The candidacy of three daughters of founding President Sukarno in the upcoming 2004 general elections has opened up new potential for a test of the loyalty of nationalist voters and possible scenarios concerning the ability of President Megawati Sukarnoputri and her Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI-P) to retain power.

The success of two other of Sukarno's daughters in winning the right to participate in the general elections has apparently upset some nationalist elements within PDI-P.

These elements are not so concerned that Megawati might fail to be elected for a second term, but that she might regain the presidency with a new range of supporters.

In theory, the Pioneer Party (Partai Pelopor) led by Megawati's sister Rachmawati and the Marhaenisme Indonesian Nationalist Party (PNI Marhaenisme) led by her third sister, Sukmawati, are potential contenders for Megawati, especially in dividing PDI-P grassroots support in its traditional heartland, especially Java and Bali.

Here, the reputation of Sukarno and his family is still popular in the hearts and minds of the population. Groups dissatisfied with PDI-P but who remain loyal to the Sukarno name can be expected to throw their support behind the two new parties that carry on the father's nationalist legacy.

The worst case scenario for Megawati would be to see the nationalist vote split in such a way that PDI-P would fail to gain the 20% necessary to nominate a presidential candidate in its own right. This would require PDI-P to seek a coalition to put her name forward once more.

Cornelis Lay, a member of Megawati's "think tank" and close to her husband, Taufik Kiemas, says a coalition would depend on a union of "groups that are now divided by their perception of Sukarno's teachings, ranging from the conservative as represented by Rachmawati's party to the less radical supporters represented by the PDI-P."

This is not a situation that Cornelis Lay and others who have little grassroots support among the nationalist camp would be happy with, since it would challenge their positions of power.

Seen from another perspective, the division of the nationalist supporters represented by the new parties led by Sukarno's daughters and the Freedom Bull National Party (Partai Nasional Banteng Kemerdekaan/PNBK) led by former Megawati aide Eros Djarot represents an opportunity for reformist elements within PDI-P to significantly reduce the power of Taufik Kiemas and Theo Syafei within the party.

These pro-reform elements within PDI-P, such as deputy secretary general Pramono Anung and businessman Arifin Panigoro, who have no traditional and emotional ties to the party as it exists today, would see a coalition of nationalist parties as a political breakthrough.

A coalition could be used as the momentum for re-directing the party towards attention to the aspirations of the middle class and lower income groups. This natural constituency of the party has largely been neglected since PDI-P came to power.

The requirement for a coalition to put Megawati forward once more as a candidate also presents the opportunity for the creation of a long-term political alliance beyond the conventional political streams of nationalism and Islam.

In such a scenario, a coalition could bridge the traditional Islam-Nationalist divide and center on reformists versus pro-status quo groups.

Recent polls have underlined that Megawati, as the daughter of Sukarno, remains a popular figure in a number of rural areas and regions, but that this popularity is not shared by PDI-P.

This could mean that PDI-P would become a small party in parliament but that Megawati, through a coalition, could still win the presidency.

If, on the other hand, PDI-P does relatively well in the polls, winning over 20% of the vote, she would not require a coalition to be nominated, ironically leaving the present set of backers in power within the party and crushing the hopes of the pro-reform groups. This would make Megawati the prisoner of her own success.

Given Megawati's failure to forge a coalition in the 1999 presidential election at the People's Consultative Assembly (MPR), it remains possible that PDI-P could fail to win the 20% required to nominate her and that she would retire in a fit of pique and refuse to consider a coalition. This would allow new political forces to come to power, potentially Suharto-era groupings determined to restate a tough hand on government.

In the coming months, supporters of the new nationalist parties will need to prove themselves as legitimate contenders to Megawati and PDI-P in representing the nationalist cause.

Both Rachmawati and Sukmawati can depend on a certain level of support as members of Sukarno's family, but it is unlikely that they will be able to compete strongly against their older sister, who after all defied Suharto openly while they say quietly in the wings.

Neither of the two younger sisters has much political experience, and are not believed to be adept at creating coalitions, particularly outside of the nationalist camp.

Both tend to be exclusivist, preferring interact only with people from the nationalist camps, and this is expected to make it difficult for both to even open communication with non-nationalist parties, let alone form coalitions with them.

At the PNBK, Eros Djarot is a far more skilled political operator. He has a wide network of relationships from his own world of the arts and within the media and is expected to be a far more fluid player in opening lines of communication with other parties such as the National Mandate Party (PAN) of Amien Rais, the National Awakening Party (PKB) of Abdurrahman Wahid or the Justice Welfare Party (PKS) of Hidayat Nur Wahid.

Djarot's PNBK, however, is very much a party of urban intellectuals, and it is likely to have little appeal to the lower classes, especially in rural areas.

Overall, Megawati remains the candidate to beat, but, as in 1999, the conclusion has to be that the election is not only hers to win, but also to lose if she fails to play her cards right.