Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) and power appear to have become two inseparable sides of the same coin. At several congresses of the nahdliyin (NU members), at least the last two, the election of the leaders of the Nahdlatul Ulama Central Executive Board (PBNU) has become an arena for competing for influence and access to power.

Before the 35th NU Congress in Jombang, East Java, the rivalry among candidates for PBNU general chair had intensified. While visiting senior clerics, the candidates also sought support from voting delegates at the congress. Even before NU's highest forum, held once every five years, was convened, rumors of cash being distributed to regional officials were rife.

It is also common knowledge that some candidates sought the Presidential Palace's blessing. Although they do not always win, those backed by the ruling regime are usually strong contenders.

Those in power who want to have a foothold in NU have their own preferences. Before the congress, several ministers and people close to President Prabowo Subianto worked behind the scenes to ensure that the Palace-backed NU leadership slate was elected. The Palace reportedly not only put forward a candidate for chair, but also a candidate for rais am syuriah – the highest-ranking leader in NU, with authority to oversee and direct the organization.

Outside interference occurs because NU allows itself to be drawn into the corridors of power. Although the organization no longer engages in practical politics as it did during the 1955 General Election or when it was under the United Development Party from 1973 to 1984, its elites behave like politicians.

If Yahya Cholil Staquf, Chair of the PBNU for 2021-2026, now says that a candidate is invoking the president's name, it is worth remembering that five years ago he was reportedly the candidate backed by President Joko Widodo. Under Yahya, NU's pragmatism has become especially pronounced.

For those in power and the NU leadership candidate they support, this is a symbiotic relationship. The candidate has an easier path to the organization's top post, while the Palace gains support to maintain government stability if its candidate is elected. For the regime, controlling political parties alone is not enough. Those in power also rally non-party actors, including Islamic organizations, to ensure that their government faces no disruption.

As a result, NU has struggled to serve as a counterweight to power. When democracy declined and anti-corruption efforts weakened during the Jokowi era, for example, NU did not criticize, let alone prevent, it. When people around Jokowi floated the idea of postponing the 2024 election, NU, through Yahya Staquf, tended to support it. Its primary service as a social and religious organization has also eroded, particularly after it received a mining concession from the government.

Mining has not only undermined the organization's function but also split NU's leadership. Yahya Staquf, who was briefly dismissed by the Advisory Council late last year for, among other things, allegedly failing to manage finances transparently, was accused of profiting from the mining operation. The Yahya camp, in turn, accused the opposing camp of being beholden to mining interests. The open conflict gave rise to factions that carried over into the Jombang Congress. In other words, the rivalry at the congress is essentially the culmination of a long-running conflict. The candidates bring their respective interests and political networks.

There is therefore no need to imagine the congress stage as a place for NU's elites to reconcile. For some, becoming a senior NU official is a stepping-stone to a seat of power. In several presidential elections, figures with NU backgrounds have been recruited as vice-presidential candidates to win votes from the sarong-clad faithful.

With opportunistic elites, NU is easily steered and dragged into practical politics. Too busy becoming part of the establishment, NU is increasingly losing its bargaining power. Yet NU has social capital – its network of Islamic boarding schools, educational institutions, charities, and millions of members – that could be used to spearhead a civil society movement. The call to return to the 1926 khitah (foundational principle), as a social and religious organization, ultimately remains nothing more than a slogan.

– Read the complete story in Tempo English Magazine

Source: https://en.tempo.co/read/2118632/the-lure-of-power-for-the-sarong-clad-communit