The disclosure in the Herald this week of highly classified Defence Signals Directorate intercepts gathered during the 1999 East Timor crisis has, understandably, raised concerns within the Government that vital "sources and methods" of intelligence may be compromised. However, equally concerning is the Australian Government's concealment of evidence pointing to the higher level of responsibility in the Indonesian military for the serious crimes against humanity in East Timor, previously blamed on "rogue elements". Such concerns are clearly shared by members of the defence community, as the unprecedented leaking of contemporary, "raw" DSD intercepts attests.

While the Indonesian military may respond to the disclosure with measures to increase its communications security, and making the job of DSD more difficult, the benefits of disclosing this crucial evidence must be considered. The intercepts detail the command structure, objective and the methods of the Indonesian military's proxy campaign to retain territorial control of a restive East Timor. This unsuccessful campaign, using local armed militia groups, caused widespread damage, death and disruption. The legal accounting for these crimes is yet to take place. The Indonesian trials, which began this week, so far include a limited number of suspects.

The senior officers among the accused are charged with the lesser offences of failure to control their subordinates. The DSD intercepts, however, outline a much more direct and sinister role in orchestrating the violence by these and other senior military officers, who remain untouched. Indeed, several of these officers have since been promoted into important positions. This failure of accountability is not just Indonesia's, but also that of the international community which has left Jakarta to try its own. It is still just possible that the provision of this Australian intelligence material may persuade Indonesian prosecutors to widen the scope of their trials. It should also refocus the attention of the United Nations on the possibility of an international war crimes tribunal should Jakarta fail to punish those who planned and controlled the operation. It would also be useful to consider the possibility that Australia's broader political objectives could be advanced with the use of these intercepts. The exposure of such a high-level conspiracy within the Indonesian armed forces could assist Indonesia's own efforts to reform the military and to exclude corrupted officers from senior positions. This may contribute more to Australia's long-term security than the preservation, in the short term, of intelligence assets.