David Jenkins – As East Timor descends into a new round of violence and savagery the time has come for searching questions to be asked of President B. J. Habibie and his sometimes unfathomable Defence Minister, General Wiranto.

Let there be no mistake. The militiamen who went on a weekend rampage in Dili, killing at least 20 supporters of independence, are creatures of the Indonesian army.

With each new atrocity in Timor it is becoming increasingly difficult to argue that local Indonesian army officers are off on a frolic of their own, acting against the wishes of their superiors outside the province.

They are not. That is not the way the Indonesian Armed Forces (ABRI) works. Local commanders are doing precisely what their superiors – or a significant number of them – want them to do. In doing so, they have taken East Timor closer to the precipice.

Who is to blame for the latest unrest? The military officer immediately responsible for East Timor is Colonel Tono Suratman, a Kopassus (Special Forces, the red berets) officer who heads the local Korem (Military District) command.

For a time, Suratman was said to be making a genuine attempt to bring East Timor's warring factions together. But he has now thrown his weight decisively behind the militias, arming them and providing them with logistics support.

Suratman's immediate superior is Major General Adam Damiri, who heads Kodam IX, the Bali-based Udayana military region. Damiri's career took off under two powerful red beret officers, both of whom have since fallen from grace.

He was chief of staff of the vital Jakarta military garrison when that command was headed by Major General Syafrie Syamsuddin, a former Soeharto bodyguard and presidential favourite.

He was hand-picked by Soeharto's son-in-law, Lieutenant General Prabowo Subianto, to command the 1st infantry Division of Kostrad, one of two key units in Indonesia's 27,000-strong Army Strategic Reserve.

If history offers any guide, Suratman and Damiri could be in for the chop before long. There are two reasons.

In 1991, when Indonesian troops ran amok in Dili, killing hundreds of unarmed civilians, Soeharto, responding to international pressure, cashiered the Dili commander and the Udayana commander, neither of whom had done anything particularly wrong on that occasion. It is difficult to see how Habibie can do less, although he, of course, has none of the authority that Soeharto had over ABRI.

Second, and more ominously, there are signs that Suratman may have lost control in Dili, or be on the verge of losing control. That, in ABRI circles, is a cardinal sin. Few ABRI officers have surrendered control of city and seen their careers prosper.

In short, ABRI may have been too clever by half. Why would the army have embarked on such a dangerous course?

One plausible explanation is that East Timor remains an emotional no-go zone for senior Indonesian officers. These men are reluctant, after so much ABRI blood has been spilt there, to see East Timor slip the surly bonds of Indonesian control. They would rather a festering sore than an independent East Timor.

That said, it may not be simply a matter of ABRI bloody mindedness. Army officers profess concern for the wellbeing of the many non-Timorese settlers, and those East Timorese who have done Indonesia's bidding over the past 24 years.

Another explanation is that Wiranto is trying to curry favour with key political leaders, from whose ranks a new president is likely to emerge following Indonesia's June 7 general election. Politicians like Megawati Sukarnoputri have no wish to wave goodbye to East Timor. Wiranto, it is argued, will need the goodwill of the politicians if he is to look after ABRI interests.

In Jakarta these days, some argue that Habibie, as an interim leader, has no right to "give East Timor away." The army can afford to ignore Habibie's autonomy vote, they say, because they know the next president will sympathise with their actions.

Some experts, it is true, are in less of a hurry to blame Wiranto for the mess in East Timor. As one source puts it: "The jury is still out on Wiranto. He was a reluctant draftee on independence for East Timor. But there are forces in the Udayana command he can't control. Besides, he may have bigger fish to fry."

Whatever the explanation, Wiranto has so far exerted no control at all. That can only mean, critics charge, that he is giving tacit support to the bloodletting.

Then there's Habibie. He may have even less control over ABRI. He may be influenced by men like General Feisal Tanjung, a red beret Timor veteran who now sits in cabinet as Co-ordinating Minister for Political and Security Affairs.

But Habibie is also Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces. If ABRI has created a Frankenstein monster in East Timor, then it is Habibie who must bear ultimate responsibility for the consequences.