While reports from the battle for the governor's position in Central Java naturally tended to focus on the "split" in the ranks of President Megawati Sukarnoputri's Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI-P), a more interesting struggle was submerged as the losers burned portraits of the President and party leader in the streets of Semarang.
The election of the governor Thursday saw the return of incumbent retired Maj. Gen. Mardiyanto accompanied by Ali Mufiz, with PDI-P supported by the National Awakening Party (PKB).
The most prominent loser was Mardijo, chairman of the Central Java chapter until he was sacked for insisting on pushing his own nomination in defiance of the party central board decision to back the incumbent once more.
The result, however, showed that it was another retired major general, Slamet Kirbiantoro, who was the most serious contender to beat. Mardiyanto won with 62 of the 100 votes in the provincial assembly, while Kirbiantoro, a former Jakarta Regional Military Commander, came in with 22. Mardijo, who initially caused concern to the PDIP central executive board by threatening to split the party vote asunder, finally was able to mobilize only 8 PDI-P members and three additional votes for his nomination.
Analysis of the poll suggests that Mardijo's main mission was to create a split in the Central Java PDI-P ranks in order to leave the field open for Kirbiantoro. Mardiyanto and Kirbiantoro are classmates, both graduates of the Armed Forces Academy in 1970, but their political orientations are distant indeed.
Kirbiantoro was supported by the United Development Party (PPP) and the National Mandate Party (PAN). Assuming that the PPP-PAN coalition remained solid until the end, the 22 votes he received consisted of 12 votes from PPP, seven from PAN and an additional three from Golkar members.
The 62 votes received by Mardiyanto consisted of 34 from PDI-P, 16 from PKB, 10 from the military-police faction and an additional two votes from other parties, probably from Golkar deserters.
Mardijo's plan was to split the PDI-P vote and take 18 of its members into his camp, leaving Mardiyanto able to mobilize only 24 or 25 votes.
If this situation had occurred, Mardiyanto would have been in danger. The coalition with PKB would have gained just 41 votes. This would have given Mardijo and his faction a strong bargaining position against Kirbiantoro, who could rely only on a definite 22 votes from PPP and PAN.
Such a situation would have put Golkar and the military-police factions in the role of kingmaker.
While the latter would have toed whatever line Armed Forces headquarters laid down, Golkar would have been a more wily player.
Assuming that Golkar threw its support behind Kirbiantoro's camp, he would have won with 52 votes, even if the military-police faction had voted with PDI-P.
This scenario did not work out. A PDI-P source told Laksamana.Net that the covert operation was anticipated by Megawati's camp.
The mainstream party cause was assisted by the dispatch of a high-level team to Semarang and Solo. The team soon discovered that the pro-Mardijo group carried little weight.
Until the D-day of the race, solid supporters of Mardijo numbered just eight persons. The central executive board team easily persuaded the remaining 34 party delegates to support the duet of Mardiyanto-Ali Mufiz.
There is little doubt that the arrival of the heavyweight PDI- players helped to swing the tide. Figures such as deputy secretary general Pramono Anung are not lightly defied.
"The willingness of Pramono Anung to get involved in the PDI-P internal split must be read as a clear sign that Megawati was all out for Mardiyanto. Pramono is known as a party figure who is reluctant to get involved in party internal conflicts, " PDI-P functionary Dhea Perkasa Yudha told Laksamana.Net on Thursday (24/7/03).
That Megawati saw Kirbiantoro as a significant threat is clear from the retired officer's track record. Before taking over as Jakarta Regional Military Commander in August 2000 during the Abdurrahman Wahid presidency, Kirbiantoro was a member of the People's Consultative Assembly (MPR) under the Suharto regime in the period 1993-1997.
From 1999 until his new assignment in Jakarta, Kirbiantoro was the Sulawesi-based Wirabuana Regional Military Commander.
During this time, communal violence between Muslim-Christian militias in Poso, Central Sulawesi, entered a crucial phase. Despite his unclear role in the increasing communal violence, his authority as the highest military authority at regional level was exposed to special scrutiny.
When Kirbiantoro was replaced as Jakarta Regional Military Commander in January 2001, then Army Chief of Staff Gen. Endriartono Sutarto gave mixed signals in his statement regarding the replacement by former Central Java Military Commander Bibit Waluyo.
Sutarto did not deny the growing speculation that the replacement of Kirbiantoro was closely connected with his failure to prevent a series of bombings and security disturbances in Jakarta. Sutarto underlined that the appointment of Bibit Waluyo was linked to the need to anticipate the social-political situation in the Jakarta.
As the center of national activities, Sutarto added, any disturbances in Jakarta had impact both nationally and internationally. This statement implicitly blamed Kirbiantoro for being at least as incompetent in handling the security threat in Jakarta.
During his brief term, Jakarta was hit by a series of blasts including the Christmas Eve bombings of December 2000.
Kirbiantoro served only six months in the Jakarta posdt before being appointed deputy inspector general at the military headquarters.
The appointments of Bibit Waluyo and later of Ryamizard Ryacudu as Commander of the Army Strategic Reserve (Kostrad) were interpreted at the time as representing a deal between then President Wahid and former Armed Forces Commander Wiranto to depose generals close to Megawati.
This interpretation was based on the assumption, since proved incorrect, that then Army Chief of Staff Endriartono Sutarto, Kostrad Commander Ryamizard Ryacudu and Waluyo were protigis of Wiranto.
In practice, at least Sutarto and Ryacudu were relatively independent of Wiranto, although they had previously owed him allegiance as the highest military authority under President Suharto until the dictator's downfall on 21 May 1998.
Their relatively independent stance suggests, in retrospect, that Sutarto, Ryacudu and Waluyo, now the Kostrad Commander, are more professional and less political as military figures.
As time passed and Megawati became president, Sutarto and Ryacudu have been increasingly seen as military professionals committed to the military chain of command and hierarchy under the president as the highest civilian authority.
Given the background to the nomination of Kirbiantoro, it is hardly surprising that the military-police faction were instructed to throw their votes behind Mardiyanto.
In Megawati's mind, going along with the military mainstream and its more professional track record, has meant that figures such as Mardiyanto, Imam Utomo in East Java and Sutiyoso in Jakarta carry far less risk than to take a chance with other figures who might harbor a hidden political agenda.