John McBeth, Jakarta – The Indonesian military is in a sorry state at a bad time. Many of its aircraft can't take to the skies, most of its ships are stuck in port and spare parts and technical assistance are hard to find. Poor logistics and maintenance only add to the catalogue of problems.
When George W. Bush won the United States presidency, many Indonesian generals thought it would only be a short time before Washington lifted its embargo on the sale of US military spare parts and got their relationship back on track.
Not any more. What they failed to take into account was the influence of Congress, which severed military links with Indonesia over the 1999 sacking of East Timor and still doesn't think Jakarta has done enough to atone for its sins.
The embargo highlights a serious problem – one lost in the cheering for the military's partial retreat from politics. The paucity of spare parts and dwindling budgets that eat into operations and training have sharply reduced the military's abilities. This raises questions about the effectiveness of the military in fighting separatists.
Externally, while Indonesia may not have foreign enemies, the draining of military power comes at a time when tensions between the US and China threaten to re-ignite their rivalry in the South China Sea. Former Defence Minister Juwono Sudarsono estimates the navy is only at 30% readiness, unable to afford to put most of its frigates and destroyers to sea.
Air force commander Air Chief Marshal Hanafie Asnan paints an equally grim picture, with pilots failing to log minimum flying hours and the air-defence system incapable of dealing with what he indicates have been increasing air intrusions by "developed countries."
For all these problems, the US embargo has proved to be a convenient weapon in a popular Indonesian pastime: shifting the blame. Defence Minister Muhammad Mahfud and other senior officials claim a shortage of spare parts for US-built C-130 transport aircraft has hampered their ability to respond across the archipelago.
But annoyed at being made a scapegoat for local shortcomings, US officials say Jakarta knew C-130 parts had been exempted from the embargo as far back as May last year; US Ambassador Robert Gelbard was just unable to arrange a meeting with Asnan until September to make it official. The reason for the delay: Gelbard's feud with Sudarsono – fuelled partly by the Defence Ministry's refusal to give clearance for domestic flights by US embassy aircraft.
To counter the problem of spare parts and technical help, Indonesia has shopped around for other suppliers. Israel, for example, has talked to Jakarta about refurbishing the 24 C-130s, only eight of which are believed to be operational. Western military sources say that poor record may have less to do with the US embargo and more to do with poor maintenance and logistics.
But external credit restrictions imposed by the Finance Ministry and counter-trade deals with countries such as Russia and South Korea underline that the military's $1.5 billion annual budget only pays for the bare essentials. Ex-minister Sudarsono says 70% of the defence budget is for maintaining equipment, including replacing engines in 12 former East German navy corvettes, and there is a 10-year moratorium on buying major capital equipment.
This year the military and police are only authorized to borrow $150 million, with the air force's share down from $85 million to $50 million. The Finance Ministry pays a small part while Indonesia's weak economy and poor credit rating mean that few vendors or banks are willing to lend the balance. What can be done?
Under the so-called Leahy Amendment, Washington won't resume arms sales and military training until Jakarta cooperates in the investigation and prosecution of military officers and militia leaders responsible for human-rights abuses in East Timor and Indonesia. But despite the establishment of a human-rights tribunal, the Indonesians are still dragging their feet in ways that suggest the military is having an undue influence on events.
Any hope that Congress may back down first on the amendment looks misplaced. Colombia University scholar John Bresnan told a recent security seminar: "American interest in human rights is not so much a hallmark of political policy as it is of a generation. It will be difficult to remove a piece of legislation like the Leahy Amendment." The situation would be made worse should evidence of more human-rights abuses emerge. In fact, lifting the embargo wouldn't do much to help the military overcome funding problems, but diplomats say it would allow US technical teams to offer assistance.
In the meantime, it has been 19 months since the Indonesians last received spare parts for their 10 front-line F-16 fighters and their two other types of US-built combat aircraft – a depleted squadron of Israel-supplied A-4 Skyhawk attack jets and about a dozen vintage F-5 interceptors. The A-4s are near the end of their useful lives and there are similar doubts about how long the F-5s will be in service. The air force acknowledges less than half the F-16s can get in the air at the best of times. How even that happens is a bit of a puzzle.
When Lockheed Martin Corp. left because of the 1999 embargo, maintenance supervisors thought the entire fleet would be grounded in six months. But engineers from the Netherlands-based Daedalus Aviation Services took over and some F-16s still fly – albeit with questions about brake pads and ejection-seat cartridges and rumours of covert spare-parts deals with Jordan and Israel.
That leaves the British Aerospace Hawk as the air force's combat backbone. But despite London lifting its arms embargo in January last year, diplomats say defence sales to Indonesia are considered on a case-by-case basis to ensure that equipment is not used for internal repression. The Foreign Office is currently sitting on a shipment of Hawk spare parts, apparently because of fears that the jets may be used against separatist guerillas in Aceh province.
Only about half of the air force's 36 Hawks are operational. Many of those at three air bases in Java, Sumatra and Kalimantan will soon need an extensive overhaul. Indonesia recently sold six Hawk 53s back to their makers at British Aerospace for $US 26 million ($37 million) of credit – presumably to pay for spare parts and other logistics equipment.
Meanwhile, the US embargo has complicated a $60 million deal for South Korea to supply 23 KT-1 training aircraft to Indonesia – as well as army trucks and a hospital ship. Washington has warned Seoul that seven key US-made components on the trainers need special dispensation. Indonesia recently secured approval to use US parts in eight locally made CN-235 cargo aircraft that it hopes to start delivering to South Korea at the end of this year. A large part of the $140 million for the aircraft has already been paid.
Other recent arms purchases are mostly barter deals for palm oil and other commodities. They include orders for Russian-built Mi-17 helicopters, and reported deliveries of Russian 105-millimetre artillery and Russian, Slovakian and Ukrainian armoured personnel carriers.
The Indonesian police are buying 5,000 Russian rifles, in addition to 4,000 last year. The helicopter deal will complicate logistics for the armed forces, which largely rely on US equipment. It is the first time that Indonesia has bought aircraft from the former Soviet bloc since the 1960s when the air force used mostly Russian hardware. The way that Jakarta's relations with the United States are going, those days could even return.