial function".
Other regulations do not help. MPR Decree No. VI/2000 (Article 4) and the Defense Act 2002 (Article 10C) includes civic mission, support to the police forces and civilian government, search and rescue and humanitarian assistance.
These are erroneous classifications. It would be a lot simpler to define it either as a supporting task for stability, humanitarian and welfare objectives; or for civilian government, police and community; or other more clearly defined categories.
In such an erroneous category, the use of "civic mission" may remind people of a meddling role of the military in the everyday lives of the people.
Indeed, the bill does acknowledge that the military can engage in territorial functions on the call of civilian institutions.
Unfortunately, the regulations are insufficient to place this function under democratic civilian control. Relations between military institutions and civilian institutions, including the police forces, remain problematic. Basically, the military retains its privilege and remains independent of democratic control. In any event, the secondary role of the military must not undermine the capacity of either the civilian or military institutions. It should not contradict democracy and security.
The military argues that civilians should no longer worry about the military's involvement in politics. Nevertheless, disciplinary measures remain a serious problem in the military.
One must be cautious in transforming the territorial command. We may not be able to do so unless the government is prepared to allocate more to defense. Nevertheless, we can abolish the territorial function without much damage to the operational capability of the military. With better planning, abolishing the territorial function would improve force structure.
Part of the routine budget could be reallocated to development and maintenance and/or be redistributed within the routine budget to provide a better salary for soldiers.
[The writer is a senior researcher at the Centre for Strategic and International Studies and a lecturer in the postgraduate studies program, University of Indonesia, Jakarta. The suggestions and thoughts of Ponny Retno Astuti on this article are greatly appreciated.]