The International Crisis Group has warned that Indonesia could face long term threats from militants, not so much from Jemaah Islamiyah ... but from smaller groups with links to the more militant al-Qaeda. One of the groups is the Mujahidin KOMPAK, formed in 1999 by J-I leaders who were unhappy with the group's slow and bureaucratic response to conflicts within Indonesia.

Presenter/Interviewer: Kanaha Sabapathy Speakers: Sidney Jones, Indonesia director of the International Crisis Group

Jones: It's not that Mujahidin KOMPAK has as much expertise as JI, is as well organised as JI or has the length of experience the JI does, but it's just that these people can be more hotheaded, more likely perhaps to be inspired by Fatwa from Osama bin Laden and therefore could under certain circumstances be extremely dangerous.

Sabapathy: To what extent would a group like this work against the greater ideals of the JI, which is to establish perhaps an Islamic nation in Indonesia?

Jones: The difference is one of strategy and tactics. I think Jemaah Islamiah has a very long term strategy, one person told us that they have a 25-year timeframe and want to build up the capacity of the organisation through religious outreach to get to that point where they can establish an Islamic state. The men who join Mujahidin KOMPAK for the most part wanted very quick results, and they weren't prepared to wait 25 years to use the skills that they got, they wanted to go to war immediately, they wanted to use their new skills immediately, and that again can be potentially dangerous.

Sabapathy: Mujahidin KOMPAK is a splinter of the JI. Is it the only splinter group or are there other fissures within the JI?

Jones: Yes there are many different kinds of fissures within Jemaah Islamiah. The two biggest ones being between those who look to Al Qaeda for inspiration and for Fatwa or religious ruling, and what we think is the majority faction, which believes that only Fatwa decreed by people already within JI should serve as the guidelines for that organisation, much more inwardly focussed, much more focussed on establishing an Islamic state in Indonesia. And that faction believes that efforts like Hambali and the Bali bombers actually undermine their long term strategy.

Sabapathy: Given the fact that the pro-Al Qaeda faction within the JI is small, what kind of threat does it pose both to Indonesia and to the region?

Jones: Well we know that there are a handful of top leaders of that faction who are still at large, and they include both the kind of master technicians, such as Dr Adhari from Malaysia, Noordeen Mohammed Taab also a Malaysian, as well as some of the people like Zulkarnain who was the top military leader of Jemaah Islamiah. These people are dangerous, there's no question about that but there are not very many of them who remain at large. If they can be caught then we believe that the immediate threat of another kind of Marriott or Bali bombing could substantially ease. But we think that people do need to pay attention to some of these other smaller groups that are not Jemaah Islamiah, because even if JI were to disappear tomorrow there would be still other groups that had military training in Afghanistan and Mindanao and were also committed to a radical Jihadist vision.

Sabapathy: And do we have names for these groups?

Jones: Yes there are a number of them, there's Wahdah Islamiah in South Sulawesi, there's Bulan Sabit Merah or Red Crescent in West Java, there are several offshoots of the Darul Islam, organisation that was active in the 50s and 60s and so on. I don't think we know how many of these groups exist but there are a number of them.

Sabapathy: And who actually is supporting these groups?

Jones: [It's] Not clear where their funds are coming from but I think it's important to realise that it doesn't take very much money to keep an organisation like this alive, they don't need outside funding. You can raise some funds from local supporters including local business partners.