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Centrifugal forces stir in Indonesia

Source
Jane's Intelligence Review - June 1, 2000

Bertil Lintner – Following years of military repression, Indonesia's new president, Abdurrahman Wahid, has adopted a new approach to solving ethnic and religious conflict in the archipelago. He has apologised to the peoples of East Timor, Aceh and West Papua (until recently known as Irian Jaya) for past misdeeds of the army, pledged to withdraw troops and listen to local grievances. He has even promised – albeit in vague terms – to consider autonomy for certain parts of the country and the assurance of a fair share of the natural resources in these areas instead of concentrating all the wealth in the capital, Jakarta.

The removal in February 2000 of former security minister and erstwhile army chief General Wiranto – who has been accused of involvement in the violence that followed last year's referendum for independence in East Timor – has been seen as a conciliatory step, aimed at creating a sense of unity in one of the world's most ethnically diverse countries. Wahid's new order will be based on consensus and democratic values rather than military might.

A Regional Autonomy Bill was passed on 22 April 1999 under the presidency of BJ Habibie, promising more power and government funds to the provinces. Wahid may go even further and create real autonomous provinces, a partial return to the principles under which Indonesia was founded.

'The Republic of the United States of Indonesia' was established as a federation of 15 autonomous states in November 1949. The federal concept was abandoned the following August in favour of a unitary state, which today contains 26 provinces (the 27th province, East Timor, was allowed to secede after last August's referendum). BJ Habibie's predecessor, General Suharto, was a staunch opponent of regional autonomy.

Will the new policies work? Is reconciliation possible after so many years of brutality? Is Wahid's political approach too late, and will Indonesia disintegrate?

Indonesia comprises 13,677 islands, its 210 million people speak over 300 different languages. Their only common history is a Dutch colonial past.

There is concern that the break up of Indonesia would jeopardise stability in the region. Therefore, Japan (whose vital oil supplies from the Middle East pass through Indonesian waters), Australia (the first country likely to be affected by a refugee crisis if Indonesia disintegrates) and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), should do everything they can to prevent disaster.

Despite Indonesia's diversity and shaky foundations, over 50 years of independence has created a sense of nationhood that should not be underestimated. Malay, the trading language of the ports, became the national language (renamed 'Bahasa Indonesia') and has since become the common language of the archipelago.

Cultural affinities also exist between the islands due to centuries of trade, commerce and travel. Nationalism has been almost a state ideology since Indonesia was founded.

There has also been freedom of religion. Indonesia has resisted becoming an Islamic state – despite the fact that 87.2% are Muslims – as it would alienate religious minorities: 6% Protestants; 3.5% Catholics; 2% Hindus; and 1% Buddhists. Nevertheless, separatist movements are, or have been, active in much of the country.

East Timor

East Timor was not part of the original Indonesia. The Indonesian government claimed the territory after the revolution in Portugal in 1974, when its African colonies gained independence.

Portuguese Timor saw the emergence of independence movements, notably Frente Revolucion-ria de Timor Leste Independente (the Revolutionary Front for an Independent East Timor – FRETILIN). Its clear leftist leanings worried Indonesia's then rightist government under General Suharto, as well as the Americans, who in 1975 had seen its allies in Indochina fall to communism.

On 28 November 1975 East Timor was declared an independent 'democratic republic'. Indonesia invaded the territory on 7 December, probably encouraged by the USA. However, the annexation that followed in July 1976 was never recognised by the UN. The East Timor issue remained a problem for Indonesia, internally and internationally, as FRETILIN guerrilla units continued their resistance to the occupation.

The Indonesian Army's brutality in East Timor helped foster a national identity in the territory. Under colonial rule it had been the most neglected part of the Portuguese empire, with 16 different tribal dialects.

The Roman Catholic church became a focal point for the resistance, and a refuge from repression and hardships: 90% of the East Timorese today are Roman Catholics. Tetum, the language of the church, became the territory's lingua franca and a local alternative to Bahasa Indonesia that underlined the separate identity of the East Timorese.

