Dili – The Humanitarian Assistance and Emergency Rehabilitation Pillar recently released its three-part assessment of the Consolidated Appeal Process (CAP). The East Timor CAP is a mechanism established in September 1999 to coordinate the overall humanitarian programme of the international community in the territory. In the ideal, the CAP is a process by which international actors involved in humanitarian relief (donors, United Nations agencies, and international non-governmental organizations [INGOs]) plan and prioritize the relief process. Secondarily, the CAP acts as a mechanism to raise funds for UN agencies and, to a much lesser extent, INGOs.
The assessment covers the period from September 1999 through late May 2000. The first part is a self-evaluation by the international humanitarian community present in East Timor. The second phase is an assessment of the humanitarian aid programs as seen by the East Timorese people; the report draws on extensive interviews with aid recipients, CNRT officials, Catholic priests, and national and international NGOs present in the districts of Manatuto and Covalima. The final part is an external evaluation conducted by a team of eight people comprised of individuals who work for (non-East Timorese) national government agencies, independent consultants, and East Timorese development specialists.
As far as the CAP Assessment Steering Committee knows, the review is the first of its scope carried out during the emergency phase of a humanitarian emergency such as that that began in East Timor in September 1999. In this regard, the very existence of the review would seem to indicate an openness to external and self-criticism that is rare. At the same time, the document helps to set a precedent for similar evaluations in future humanitarian emergencies, while providing important lessons for the United Nations and for the humanitarian aid community beyond East Timor.
In general, the assessment found that the humanitarian relief effort was highly successful – despite some shortcomings – in meeting the most urgent needs of the East Timor's population. The UNHCR and their international NGO partners, for example, successfully distributed 250,000 family tarpaulin sheets as emergency shelter. Furthermore, as a result of emergency health activities, no epidemics occurred during the period analyzed. And the timely delivery of food aid helped to prevent a food emergency throughout the territory.
A good deal of the success lies in what the assessment identified as the strong coordination, commitment, and flexibility of the humanitarian community.
The assessment correctly stresses the context in which the humanitarian relief took place. East Timor was a country devastated, with most of its buildings and infrastructure destroyed, the majority of its population displaced, and its administrative apparatus non-existent given the departure of the Indonesian authorities.
Further degradation of roads, bad weather, and some natural disasters have served to aggravate the situation even more. Such difficulties make the many successes of the humanitarian aid effort all the more impressive.
The documents are far too long and detailed to summarize adequately in this brief article. And while the assessment finds much to praise about the humanitarian aid effort, the different parts of the assessment contain explicit and implicit criticisms of the humanitarian aid effort. In the spirit of improving the delivery of human assistance in East Timor and beyond, La'o Hamutuk will highlight some of the more critical points made by the assessment, and offer some comments.
There are, at times, inaccuracies in the assessment. The Phase 1 report incorrectly states, for example, that all district centers – with the exceptions of Oecussi, Gleno, and Ainaro – now have electricity. But a visit by La'o Hamutuk to Suai confirmed that that town as well (as of late June) does not have any electrical power.
The report also highlights the inadequacies in certain areas of the humanitarian effort. Violence by the Indonesian military and its militia in September 1999, for example, resulted in the destruction of an estimated 85-90,000 homes. But logistical problems, labor disputes, and the poor quality of materials and tools purchased by the UNHCR – among other dilemmas – resulted in a very slow start for the shelter program.
At the same time, it appears that the resources provided by the "international community" to UNTAET, various UN agencies, and international NGOs has been insufficient. The UNHCR, for instance, "by far the major supplier of shelter kits," according to Phase I of the report, will provide only 35,000 shelter kits. Although the report estimates that 40-50,000 East Timorese now in West Timor will probably opt not to return, and although a number of international NGOs are also providing full and partial shelter kits, the report admits that there will still be a significant gap in the provision of shelter materials. It is for such reasons that Phase 3 of the assessment calls the shelter program the "most evident shortcoming of the humanitarian response given its delay in limitation and limited coverage." And it is for such reasons that the international NGOs (in Phase 1) recommend the provision of a further 20,000 shelter kits.
At other times, the report fails to link its various findings. The Phase I report, for example, states that 98 percent of primary school children are back in school. It later notes, however, that in many areas of the territory, most school buildings still lack roofing. But it never asks how the lack of roofing would serve to undermine the validity of its earlier claim. On rainy days, a continuing phenomenon on the south coast, children are not able to attend roofless schools. (In some areas, in fact, even a suitable building is lacking. Thus, "school" may take place under a tree.)
In addition, Phase I notes the total lack of any provision by the international community for the care of the mentally ill. As it is beyond the capacity of national and international NGOs, the Catholic Church, and East Timorese society in general to provide adequate care, the report calls upon UNTAET to fill the resulting gap.
Transportation is another area highlighted by the report. But in doing so, the report focuses only on transportation infrastructure, and says nothing about actual means of transportation. In many areas of the country, there is still an almost total lack of local public transportation. Such a lack is not only a reflection of the East Timor's difficult state, but also contributes to it as it inhibits economic recovery. There are rather simple things the international community could do to facilitate local transportation – especially within more urbanized regions. These include the provision of bicycles and bemos; the management of the latter, for example, could be a cooperative economic activity for local organizations.
Regarding the quality of the roads, the report notes that they "have seriously deteriorated since September." The extremely heavy nature of many of the military vehicles now using the roads (which are simply not made to withstand such weight) has only added to their deterioration. Part of the reason for the lack of corrective measures was the lack of UNTAET funds for road repair in the first few months of operation. Even now, however, UNTAET funds are totally inadequate, according to the report, and thus more resources are needed.
