There has been a flurry of activity and announcements on East Timor since the resignation of Indonesian President Suharto, most recently with regard to the United Nations talks in New York on August 4 and 5. Many headlines greeted news of a possible autonomy agreement with enthusiasm.

An August 10, 1998 editorial in the New York Times was entitled, "Breakthrough in East Timor" – a very well intentioned piece of writing, though perhaps over optimistic in terms of where matters actually stand at present: for one thing, diplomats involved in the talks say insist that "breakthrough" is much too strong a word to describe what has happened thus far. But the Times editorial only reflects a view that has received widespread attention in many places.

Nonetheless, Bishop Belo and other reliable sources in Dili said on August 20, 1998 that the situation in East Timor remains substantially unchanged. Asked if he saw any concrete results after the UN talks, the bishop said firmly, "Not yet." Two weeks earlier, Belo stated, "There is still intimidation and terror."

In late July there was a widely publicized announcement of Indonesian troop withdrawals from East Timor, with about 100 foreign journalists brought there for the occasion. In its editorial, the New York Times called it "a partial troop pullout," and again, the Times was far from alone in taking this announcement at face value.

The problem is that there is every indication that it is not true. Bishop Belo stated on August 20 that the troops were actually shifted to the western side of the island and brought back to East Timor in 24 trucks. "We must denounce this," Bishop Belo said on August 20.

A highly qualified independent observer was also in East Timor on August 20. This source said that on the surface in Dili, the situation is unlike anything it has ever been, with an appearance of openness. But reliable local people have told this observer that such appearances are deceptive. And in East Timor's countryside, there has been no change: "in the interior, no one has told the army about 'reformasi', the source added.

In light of the lack of change on the ground, one must be especially careful to avoid over)enthusiasm in one's approach to the results of the UN talks. On the one hand, it is encouraging that for the first time in the 15 years of talks under the auspices of the UN Secretary General, there is at least the possibility of substantial gains. On the other hand – and this has been Bishop Belo's position for 15 years – it is necessary to see concrete progress, not simply public relations gestures.

The August 5 communique outlining the results of UN-brokered talks between Indonesia and Portugal said that the two sides had agreed to "wide-ranging autonomy" for East Timor, (which might be concluded by year's end) "without prejudice" to "basic positions of principle." This last part leaves open the possibility of an eventual referendum on independence. These are positive elements, but it is necessary to be vigilant, not only on the ground in East Timor but also in assessing the overall political context.

The fall of the Suharto government and the ongoing financial crisis in Indonesia have increased pressure on the Indonesian government to boost its tarnished international image. What is certain is that Indonesia needs all the international good will it can muster. East Timor has been an irritant in its relations with the United States and many other nations, especially since Indonesian troops massacred more than 250 people at Santa Cruz cemetery in the East Timor capital in 1991 and after the Nobel Peace Prize in 1996. Indonesia will need at least $70 billion in foreign loans to begin rebuilding its financial house, and will need continued heavy support in the years to come.

Close observers of the diplomatic scene in Jakarta say that the official Indonesian position on East Timor may be in the process of shifting – although the word "breakthrough" is too strong a way to describe it, some well regarded diplomats say we may be at a turning point – but until there are concrete changes, it is hazardous to put one's faith in this or that signal. Foreign Minister Ali Alatas recognizes that a show of flexibility wins praise from foreign governments whose good will is vital. Announcements of troop withdrawals are similarly helpful, even if the number of troops remaining behind is so large that the withdrawals are meaningless in practical terms.

Alatas has pushed the view that autonomy is a final status for East Timor, not an interim status. The problem is that the parts of Indonesia that have been granted "special status" have received almost nothing of substance.

As stated before, it is unrealistic to expect that a transitional government like President Habibie's would be able to do more at this time: Going any further would antagonize the all-powerful military. On the more positive side, some observers believe that in time, an elected government (elections are slated for 1999) with political legitimacy, might be able to agree to real concessions, even a referendum.

If the process were to end where it is now, it would be a devastating blow for the people of East Timor, who, according to Bishop Belo, are overwhelmingly in favor of a referendum to decide their own future, even if it takes years.

The first order of business is to implement the points outlined in the UN agreement, which call for release of political prisoners and consulting the East Timorese in the UN negotiations. There is growing pressure to release resistance leader Xanana Gusmao, reflected most recently in an August 20 statement by Australia's foreign minister.

There also must be a strong push to demilitarize East Timor as quickly as possible, and establish a UN presence to protect human rights. Until such measures are in place, any claims of progress can have little credibility. And there is a strong need to monitor closely conditions on the ground.

Much depends on what happens in Jakarta in the coming months. People closest to the scene, both in the diplomatic arena and within East Timor itself, emphasize that Indonesia is unlikely to make major concessions unless pressed to do so: Maximum international pressure is needed if an end to East Timor's long nightmare is to be finally realized.

Contrary to popular belief, the United Nations has little power to bring about change in East Timor in the absence of international support, which is urgently needed. It is to be hoped that people of good will can join together for this purpose.