Former Armed Forces Commander Wiranto has re-stated his determination to run for the presidency.

Speaking at the launch of his biography, (Testimony in the Middle of the Storm) in Solo on Friday, Wiranto urged his audience not to take wild chances in electing a new president.

"Learning from our previous presidents, if someone wants to be a president, it must not be based on the spirit of trial and error. The consequences would be fatal," he said.

"That would mean," he added, "that kind of president has sacrificed the people as the victims of an experiment, whether deliberately or not. What we need at the moment is a president who is resolute, whether civilian or military. He must be capable of implementing the law as the supreme commander."

Wiranto, who is bidding for the nomination from Golkar Party, went on to suggest that a candidate with a military background would more suitably fulfill this criteria.

"The fact that someone with a military background can be resolute in his attitude is because, from early education up to retirement as a military officer, he has become used to discipline and is resolute in taking decisions," said the one-time adjutant to former President Suharto who rose to become Armed Forces Commander.

Wiranto also warned Golkar that it must be fair and honest in its upcoming national convention, or risk further undermining its Golkar.

Once seen as the crown prince to Suharto, Wiranto had reason to be disappointed not because of the downfall of his patron from the presidency, but because of the way in which Suharto left power on 21 May 2002.

After the killing of four students on 12 May 1998, mass riots broke out across the country, making it clear that old dictator's hold on power was weakening as public resentment grew.

An acute struggle for power among the inner circle around Suharto took place behind the scenes. The main players were Wiranto, then Armed Forces Commander, then Vice President B.J. Habibie and the then Commander of the Army Strategic Reserve Command (Kostrad), Prabowo Subianto.

The army of the day was split by tension. On one side were those who were dubbed the green generals, officers who had close contacts with Islamic organizations and who were advocates of a greater role for Islam and the Muslim community in political life. The group was led by Prabowo, R. Hartono and Feisal Tanjung.

The other military faction, the red and white or "nationalist" officers, were led by Wiranto, former Defense Minister Edi Sudrajat, and Bambang Yudhoyono.

Essentially, the green versus red and white split reflected the personal rivalry between the palace generals, centered on Wiranto and Prabowo.

It was no secret that Wiranto and Prabowo disliked each other, and the quick rise of Prabowo had rankled fellow officers. He was given the important command post of Kostrad at the tender age of 47, without having had to serve as commander of a territorial unit.

During the crucial period between 13 May and 21 May, events transpired that suited neither of these two prominent generals.

At first sight, the green generals should have been happy, along with the Islamic organizations. Vice President Habibie, a prominent figure in Islamic politics through his leadership of the Indonesian Islamic Intellectuals Association (ICMI) took over the presidency.

Wiranto, who had every reason to consider himself Suharto's crown prince, was less than happy with the rise of Habibie. Wiranto and the anti-Habibie faction fought hard to retain Suharto as president, with the establishment of a Reform Council to silence the critics of the government, and a reshuffled cabinet.

The agenda behind his maneuver was clear. Suharto was to be gradually crippled by the Reform Council as a countervailing cabinet, allowing Suharto finally to be deposed through an extraordinary session of the Peoples Consultative Assembly (MPR), fully controlled by the Wiranto faction.

Muslim forces and other right wing groups linked to Habibie tried to scotch this plan through extra-parliamentary demonstrations and maneuvers within parliament led by Speaker Harmoko.

On the morning of 19 May, a meeting of the chairmen of parliament and the leaders of the parties, spoke out in favor of Suharto's resignation. Even in the afternoon of 18 May, after having to deal with protesting students and numerous delegation for eight hours, the five chairmen of parliament such as; made up their mind that the president had to be asked to resign.

The leadership of parliament – Harmoko, Abdul Gafur, Syarwan Hamid, Ismail Hasan Metareum and Fatimah Achmad – asked for an audience with Suharto after midday on 19 May.

Faced with the constitutional legitimacy of Habibie as the legal replacement for Suharto, Wiranto launched a counter move, saying that Harmoko's comment that it was time for Suharto to go was a private statement and therefore not legally binding.

Wiranto pointed out that only a decision by a plenary session of parliament would be properly valid. As an alternative, Wiranto suggested the formation of a Reform Council made up of representatives of the government, academics, and prominent critics.

Analysts saw the move as an attempt by Wiranto to co-opt prominent political figures such as Abdurrahman Wahid, Nurcholish Madjid and Megawati Sukarnoputri, under the umbrella of the Reform Council.

On 17 May, Muslim scholar Nurcholish Madjid offered a way out of the crisis that suited the military. It was also felt that Suharto would be open to a meeting to discuss the initiative.

Madjid's plan was for Suharto to announce that he would resign in a peaceful and constitutional way as soon as possible, and that in the meantime he would replace those cabinet ministers who were opposed to reforms.