It is unclear why Habibie's government agreed in early 1999 to hold a referendum to decide East Timor's future. Observers believe that he thought it would remove the East Timor issue from the UN's agenda. BJ Habibie, and other civilian and military powerholders in Jakarta, misjudged the level of local discontent with Indonesian rule. Observers at the time speculated that the outcome would be in Indonesia's favour, or perhaps 50-50: the 80% vote for independence shocked Jakarta. Indonesia's leaders also misjudged the sentiments of the international community, which condemned the military action unleashed in East Timor after the vote. Indonesia was on the brink of becoming a pariah state at a time when it badly needed international assistance to help its crisis-ridden economy. It was forced to withdraw its forces and to accept international peacekeepers under a UN mandate.

The long-term implications of the loss of East Timor are difficult to gauge. It may not jeopardise Indonesia's unity as East Timor has always been a separate case. Critics, however, argue that by letting one part of the country go to save the rest, a process of disintegration may be set in motion that the authorities are unable to control.

The violent reaction of the Indonesian military to the outcome of last year's referendum was a clear signal to other provinces that want to break away.

Aceh

On the northern tip of Sumatra, Aceh was the first province to demand a referendum after the vote in East Timor. Last November nearly two million of the province's five million inhabitants rallied for a referendum and an end to military violence, which since 1988 has claimed 30,000 lives, according to the pro-independence movement. Indonesia's National Commission for Human Rights has confirmed 1,021 deaths and 864 disappearances.

Once independent, Aceh was conquered by the Dutch in the late 19th century. Aceh resistance against the Dutch continued and although Indonesia became a unitary state in 1950, Aceh was promised 'special territory status' in 1959. Demands for separation from Indonesia were raised and armed resistance broke out (supported clandestinely in the 1950s by the US CIA). It was not until December 1976 that Hasan di Tiro, a descendant of the old sultans, returned from exile in the USA and declared Aceh an independent state.

In early 1979 di Tiro left Aceh for exile in Sweden; his Aceh-Sumatra National Liberation Front or Gerakan Aceh Merdeka (GAM – Free Aceh Movement) continued the guerrilla campaign from jungle hideouts in the province. In the 1980s an undisclosed number of GAM soldiers (di Tiro claims as many as 3,000) were trained in Libya. That connection now seems to have been severed as the movement is seeking support from the West for an independent Aceh.

Today, Aceh poses the most serious challenge to Indonesia's unity. GAM is stronger and much better armed than any other separatist group in the country. Wealthy Acehnese businessmen in Malaysia and Thailand are said to contribute money to the war effort and modern weapons have been obtained on the black arms market in Southeast Asia.

The GAM is divided into two factions: one led by the now 75-year-old di Tiro, who has ruled out any compromise with Jakarta; the other by the younger Dr Husaini, who is more willing to negotiate with Indonesia.

President Wahid has extended several olive branches to the Aceh militants, offering to negotiate and to investigate human-rights abuses. However, di Tiro has refused. "There'll be no solution until and unless the Javanese occupation army leaves Aceh", he told JIR last July.

Aceh is important to Indonesia. If it broke away, Indonesia would suffer a severe psychological blow.

Also, the province is very rich in oil and gas. Wahid has pledged to allow the province to retain more of the profits from industry, but even that has failed to placate di Tiro and other hard-line independence advocates.

West Papua

The western, Indonesian half of New Guinea comprises 418,000km[2]. Of its 1.8 million people, 50% are indigenous Papuans and 50% Indonesians from other islands. The West Papuans are Melanesians and are composed of about 240 different peoples – each with its own language. Their historical, cultural and social ties with the rest of the country have always been tenuous.

Eastern New Guinea became independent in 1975 as Papua New Guinea, inspiring the western half to also seek independence.

When the Dutch in November 1949 agreed to transfer sovereignty to Sukarno's Indonesian government, it was decided to negotiate the future of western New Guinea the following year. No such negotiations were held. On 1 December 1961, some Papuan leaders declared independence while the territory was still under Dutch rule. The Indonesians then formed a special force, 'the Mandala Command', in January 1962 to 'liberate' the territory. Skirmishes erupted and the crisis was resolved only when the UN convinced the Dutch to negotiate. The outcome was that an interim UN administration took over in August, which led to the territory being turned over to Indonesian sovereignty on 1 May 1963. In 1969, Indonesia's annexation was ratified in an exercise called 'the Act of Free Choice' – a 'referendum' which involved only 1,025 hand-picked Papuans.

