Jean Pierre Catry – UN Secy Gen Kofi Annan and the Portuguese government have done all they can to facilitate the referendum that will decide the future of East Timor on 8 August. Mr Annan will decide if the referendum can go ahead on schedule or must be delayed. The agreement signed in New York on 5 May between Portugal and Indonesia refers to Security Council resolutions 384 and 389 which call for the withdrawal of Indonesian forces. Under the agreement theses same forces – responsible for the deaths of 1/3 of the population – are supposed to guarantee Timorese security.
The purpose of the referendum is to give the Timorese the chance to say whether they want the Indonesians to stay or go. It is to take place without the prior withdrawal of the 30,000 Indonesian soldiers stationed in the territory: an annex to the memorandum just speaks of "redeployment" and no withdrawal has been scheduled. The UN will only send it police monitors (300 at present). The question is to what extent the changes that have taken place in Indonesia and the army inspire confidence.
When President Suharto fell from power in May 1998, his successor, B J Habibie, gave every indication of wanting to resolve the East Timor question which was damaging to Indonesia's image abroad. In June he promised a gradual troop withdrawal. On 5 August, under UN auspices, Indonesia seemed ready to resolve the question for the first time by offering East Timor autonomy.
The offer was less generous than it may seem since it came with one unacceptable condition: the UN and Portugal had to recognise the 1976 annexation of East Timor. Nevertheless, Kofi Annan and the Portuguese government decided to enter into more detailed negotiations. The UN secretariat drew up a framework for autonomy that was as wide-ranging as the limits set by Jakarta would allow. This mean excluding such key sectors as security, foreign affairs and some areas of tax revenue, most importantly oil royalties. The leaders of the Timorese independence movement were willing to accept autonomy as a transitional phase. The people of East Timor took advantage of a reduced police and military presence to demonstrate in favour of independence.
Since then signs of double-dealing by Indonesia have growth. In late July the army arranged for a hundred or so journalists to visit Dili to witness the withdrawal of 1,000 soldiers. But simultaneously thousands of other soldiers were being brought in under cover of darkness. In early October military operations (suspended for four months) resumed and Kofi Annan called for substantial troop reductions. Indonesian foreign minister, Ali Alatas, said that were only 6,000 troops left in East Timor. Three days later, official figures showed the figure to be 21,000. The source of the leak, a civilian official in the military statistics division, also revealed that the figures did not show a further 11,000 soldiers belonging to the military intelligence service (SGI) – making a total of 32,000 for a population of 800,000 or one soldier for every 25 Timorese.
In November the Indonesian and Portuguese representatives were again in New York when news broke of a massacre of civilians in the Alas region. Portugal called for the talks to be suspended until Jakarta agreed to an inquiry by a UN representative. Jakarta agreed and Tamrat Samuel was sent to Dili. The military prevented him from going to Alas and the inquiry never took place.
In December 1998 the EU heads of state declared that the East Timor question could not be solved without the "free consultation of to establish the real will of the East Timor people". Then on January 27 Jakarta dropped a bombshell. If the Timorese did not accept autonomy they were being offered, the government would have to ask the Peoples' Consultative Assembly (MPR), elected recently, to rescind the 1976 decision to integrate East Timor. The offer seemed too good to be true.
Differences exist at the highest levels on the East Timor issue. Habibie's senior adviser on the East Timor issue conceded that the "president consulted only a few members of his entourage" before taking the decision. Alatas, the most vociferous champion of annexation, was only told a few days before the decision was made public. The proposal mentioned the possibility of the Timorese "rejecting" autonomy. But Alatas continued to say no to a referendum through which the rejection could be expressed.
This time the UN stood its ground and held firm on the referendum issue. Jakarta finally agreed, provided that the word "referendum" was not used. The "consultation" is to be organised by the UN from start to finish – from compiling the electoral list to announcing the result. The Timorese must say "Yes" or "No" to the autonomy offer. The way the question is worded makes it clear that a "yes" vote means integration with Indonesia, a "no" vote means separation. No one is in any doubt as to the outcome provided it is a free vote.
The whole issue of autonomy is a dead letter. Neither the UN nor Portugal have shown any interest in reviewing Jakarta's amended text, now a wholly Indonesian proposal. As far as they are concerned, the central issues are the voting procedures and security at the ballot box.
In April 1999, Colonel Suratman, military commander for East Timor, announced that 50,000 civilians were to be trained as security guards – in reality to contain those supporting independence. On 6 April, some 1,200 people took refuge from the militias in a church at Liquia, 30 km from Dili. The Indonesian police stepped in, taking the priests to the military command post. In their absence, riot police threw in tear gas grenades. Once outside the church, the people were at the mercy of the militias. The massacre left 62 dead, 40 wounded, and 14 "disappeared". Jakarta has refused an international inquiry.
In Dili, the militiamen said they would eliminate all Timorese who did not display the Indonesian flag over their doorway. On April 17, 1,500 militia entered Dili and participated in a parade addressed by the pro-Indonesian governor, Abilio Osorio Soares. They then went in pursuit of the independence movement, killing about 30 of them. The Irish foreign minister was visiting at the time, but that did nothing to restrain Suratman and Silaen, respectively military and police chiefs, who claimed they could not intervene as they were "neutral".
The Indonesian leadership continues to deny that weapons are being handed out to civilians and used to kill defenceless people. But Herminio da Costa Silva, the militia "chief of staff", says there is no shortage of money, some of from wealthy Indonesians. Generals Murdani and Sutrisno may be among the donors. The fact is that the Indonesian armed forces are not neutral. Though Suratman and Silaen signed a peace agreement with the independence movement in April, in early May they appeared in public alongside militia commanders and announced that the National Council of Timorese Resistance have been dissolved and "its members now supported integration".
It is no coincidence that the two points on which Indonesia refused to give way – retention of its own forces and rejection of UN peacekeepers – are allowing the army the control developments before, during and even after the Timor vote.
One of Indonesia's arguments for integration has been that East Timor is not economically viable. It may not be very big, but there are at least 45 independent countries with a smaller population than East Timor. Although Indonesia has failed to stimulate development in East Timor, in terms of actual resources it has oil, agriculture and tourism.
The 5 May agreement provides for a UN supervised transition period on Indonesian withdrawal. As the UN-recognised administrative power, Portugal has agreed to provide substantial aid. In the face of increasing violence, Xanana Gusmao wrote last April: "Everybody is promising me aid for an independent Timor, but we need aid now."
So long as Indonesia has a greater military presence than the UN, the New York agreement will remain an agreement "in principle" only. The very presence of the military will curtail voter freedom. To ignore it may prove disastrous.