Madjid's scheme was an attempt to undermine the chances of promoting Habibie as Suharto's automatic successor, a gambit that appealed to Wiranto and his faction.

On 18 May, at the instigation of the then Armed Forces Chief of Staff for Political and Social Affairs Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, Madjid passed the text of his proposal to Secretary of State Saadilah Mursyid, who in turn presented it to Suharto, who subsequently approved Madjid's scheme.

Suharto then held a meeting with eight prominent religious leaders and his speech writer, Yusril Ihza Mahendra. Among the religious leaders were Malik Fajar of Muhammadiyah, Ali Yafie of the Council of Ulama (MUI), Achmad Bagja and Ma'aruf Amin of Nahdlatul Ulama, Kholil Baidowi of Muslim Indonesia, Nurcholish Madjid and Emha Ainun Nadjib.

But instead of gaining strong public sympathy, Suhartos's acceptance of gradual change led to much larger demonstrations across the country.

Wiranto, who had initially supported the setting up of a Reform Council as a block to Habibie, changed his mind when he saw the clear majority of parliamentary members speak out in favor of an extraordinary session of the MPR.

This indicated to Wiranto that the parliament wanted to force Suharto and Habibie to resign together. With a Reform Council no longer of value to him, Wiranto withdrew his support for Suharto.

On the evening of 20 May, a meeting attended by Ginandjar Kartasasmita and 14 ministers in the economic, financial and industrial sectors moved to issue a statement informing Suharto that they would refuse a seat in the Reform Cabinet.

Faced with betrayal from his closest aides, Suharto decided to resign. Ginandjar and his faction then joined forces with Wiranto in bargaining with the Habibie faction over the shape of the post-Suharto era.

In the Habibie cabinet installed on 22 May, Wiranto became Armed Forces Commander and Defense Minister.

The relationship between Wiranto and Habibie was a love-hate one. They did not come from the same group but both needed the other. In the end, their alliance lasted until October 1999, when Habibie's accountability speech was rejected by a majority of members of the MPR.

Golkar had lost relevance, having pushed for the continuation of Habibie as president. Wiranto saw this as the momentum to play king maker.

With the support of Golkar, Wiranto was nominated as a replacement candidate by all parties, and opened up the bargaining with Megawati, the presidential candidate of the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI-P).

Wiranto's supporters saw him as having all of the three criteria required to be the president of Indonesia: he was a Muslim, Javanese, and a military officer.

In July 1999, a month after Megawati and her party won the general election by gaining 34% of the vote, Wiranto held a "commander's call" of his loyal generals at military headquarters in Jakarta to discuss the upcoming presidential election. They agreed that Megawati should be elected President and that Wiranto should run the government from behind the scenes as Vice President.

But to virtually everyone's surprise, moderate Muslim cleric Abdurrahman Wahid, leader of the 40 million-strong Nahdlatul Ulama, was elected President, defeating Megawati by a narrow margin. Faced with such an unpredictable development, Wiranto had no choice but to attempt to remove Megawati from the race for the VP position so that he could exert control over the new government under Wahid.

Wahid was smart enough not to give space for maneuver to such a dangerous political player as Wiranto. Shortly before the vote began in parliament, Wahid convinced Wiranto to drop out of the race so that the pro-Megawati riots would stop. In return, he promised Wiranto a powerful position in the cabinet.

In November 1999, Wiranto was named Coordinating Minister for Political and Security Affairs, previously a largely ceremonial post, but now with authority to act as quasi prime minister.

In December 1999, a commission of inquiry set up by the National Commission on Human Rights reached the conclusion that Wiranto was responsible for the September bloodbath in East Timor.

Wahid, who had previously given Wiranto the benefit of the doubt, began to perceive the general as a war criminal. Wahid told Wiranto to submit to a war crimes tribunal in Indonesia or else prepare himself to be sent to Geneva or the Hague for a UN tribunal on crimes against humanity. The general refused both options.

This situation gave Wahid the momentum to reshuffle the military, replacing generals identified as Wiranto supporters. In January 2000, Wahid ordered Armed Forces Commander Admiral Widodo to discharge Wiranto from military service.

In a show of strength, Wahid left for Davos, Switzerland, on a 16-day visit to Europe and the Middle East, leaving Megawati in charge of the government. From Davos, Wahid demanded Wiranto's resignation from the Cabinet.

Wiranto refused to step down, telling reporters outside a Cabinet meeting run by Megawati on 2 February that he wanted to meet Wahid after his return to Jakarta in mid-February.

On 13 February 2000, Wiranto was made non-active in cabinet, and replaced by an interim Coordinating Minister for Political and Security Affairs.