West Papua – sparsely populated but by far the largest in Indonesia – was an early destination for the government's 'transmigrasi' programme (people from overpopulated Java were encouraged to migrate to outlying islands). The influx of 'outsiders' caused resentment among the native population and armed resistance began in the mid-1960s. In 1969 the Organisasi Papua Merdeka (the Organisation for Papua's Independence – OPM) was formed to co-ordinate the struggle against Indonesian rule. The response was familiar: military action, arbitrary arrests and disappearances of suspected independence activists. This resulted in even more local discontent.

In 1973 western New Guinea was renamed 'Irian Jaya' – 'the Victorious Irian'. In a conciliatory move, Wahid agreed in January 2000 to change the name of the province to Papua. He also publicly apologised for years of repression and human rights abuses. Wahid's statement came in the wake of massive demonstrations in Jayapura and elsewhere to celebrate the 38th anniversary of the 1961 declaration of independence. Some 800,000 people took part and the OPM's flag was hoisted all over the territory as rival factions of the movement finally agreed to co-operate in the struggle for independence.

The Papuans, who feel much closer to their Melanesian brothers than the Javanese in the east, have appealed to the South Pacific Forum, which groups 16 states (Australia, New Zealand, Papua New Guinea and more than a dozen Pacific islands). In an article published in the December 1999 Suva-based monthly Islands Business, exiled OPM leader Otto Ondawame stated: "We, the West Papuans, hope that one day, we (with the help of the Pacific Islands nations and others) will be able to fly our flag as a member of the South Pacific Forum. All we ask for is the opportunity to determine our own future."

However, Indonesia has strong reasons to retain Papua. The province is rich in timber, copper and gold.

The biggest mine, at Grasberg, is run by Freeport Indonesia, a private company, and is one of the country's most profitable businesses. After smelting, the copper and gold is worth an estimated US$2 billion a year. The 1999 revenues of the mine operator's parent company, the New Orleans-based Freeport McMoRan Copper & Gold Inc., are forecast at $1.6 billion. The Indonesian military still guards the open-cast mine, in which the government has a 9% stake.

The Moluccas (Maluku)

The approximately 1,000 islands of the Moluccas spread across 850,000km[2] – of which only 10% is land - between Sulawesi, Timor and New Guinea. Also known as 'the Spice Islands', they were the first of the present Indonesian islands to attract large numbers of Chinese, Portuguese, British and Dutch merchants.

Before the arrival of the Europeans, most of the Spice Islands were ruled by local rajas, many were Muslim. The Portuguese introduced Catholicism and Dutch rule, which was firmly established in the early 19th century.

Christianity made the Ambonese more loyal colonial subjects than the Muslim Javanese, the majority population in the Dutch East Indies. Thus in 1830, when the Koninklijk Nederlands Indisch Leger (KNIL) or the Royal Netherlands Indies Army was founded, it consisted almost entirely of Ambonese and other Moluccans.

Indonesia's independence was a dilemma for many Moluccans and many feared retribution from the Javanese. In April 1950 local leaders proclaimed the independent 'Republik Maluku Selatan' (the South Moluccan Republic – RMS) comprising Ambon, Seram, Buru and over 100 smaller islands. Armed RMS supporters clashed with Indonesian troops and the conflict became potentially more explosive as the Netherlands began to demobilise the KNIL. It was feared that many Ambonese soldiers would defect to join the RMS. Some 35,000 former KNIL soldiers and their families were evacuated to the Netherlands, believing that the transfer was temporary. However, 50 years on, tens of thousands of people of South Moluccan descent remain in the Netherlands where the independence movement has been kept alive.

In 1966 the Indonesian government executed one of the original founders of the RMS. His followers set fire to the Indonesian embassy in The Hague. Frustrations among the Moluccans in the Netherlands was heightened by two train hi-jackings in the mid- 1970s by young South Moluccans trying to draw attention to their cause.

Nevertheless, peace prevailed on the Moluccan islands – until last year. Bloody clashes erupted between Christians and Muslims throughout the Moluccas and up to 5,000 people were killed. By the end of 1999 the Moluccas were on the verge of civil war. Islamic militants in Jakarta called for a jihad (holy war) to support their Muslim brethren on the islands.

In January 2000 security forces mounted a massive sweep for illegal weapons as reports had reached Jakarta that various armed gangs on the Moluccas had bought guns from East Timor's disgraced, pro-Indonesian militias, which were about to be demobilised. The roots of the conflict in the Moluccas can be traced back to the religious divide on the islands. The situation deteriorated when a Christian, Colonel Dicky Watimena, served as Mayor of the City of Ambon between 1985-91. He subdued areas controlled by Muslim migrants from Sulawesi. This influx of 'new Muslims' from other areas of the archipelago upset the delicate religious balance on some of the Moluccan islands.

