The armed forces (ABRI) includes the army, navy, air force and police. All are involved in repression in East Timor, but the army is the most important. Note that the lack of a civilian police force has been blamed as the cause of human rights problems by various UN rapporteurs on East Timor.

Leaked ABRI documents published last year (see The Australian 30 October 1998, and Budiardjo & Liem 15 November 1998) show there have been approximately 18,000 regular Indonesian army troops in Indonesia for some years (much higher than officially claimed). This excludes the navy, which also has marines on the ground in East Timor. Army troops fall into two main categories: territorial or garrison troops (also called organic, about 10,000), and non-territorial troops (about 8,000).

The territorial military structure runs as follows:

• East Timor falls within Military Area IX (Udayana), known as Kodam IX, with its headquarters in Bali.
• Within Kodam, the whole of East Timor makes up a military resort known as Korem 164/Wira Dharma.
• Below Korem there are a dozen or so Kodim (military districts), below that a much larger number of Koramil (sub-districts), and finally about 450 Babinsa (single non-commissioned officers in every village of East Timor).

While the government claims territorial troops are engaged mostly in building infrastructure, their main task appears to be intelligence gathering, riot control, small scale repression, making money to supplement a meager budget, and running local government at every level through a complex arrangement of cross-postings.

Non-territorial troops fall into troops rotated into East Timor from other territorial commands in Indonesia (about 6,000), and combat troops commanded directly from Jakarta (about 2000). The latter include the red beret elite forces Kopassus, and the green beret infantry Kostrad, who both tend to use East Timor as a combat training ground.

The conflicting chains of command between territorial and non-territorial troops has repeatedly led to serious problems – most notably during the Santa Cruz massacre of November 1991, which was committed by non-territorial troops but for which the territorial commander got the blame.

In addition, East Timor knows a variety of militias. They are all broadly called "trained civilians" (rakyat terlatih, or Ratih). Together with civilian emergency services they fall into the category of civil defence (tahanan sipil, Hansip). They are employed by the Interior Ministry and then seconded to whichever military command requires them. The militias fall into various categories, including public security (keamanan rakyat, Kamra) and people's resistance (perlawanan rakyat, Wanra).

Although they are specified in the 1982 Defence Act, militia have not been used elsewhere in Indonesia until Armed Forces Commander Wiranto introduced them last January to help safeguard the upcoming elections. However, they have long been known in East Timor – since shortly after the 1975 Indonesian invasion (see Budiardjo & Liem 1984). There they have been used to "Timorise" the conflict – including in combat operations and ongoing surveillance of the population.

Militias are meant to be flexible means of recruiting locals for a specific purpose. They may exist only for one operation, for a specific campaign or some period of time.

Since mid 1994 reports have emerged of a number of "special" militia "teams" attached to military district commands in East Timor, for example Makikit in Viqueque, Alfa in Lospalos, Saka in Baucau, and Mahidi in Ainaro. Presumably these groups are officially considered to be Ratih. Most of them (but not the most feared of them, Gadapaksi) are mentioned in the leaked October documents as being on the ABRI payroll, where they number about 4000.

The local military commander in Dili announced on 5 December 1998 that the Kamra/Wanra were to be armed with firearms to help protect them against increasing attacks by Falintil guerrillas. In subsequent disputes in early February over the arming of militias in East Timor General Wiranto claimed that the groups under the media spotlight (he specifically named Saka and Makikit) have now been disbanded and that they are in any case distinct from Ratih/Kamra/Wanra. However it seems reasonable to assume that, contrary to Wiranto's claims, Makikit et al are indeed part of the regular Ratih structure, and there is as yet no independent evidence that they have been disbanded. It is not clear whether there is some strategic purpose in arming these groups at this time.

The most notorious one of them – Gadapaksi – may not fall under the regular militia structure but may be a counter-terrorist improvisation established in late 1995 by Maj-Gen Prabowo, at that time the new commander of Kopassus and a man with much East Timor experience. It is unclear whether Gadapaksi remains active after the sacking of Prabowo in May 1998.

References:

1. Carmel Budiardjo & Liem Sioe Liong, East Timor under the Indonesian jackboot, Tapol, 15 November 1998 (or briefly in The Australian, 30 October 1998).
2. Robert Lowry, The armed forces of Indonesia, Allen & Unwin, 1996.
3. Carmel Budiardjo & Liem Sioe Liong, The war against East Timor, Zed, 1984 (based especially on captured ABRI documents of 1982).