Golkar deputy chairman Marzuki Darusman talks to Yang Razali Kassim about the many politically volatile issues facing Indonesia today

Q: The spate of violence in Indonesia has taken a baffling turn. The brutalities are now not only between ethnic but also religious, even tribal, groups. How does one make sense of all this?

A: It's the theory of accumulated grievances at work. Apart from that, you have perspectives suggesting an external factor behind all these, as the primary cause of the initial disruptions. But I don't really go for conspiracy theories. It's best to explain in terms of the local situations.

Q: What conspiracy theories?

A: The conspiracy theories are played up to point to groups associated with former president Suharto. These are normally expressed by the government and also by people like Abdurrahman Wahid (a presidential contender), for example.

The government uses such terms as "provocateurs" and "third party elements" being behind all these troubles. But "third party" is now a code word for people associated with the former regime.

The local factors would be the general socio-economic conditions that have made life much more difficult. A situation of hyper-sensitivity has been created towards the slightest aggravation or provocation. It's part of the general economic decline. It touches on the already existing tensions among ethnic, religious groups. The tensions have developed over the years, but the local communities were not able to resolve them during the Suharto era.

At the time, these tensions were categorised as SARA (tribal, religious, ethnic and inter-group relations). But the policy was to stay away from these problems and let the central government resolve them. This has, however, weakened the capacity of the local government to resolve them. It's always the central government. So, the moment Mr Suharto is not in the picture, and the central government is not seen to be in charge, these things flare up.

Q: Are you saying that Suharto failed to resolve the SARA issues?

A: That's right. Suharto swept them under the carpet. They were frozen, and directed to a certain point, instead of being taken to a higher stage of inter-ethnic and inter-religious understanding. It has been a hands-off policy with no clear direction.

Now that Pandora's box has been opened, you can't really close it. However, it can be eased the moment we have a strong, legitimate government which can take charge and exert authority. That can only come up after the elections. Even then, it's not a guarantee.

Q: The military could have asserted its role as a peacekeeper . But the military has seemingly failed to do so. ABRI is seen to be weak, General Wiranto notwithstanding. How do you explain that?

A: Two factors: The armed forces is at its low point in terms of public regard because of its human rights record. Second, the armed forces, or the leadership of the armed forces, can't exceed the political leadership, which is already weak. The moment they (the military) do that, they create a dualism; the armed forces is seen as assertive and effective while the president is seen as less so.

So the only way to get the armed forces motivated is if we have a strong political president, under whom the army is able to discharge its normal responsibility without creating this imbalance. Because the moment Wiranto becomes more visible, more national and more popular, he risks being dismissed by Mr Habibie.

Q: But shouldn't Gen Wiranto transcend that narrow political self-consideration for the sake of a higher calling, of keeping the peace and law and order, which is well within his powers?

A: Yes, that's an anomaly. He has to live with that. The armed forces is completely immobilised, not that there is less dedication. It's a problem of lack of space for action. So I certainly would be able to criticise the slowness of the armed forces in taking action, of not being up to meet its duties.

But having said that, you still have to pose the question: Why is there no action being taken? Because these are the people, the leadership of the armed forces, the very group identified as a reform group in the armed forces. So I don't have the slightest doubt of their patriotism, professionalism. But the fact that they are not able to take action indicates a much deeper problem than a picture of being derelict.

Q: Is there a problem of cohesion between the president and the commander-in-chief, between President Habibie and Gen Wiranto?

A: The impression is that they are close. There's been pressure on Mr Habibie to replace Wiranto – from the ICMI (Association of Indonesian Muslim Intellectuals) group, but Mr Habibie stood his ground ... It doesn't make sense to replace the chief of the armed forces every time there is social disruption. You might have to replace him every month.

Q: Some people suggest that Gen Wiranto's problem is one of indecision. Is that a fair assessment, from Golkar's experience?

A: I don't think so. There's a clear policy of balancing out, there's a clear pattern. It does come out as suggesting that Wiranto is indecisive, but one has to see this in the broader context of the balancing between the new government, and it's clear that he is maintaining his relationship with Mr Suharto...

I would suppose that any action taken within these parameters – for example, not taking action against Prabowo (Gen Prabowo, former chief of the Army Strategic Command and Mr Suharto's son-in-law) – has nothing to do with not having determination. But if he did pursue this, it would have led to very serious consequences or revelations of the multiple roles of Mr Suharto and Dr Habibie in the last months of the New Order.

Q: What multiple roles?

A: It's more than just the people who are formally in charge; it's the context of the involvement of Mr Suharto, at least in terms of his knowledge of what Prabowo was involved in – the student abductions, the May riots. You'll open Pandora's box.

Q: Why is Gen Wiranto still keeping a line with Suharto? Wouldn't that raise suspicions about his intentions?

A: It would. But it goes to show that Mr Suharto is still a factor to contend with. There are senior generals, retired ones, who are still linked to Suharto, emotionally at least. People like Benny Murdani (the former military strongman), Try Sutrisno (former vice-president), Edi Sudrajat (former defence minister), and some lesser generals. If Mr Suharto is put on the stand, it will be the whole institution of the armed forces that will be in judgement. That is something that they will not accept, which they cannot contemplate. They may not be directly supportive of Suharto, but they realise that if the handling of the Suharto problem gets out of hand, the consequences will be unpredictable, very serious.