The situation was reversed when a Muslim, Mohammad Akib Latuconsina, became governor of the province in 1992. All important positions in the administration, traditionally filled with Christians, were replaced by Muslims. All newcomers were Muslim. Fights among Christian and Muslim youth gangs erupted and within a few years Ambon was ready to explode. Indonesia's economic crisis has made competition for jobs and business opportunities fiercer. Although a semblance of peace and order has returned to the Moluccas, it remains one of Indonesia's potentially most explosive powder kegs. Many Ambonese have revived their dreams of an independent Christian republic.

Riau

In April 1999 1,500 people gathered near Pekanbaru in oil-rich Riau on Sumatra to demand that the government honour a promise to deliver 10% of all oil revenues back to the province. If not, they would fight for independence. Asia's largest oil field, Caltex-operated Minas, is situated in Riau. Together with the nearby Duri field, also operated by Caltex, it represents 15% of Indonesia's revenues. However, local activists claim that the province receives a mere 0.02% of its contributions in return through the national development budget.

Riau has benefited from being included in the so-called Sijori (Singapore-Johore-Riau) 'Growth Triangle'. The boom islands of Batam and Bintan have attracted considerable investment from nearby Singapore.

Demands for separation from Indonesia are new in Riau – a province of three million people – and it is possible that local autonomy and a fairer share of oil profits would pacify local militants. Saleh Djasit, governor of Riau, told Asia Business last June: "Our heart is still in Indonesia. The people just want a better balance of wealth."

Sulawesi and Kalimantan

In early 1999 the Sambas area of West Kalimantan saw some of the country's most vicious ethnic killings in recent years. The conflict did not follow 'normal' ethnic and religious patterns: local Malay Muslims, and indigenous Animist and Christian Dayaks confronted Muslim settlers from the island of Madura off Java.

In West Kalimantan, relative harmony between the Malays and the Dayaks has prevailed for generations. The balance was upset by a massive influx of Madurese, brought to Kalimantan (Borneo) under the transmigrasi programme. The bloody clashes in Sambas were not separatist per se, but could give rise to regionalist sentiments if the rights and needs of the local people are not safeguarded.

Similar problems exist on the nearby island of Sulawesi, with its many different ethnic and religious groups, as well as migrants. Demands for independence have also been heard in parts of the island, which in the late 1950s were drawn into the CIA-sponsored revolt against the then president Sukarno. In 1958 a group of dissident army officers set up the Revolutionary Government of the Republic of Indonesia (PRRI), based in West Sumatra. Munitions and other equipment were air-dropped by Americans based in Thailand, Taiwan and the Philippines. The rebellion was supported by leaders of the Islamic Masyumi party, whose aim was not to break up Indonesia but to oppose Suharto's policy of allying himself with the powerful Indonesian Communist Party, the PKI.

The rebellion on Sumatra and Sulawesi was eventually crushed by the Indonesian Army. However, the defeat of the rebels led to the increased militarisation of some of the outlying islands, which exacerbated local resentment with the central power in Jakarta.

Delicate balance

It is this decades-old resentment that Wahid has to change into a sense of unity under a more democratic leadership. This process, and the re-emergence of various separatist movements, does not have to lead to the disintegration of Indonesia.

It is hoped that attempts at restoring democracy will lead to the decentralisation of politics and administration, privatisation and the deregulation of business.

Wahid's challenge is to find a constitutional framework that does not upset the delicate balance between the centre, and the outlying islands and provinces. If decentralisation is underdone, the separatist sentiment in resource-rich provinces will escalate. If decentralisation is overdone, the central government will lose the ability to smooth revenue differentials across the country and the provincial rich-poor gap will increase.

The other major issue is religion. Wahid's view of tolerant, inclusivist Islam must prevail if Indonesia's religious mosaic is to hold together. If it doesn't, pockets of separatism, especially in the East, will grow.

Wahid must also convince the armed forces to accept a greatly reduced role in politics and society. Whether this means that 'the Republic of the United States of Indonesia' will be restored is too early to say.

Without more power to the provinces, less military action in response to local problems and a willingness by all sides to compromise, Indonesia's unity may be in serious jeopardy.

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