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DPD set to play important role in political system

Source
Jakarta Post - March 10, 2004

Anton Doni, Jakarta Post – Sarwono Kusumaatmadja, who served as minister and secretary-general of the then ruling party Golkar, during the Soeharto era, was very confident that the new Regional Representatives Council (DPD) would play key role in the country's political system despite its weak legal position.

Sarwono, who is still highly regarded by the public despite his role during the Soeharto era, argues that the fact that DPD members are directly elected by the people and their independence from political parties will give them strong legitimacy and greater freedom in serving the public.

Sarwono himself will run as one of Jakarta's 38 candidates. Each of the country's 32 provinces will have four DPD members. Very few, at least for the moment, agree with Sarwono's optimism.

The People's Consultative Assembly (MPR) – with the full endorsement of the major political parties – in its annual session in 2002 made a historic decision through the passing of the fourth amendment to the 1945 Constitution by bowing to the public demand for a direct presidential election. Starting this year, in July the country will hold its first direct presidential election.

The Assembly also changed the composition of the Assembly which previously comprised the members of the House of Representatives (DPR) and the appointed Assembly members. The appointed MPR members will now be replaced by the Regional Representatives Council (DPD). The new system will take effect after the legislative elections on April 5. The major political parties, however, only halfheartedly supported the establishment of the DPD and over-jealously attempted to restrict its powers and functions. Its membership must not exceed one third of the total membership of the House (550 members), and all provinces are to be represented by an equal number of DPD members.

According to Article 22D of the fourth amendment to the Constitution, the Council has the right to propose and discuss with the House bills on regional autonomy, central-local government relations, the formation, expansion and merging of regions, natural resources management, and inter-governmental fiscal balance.

The Council, however, is only allowed to put forward opinions and considerations in the case of bills on the state budget, taxation, education and religion.

But despite the perceived limited role provided by the legal framework as mentioned above, it is important to note the hidden significance and powers of this new institution.

One aspect is related to long-term prospect. With equal representation for all regions within this body – each province has four representatives regardless of the size of the province – we may hope that this will compensate for the imbalanced representation of the regions within the House.

This means that while its position in relation to the DPR and other state institutions is weak for the moment and a proper role is still something that will have to be struggled for, early work by this Council in alleviating the representation balance problem could be quite significant.

The results of these early exercises will be capable of highlighting to the public the differences in performance between directly elected representatives (DPD) and the "indirectly selected" DPR members (political parties still have the final say on the members of the House). A good performance by the DPD will help to convince the public that the direct selection of legislators is much better than using the current system.

In the short run, the Council's significance will lie in its providing a bridge between the people, or at least their constituencies, and the government. As the Council members do not have links to the political parties, they will be much freer than the House members in voicing the wishes of the public.

Another significance corresponds precisely to the limited role of this institution. This limited role implies there will be a lack of equality with the executive in the policy-making processes. The DPD has none of the privileges enjoyed by the DPR in summoning officials of the executive, for instance.

On the one hand, this is a weakness, but from another perspective it could be considered positive in the sense that it could prevent the DPD members from becoming involved in horse-trading and corruption. Thus, they will be able to work more consistently in serving the public interest.

Considering the significance of the DPD as described above, there are various reasons for strengthening this institution.

Several measures may be considered, taking into account the DPD's current weaknesses.

The first is establishing full access to information. As mentioned, the DPD has limited powers to acquire information from the executive. The DPD itself, however, could also create its own ways to obtain information from the government.

The second measure involves opening up more access to the media. The DPD's limited role can be compensated for by forging good relations with the media to get public support.

The third involves capacity building. The Council's members should be supported by experts as House members are.

Fourth, to support its long-run legitimacy, a code of conduct needs to be instituted right from the very start. A violation of the code of conduct should be followed by expulsion or censure in accordance with the set procedures.

In addition, the code of conduct should include measurable standards of accountability to constituents so as to ensure that this institution always remains close to the real owners of power – the people.

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