Furthermore, it appears that the Peacekeeping Force (PKF) is not as well equipped as was INTERFET to engage in road maintenance and improvements. For the most part, it has been private contractors employed by bilateral aid donors who have been responsible thus far for road repair. Larger-scale road rehabilitation projects funded through the Trust Fund for East Timor (TFET) administered by the World Bank in cooperation with the Asian Development Bank have yet to begin.
For this reason, the TFET has recently come under criticism. As the head of one Australia-based NGO stated, "The World Bank projects have been unbelievably slow in coming through so far." It appears that these problems have been a result of both the slow pace of disbursements into the TFET by donors and of the procedures of the World Bank. According to UNTAET's Donor Coordination Unit, the donor community and the World Bank have now rectified these problems.
The Phase 1 report is very critical at times of the CAP process, and various UN agencies. Many international NGOs, for example, felt that the CAP process was insufficiently transparent. Some were critical of the fact that they had to continuously chase UN agencies for funding, thus undermining the validity of the claim that the relationship between UN agencies and INGOs was one of partnership. At the same, the NGOs expressed concern about the spending priorities of some UN agencies which seemed to put a greater emphasis on costly rehabilitation projects for their offices.
The Phase 2 section, the one based largely on interviews with aid recipients (in Manatuto and Covalima) contains perhaps some of the most important criticisms for the future activities of agencies and organizations involved in humanitarian relief here in East Timor. One of the most significant issues raised was the lack of sufficient communication (which often took the form of misperceptions) between the United Nations system, international aid agencies and the East Timorese people. Unrealized promises made by some of the humanitarian agencies only served to aggravate the resulting tensions. It is for this reason, among others, that the report calls upon UNTAET "to monitor intensely every activity of humanitarian assistance." Amazingly, according to the report, UNTAET did not monitor aid distribution at all (although there were coordination efforts through the Humanitarian Pillar). This contributed to duplication of aid delivery in some areas, while other areas were left lacking.
Phase 3 of the report, the external review, similarly criticized the fact that "no initial framework agreement was established between UN agencies or INGOs working with local NGOs or local institutions to ensure East Timorese participation." As a partial explanation for this problem, the report states that the international community had difficulty identifying legitimate representatives of civil society: Xanana Gusmao and Bishop Belo, for example, were not present during the initial phase of the humanitarian response. Furthermore, the Catholic Church is divided into two dioceses.
How the existence of two administrative districts of the Catholic Church in East Timor would serve to inhibit East Timorese participation, however, is not at all clear. And while Xanana and Bishop Belo might not have been in the territory, they were certainly contactable. Certainly, the chaotic nature of the situation in East Timor in the aftermath of September's violence made effective international-East Timorese collaboration difficult. And the perceived need to deliver aid quickly to avoid disaster would limit opportunities for the time-and labor-intensive process of establishing cooperative links.
At the same time, however, it would seem that the United Nations and many, but certainly not all, international NGOs did not have sufficient knowledge of East Timorese society to know with whom to work, and, perhaps more importantly, simply did not make effective East Timorese participation a priority. (And, arguably, as a result, the ultimate effectiveness of aid delivery suffered.) For such reasons, the report criticizes UNTAET and the international community for their slowness at establishing multi-lingual work environments to facilitate the inclusion of East Timorese in employment opportunities. The assessment seeks to remedy such problems by calling for an "overwhelming commitment" by the humanitarian community and UNTAET to include East Timorese into the decision making process, to facilitate their recruitment [for employment at all levels], [and to] provide adequate training and skills as well as appropriate language courses."
As East Timor transitions from the emergency relief phase of the reconstruction to the development one, the external review (Phase 3) suggests that the UNTAET is ill-prepared. Neither the Humanitarian Assistance and Emergency Relief nor the Government and Political Administration "pillars" of UNTAET, the report states, "have assumed responsibility over an overall transition plan from relief to development." Similarly, the assessment contends that most United Nations agencies have no exit or transition strategy.
As a whole, the East Timor Consolidated Appeal Process Review is a valuable document as an overview and evaluation of humanitarian relief. Again, the report highlights the overall success of the humanitarian relief effort, while containing criticisms aimed at the shortcomings of the international endeavor. In this respect, it also serves as a source of ideas to improve the activities of the international community in East Timor and beyond as they relate to relief and development. Now having done the report, however, the question arises as to how UNTAET, the UN agencies, and the international aid agencies will respond to the concerns and criticisms contained within – especially those relating to the lack of sufficient East Timorese participation.
More narrowly, how will UNTAET help ensure that the problems identified will not re-occur, and how will it facilitate a transition by the international community in East Timor from humanitarian aid to development?
A final note: the Phase 2 portion of the report contends that "militia supported by the Indonesian Military destroyed all social structures, people's livelihoods and the economy." While it may seem like a minor point, it is incorrect to place the blame, first and foremost, on the militia. The militia, after all, were a creation of the Indonesian military. They could not have operated as they did without not only the support of the Indonesian military (TNI), but also with their direction. There is ample evidence to document that the militia were a mere extension of the TNI. Many of the militia members, in fact, were TNI members who simply changed their clothes when working as "militia." Furthermore, numerous eyewitness accounts confirm that uniformed Indonesian soldiers directly participated in much of the horrific violence and destruction carried out in September 1999 and, to the extent that East Timorese militia participated, it was under the direction and with the logistical support of the Indonesian military. After all, how could a band of ill-equipped, poorly-trained militia with little political support carry out a systematic campaign of terror and destruction such as that that took place in September? The fact is that they could not have done so. Let us be clear that the primary responsibility lies with the Indonesian military. This is not a mere academic point. It has important implications for the processes of justice and reconciliation, as well as for the physical reconstruction of the country.