Barry Wain – The way most reports had it, the Indonesian military ambushed unarmed politicians in the final hours of People's Consultative Assembly deliberations in Jakarta last week. They somehow persuaded or coerced the civilians into agreeing that officers be allowed to sit in the assembly until 2009, instead of 2004. They also inveigled the stunned members to accept a change in the nation's Constitution that will protect the army brass allegedly responsible for atrocities committed last year in East Timor.
Taken together, many commentators said, the measures amount to a major blow to the democratic forces that toppled former President Suharto in 1998 and opened the way for the first free election in more than 40 years. The maneuvering further showed, they said, that the military was trying to stage a comeback after being shunted aside in the running of the country.
But what actually happened, as the annual session of the highest constitutional body closed, wasn't immediately clear. Now that the dust has settled, it is obvious that the military, while trying to protect its interests, has made no attempt to reassert itself nationally. And while the constitutional amendment will make it hard to hold the top generals accountable for the bloodshed in East Timor, it won't prevent the prosecution of those who carried out the killing.
President Abdurrahman Wahid's government, which took over in November, has made a reasonable start in establishing civilian control of the military, known as TNI. In two shuffles of the military leadership and commands, Mr. Wahid has promoted reform-minded officers without provoking serious resistance. As part of its own reform program, the TNI has agreed it won't appoint officers to the national and regional legislatures after 2004, when the next elections are held.
But demilitarizing Indonesian society won't be easy because Mr. Suharto used the TNI as the backbone of his authoritarian regime. Military officers, both active and retired, served as cabinet ministers, provincial governors, district chiefs, bureaucrats in the central and regional administrations, heads of state corporations, supreme court judges and ambassadors. Since early last year, about 4,000 officers have been required to resign from the armed forces if they want to continue holding civilian posts.
Indonesia is undergoing such an upheaval that it is often difficult to know what a single action portends. For example, when Maj. Gen. Agus Wirahadikusumah was removed this month as head of Kostrad, only six months after taking over the army's strategic reserve, some analysts saw it as a blow to reform, since he has been the most outspoken advocate of change in uniform. But contrary to that line of speculation, he was almost certainly ousted because Mr. Wahid came to accept the view of fellow senior officers that Maj. Gen. Agus acted unprofessionally by washing dirty linen in public, while probably harboring political ambitions as well.
In the 700-member People's Consultative Assembly, the contending political factions, none with a firm majority, didn't need to be threatened to show some sympathy for the military. Amidst the uncertainty, they remained acutely aware of the wisdom of not alienating a group that holds 38 seats – down from 75 under Mr. Suharto – notwithstanding their previous demands for an end to the TNI presence by 2004. Members adopted a decree – by the traditional method of consensus without a vote, though a couple of Muslim politicians did protest – stating that the TNI can stay in the assembly until 2009 "at the latest." It is important to note that a decree isn't a law. It can be amended or reversed, logically at next year's session of the assembly. Even as the decree stands, it doesn't say the military must remain for another nine years. Further, no number of seats is specified. "I would expect that there will be a lot of public pressure to reduce the numbers," says Harold Crouch, who represents the Brussels-based International Crisis Group in Indonesia.
More significantly, the role of the TNI wasn't incorporated into the Constitution, as was proposed at one point during assembly committee discussions. That would have given functional groups that don't have the right to vote in general elections or be elected to public office – code for the military and police – ongoing representation in the assembly. Had that clause been inserted into the Constitution, it might have been difficult to remove in future.
The constitutional amendment that raised a ruckus contained a passage on human rights, including the right not to be prosecuted "based on a law that can be applied retroactively." While the concept of retroactivity is lifted from the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and is considered legitimate, it has implications for TNI rampages over the past decade in East Timor, Aceh, and West Papua, formerly known as Irian Jaya.
Some activists immediately interpreted it as blanket immunity for past human rights abuses by the military. But in truth it always has been a crime under Indonesia's Criminal Code to murder, assault, rape, loot and damage property. No new law is needed to prosecute soldiers in the field who physically perpetrated abuses.
However, the amendment may impinge on forthcoming human rights legislation, whose key elements provide for so-called crimes of omission – failure to use authority to prevent the commission of crimes – and for retroactive application in the case of gross abuses. It is these provisions that threatened former TNI commander Gen. Wiranto and other senior officers. So, unless they left a trail of written orders, it seems that they will escape after all, much to the consternation of local and international critics.
The issue of civilian control of the military will be tested with the pending revision of the 1982 law that gives the TNI a social-political, as well as a security, role, according to Marcus Mietzner, an armed forces specialist and researcher. Many civilians and even some senior officers want to eliminate the dual function and turn the TNI into a professional force charged with defending the country from outside aggression, leaving internal security largely to the police. The pace of military reform will depend on how the law is overhauled.
Although the military has accepted a drastic reduction in its political activities, many people suspect it is reluctant to leave the political arena altogether. A draft just produced by the Department of Defense, designed to promote debate, suggests that the discussion is going to be long and difficult. Mr. Mietzner, who has read the paper, says it opens with the provocative statement that the TNI is to remain responsible for defense matters, both external and domestic.