The complete collapse of the PDI in the 1997 election left the Islamically coloured PPP as the only viable non-government party. Does this mean the Indonesian government now faces a Turkish, or even an Algerian scenario of popular opposition focused only on the symbols of Islam? No, it does not.

Not that the PPP as sole vehicle for Islamic opposition is a completely implausible idea. Vigorous PPP rallies were the life of the election campaign. The Mega-Bintang phenomenon (supported by the Solo branch of PPP) brought disenfranchised PDI voters under the PPP banner – though probably more did not use their vote at all. A PPP branch in Madura under the charismatic leadership of Kiai Alawy Muhammad successfully forced the government to repeat the election locally six days later. Ballot boxes had been destroyed in rioting by PPP voters turned away by officials at the 29 May poll.

Many district branches beyond Madura refused to sign the election result, a largely ceremonial requirement. Two provincial executives appear determined to do likewise – West Sumatra and Southeast Sulawesi.

At a national meeting held in Jakarta last week top PPP executives were under intense pressure from below to refuse to acknowledge the election result. One national executive member thought to be responsive to this moral indignation from below is PPP secretary-general Tosari Widjaya.

According to the anonymous Internet service SiaR, the government was so worried about this post-election militancy it offered six top PPP office holders Rp 1 trillion (almost AU$500 million!) last weekend for 'party development' purposes, in exchange for unreserved acceptance of the election result. As the story spread, branches rang in threatening mass action if the office bearers accepted.

Former Religious Affairs Minister Alamsyah Ratuperwiranegara, himself known as a militant Muslim, publicly told the PPP it would be opposing both the government and the Islamic community if it refused to accept the result. In the end, the PPP announced a non-committal 'cooling down' period.

However, despite what the branches may demand, the PPP is not about to become an opposition party. Key observers are convinced that (presumably with or without the trillion rupiah) the PPP will submit meekly after its 'cooling down' period. Both NU chairman Aburrahman Wahid (Gus Dur) and Muhammadiyah chairman Amien Rais say the PPP would not dare do otherwise because it would imperil the (much increased) number of PPP parliamentary delegates now poised to take office.

The fact is that, like PDI's Soerjadi, PPP chairman 'Buya' Ismail Hasan Metareum is government-approved. The party is entirely dependent on government funding. Buya knows that his political life would end abruptly at a PDI-style 'special congress' if he did not comply. It would be easy enough for opponents to connect rebellious sentiment with 'anarchic' pre-election violence.

Nor does PPP represent all the Islamic interests in Indonesia. Nahdatul Ulama (NU), Indonesia's largest Islamic organisation, is almost unrepresented in its leadership. Its chairman Gus Dur worked actively to 'deflate' (gembos) PPP votes during the campaign.

There is a desire for change. But the PPP is not positioned to be its champion. PPP is almost as much part of the political establishment as is Golkar. The same is even more true of ICMI, once regarded as another Islamic foot in the door of the hitherto secular New Order regime. Neither PPP nor ICMI are about to make Islam an alternative.

The real political divide in Indonesia is not religious, between secularism and Islam. It is economic, between the elite establishment and the poor masses. Ever optimistic, those masses were momentarily excited by the militancy of PPP branch leaders in places like Solo and Madura. But that was not enough to make PPP a reliable constitutional outlet for their demands.

[Gerry van Klinken, Editor, Inside Indonesia magazine.]