[The following is a by Jeffrey Winters, Northwestern University, via Joyo Indonesia News Service.]

I would like to offer the following observations:

1. Party loyalty remains relatively weak in Indonesia. The electorate is fluid partly because the parties themselves have not achieved Definition (ideology, clear statement of principles, promises about the future), Motivation (linking party support to expected or actual change/benefit for supporters), and Participation (mobilization, activism, grassroots engagement). Most parties have not even tried to make progress toward greater DMP.

2. As the number of parties proliferates, all existing major parties have fragmented (either openly or just below the surface). For this reason all of the major parties are weaker and in greater disarray. This is a common phenomenon when parties lack ideological definition. Parties operate mainly as shells for grabbing power. Fights among party elites are almost exclusively about dividing the spoils and about personalities (egos, jealousies, and personal loyalties).

3. As of January 2003, indications are that all the major parties will receive a smaller percentage than they did in 1999. PDI-P is split and Megawati's performance has been poor. She can no longer campaign credibly as a reformist. She has completely ignored the 27 July emotional base/strength of her party and embraced the New Order bureaucracy and the TNI (both utterly unreformed). For those who really believed in the P for "perjuangan," alienation runs deep. The PDIP still has its core nationalist base, but it could see a drop of 10 percentage points. Golkar is also split, Akbar Tanjung is a convicted criminal (under appeal), and the party will not have the 1999 advantage of being in power and using dirty money again to run the election. Golkar could see a 5-8 point drop in 2004. PKB also split while its leading figure, Gus Dur, is perceived as having been an ineffective president. PKB could lose 2-4 percentage points. PAN also split and the party has lost its image as a broad-umbrella party and is now more narrowly Islamist (A.M. Fatwa, etc). Amien Rais, who cannot shake the image of being an inconsistent opportunist and has no mass base across the country, has likely peaked politically at his position of Speaker of the MPR (and he won't get it again). He will not be able to be kingmaker in 2004 as he was in 1999 with the Poros Tengah because PKB-Gus Dur was the real key to that alliance. PAN won only a small percentage of the vote in the last election and can expect to get even less in 2004. PPP also split, though this is offset slightly by having Hamzah Haz in the VP seat. If Haz runs for president it will be against Megawati and thus against his own government and role in it. Haz has very few ideas, and the ones he has take the country nowhere. PPP could lose 2-4 percentage points in 2004.

4. Estimated conservatively, between 20-30% of the vote that went to these major parties in 1999 is now free-floating and available to be grabbed. A key question is whether a single new emerging political force could grab it (Eros Djarot's PNBK, which has been gaining momentum fast?), or whether existing parties that had a weak showing in 1999 will do better (Partai Keadilan, for instance, could see its support base double or even triple in 2004). If the free-floating segment of the electorate gets divided in dozens of different directions, its impact on the big parties will obviously be less significant.

5. The key to grabbing the votes the major parties will lose in 2004 is having a genuine alternative available that the people can support with enthusiasm based on the DMP factors mentioned above. Money politics will not be enough to hold it together. Only a strong and inspiring (and genuinely reformist) political message/movement can serve as the glue to hold the pieces solid. This will not be easy given current levels of cynicism about "reformasi."

Concluding Remarks: Polling Center Indonesia (PCI), one of the few professional companies assessing public opinion in Indonesia, has done surveys showing that 67.3% of people believe the Government could not eliminate corruption and 59.5% did not believe it could create jobs. This is a resounding vote of no-confidence.

PCI's survey in August 2002 showed that only 58% of people who voted for PDI-P in 1999 were certain they would do so again in 2004. The figures for the other parties were even lower: PAN (53), Golkar (52), PPP (48), PKB (40), and PBB (29). This reflects a deep sentiment of dissatisfaction with the performance of all the parties.

In the same survey, only 38% of voters said they would "definitely" choose the same party in 2004 as in 1999. 10% said they would not vote, 34% responded that they were undecided (floating), and a full 18% said they would "definitely" not choose the same party that they did on 1999. These figures represent a massive degree of fluidity.

Feelings of dissatisfaction regarding the current government under President Megawati (PDI-P) are growing. In January 2003 there are already signs that opposition is mobilizing and the criticisms are mounting. PDI-P's single claim to legitimacy in the last election was the promise that corruption would be cleaned up. This has not happened. On the contrary, the public perception is spreading that the system has corrupted the PDI-P leadership rather than the PDI-P leadership coming in and cleaning up the system. In the rough-and-tumble politics of Indonesia, it does not matter whether these perceptions are backed up by facts and evidence. It is a dramatic reversal of fortunes for the PDI-P that the allegations are being made at all and that they are sticking and growing stronger.

Throughout most of 2002, the dominant view was that Megawati was assured a second term until 2009. The October 2002 Bali explosion marked the turning point (both domestically and internationally). Since then her government has been on a slide. As of January 2003, there are no longer any assurances that Megawati will win a second term. This perception is growing even within the PDI-P itself. Watch for a last minute attempt by the PDI-P in the August 2003 MPR session to block direct elections of the president.