It could end up with the armed forces being immediately pushed out of politics. That's something that would be unrealistic. Because the armed forces is an interest group, not just an instrument of state. It has its business group, social structure, political interests. You can't visualise the armed forces voluntarily giving up its vested position. It has invested too much in politics. It's more than just a normal army.

Q: Benny Murdani is still a player in all this?

A: No, he's not. But when it comes to fundamental issues, they close ranks. Edi, Try, Harsudiono Hartas (former chief of socio-political affairs), Theo Syafie (former regional commander, who has now joined Megawati's party). That's the core. Plus a number of other retired officers – junior to these people but still very vocal and visible – with Benny and the group. Plus Bambang Triantoro (former chief of socio-political affairs) and Maj-Gen Sunarso (the retired China expert and one-time head of the intelligence body, Bakin).

These people have superb networks. It's not easy to imagine them to be passive. Their whole reputation is on the line, their whole life's worth is at stake, the whole justification of dual function (ABRI's doctrine of doubling up military with civilian functions) is at stake.

Q: From the emerging leadership being thrown up by the presidential contest, what kind of changes can we expect in the way Indonesia is run?

A: Looking at the next round of nominations, the choice after five years would give a much clearer picture of the situation.

You see, if there's going to be fundamental changes in national politics, it wouldn't be symbolised by the existing five candidates now. Any fundamental changes now can't come from Golkar. The organisation is still dominated by the old groupings, associated with the past, although we have a few good people.

So it's impossible to build a new power base on Golkar to launch a complete renewal, immediately. I would be uncomfortable with that – with having to build up a support base upon the existing organisation, the people within Golkar.

Q: You see fundamental changes possible only from outside Golkar, not from Golkar itself? Being a Golkar deputy chairman, is this not a heretical statement to make?

A: That's not new as far as it comes from me. There were a few occasions for Golkar to reinvent itself, but these were missed. By this I mean repositioning itself; reformulating its position with the cabinet. So ministers continue to be an extension of the presidential powers. They are not representing Golkar, but continue the format of being administrative extensions of the presidency. It was this independent repositioning that would have appealed to the public.

Secondly, we missed also the chance to apologise genuinely for the organisation's involvement in the past which led to the crisis. It was half-hearted. That didn't go down well with the public. These missed chances have diluted the trust in a reinvented Golkar.

Q: What you are saying sounds like what Adi Sasono has been calling for.

A: Adi has a more specific agenda. He was never associated with Golkar. He is a newcomer (in Golkar) while some of us have been in Golkar for 30 years. He was enlisted because he is a minister close to Habibie, because of his ICMI connections. So he may have a view of Golkar. I'm still trying to save what is salvageable. He has completely written off Golkar.

Q: You had your fair share of brushes with Suharto when he wa s the all-powerful president. How did you end up clashing with him?

A: It was made out that there was a fundamental difference between myself and President Suharto. Many of us in Parliament at that time felt that it was time for Golkar to come into its own, become a "real thing" rather than just a superficial set-up, being just an electoral machine.

There was a real need to look into the future, beyond Suharto. If President Suharto were to step down and Golkar was not ready, it would disappear together with Suharto. So there was a real need to build up a system. I was part of that grouping (pushing for change) to make the party independent of Mr Suharto.

The grouping included Kharis Suhud (MPR Speaker), Wahono (then Golkar chairman) and Sarwono Kusumaatmadja (then Golkar secretary-general). We were in that sense like a reformist group, but not behaving politically. Even that was already [seen] as a deviation from the line.

This has been borne out now. Golkar is experiencing the effects of withdrawal, being attacked from all sides because of an image problem. If we had done this [change] 10 years ago, we would have survived better. Akbar Tanjung was not in that group, but he was not against us. He was an ally within the establishment, but not somebody expected to come out too visibly in support of the reformist friends.

I was then put on a list in a way that would have prevented me from being re-elected into the DPR (Parliament) in 1992. So I was effectively sidelined. I was proposed for re-election by Wahono but President Suharto vetoed it.

Q: But when did your battle with President Suharto actually begin?

A: I was seen as running for the presidency. In early 1992, there was a publication, MATRA, sister of Tempo, which quoted me as saying that it was "natural for any politician to aspire to the highest political office, the presidency, as it was natural for any academic to aspire to be a professor, a soldier a general". That was misconstrued as breaking a taboo.

The presidency was off limits. The presidency was Mr Suharto. Period. So that [statement] might have been seen as a new rallying point against Suharto. It worried some that this would capture the imagination of the students and the Opposition. Nobody with aspirations for the presidency had made such a statement. I did. But I didn't have any aspirations for the presidency. The atmosphere was so stifling.

Q: It seems that you are now playing quite a major role in Golkar.

A: I realise that I was brought into Golkar from outside as an element of novelty, perhaps contrasting with the old people there – the "holdovers". That's much one can do in that kind of political ecology in terms of renewal.

I joined primarily because of my friendship with Akbar Tanjung. Otherwise I wouldn't have joined. This relationship went back 30 years to our student days and in KNPI (the youth movement). He was chair and I was deputy chairman.

Q: You are somewhat like a Golkar in-house critic?

A: I suppose so. I could be seen as such ... I don't see myself as being overly critical. Under different circumstances, that would be considered normal. But my normal criticisms are seen as dissent.