Max Lane – Over the last few months, controversy has erupted in Indonesia over a major foreign policy decision of the Prabowo Subianto government. This was the decision to join President Trump's Board of Peace, whose immediate stated task is to take control and manage the Gaza strip. The Prabowo Government not only joined the Board of Peace but also made a public commitment to send thousands of troops to Gaza as part of an international force to be in Gaza.
This decision was met with criticism from a broad spectrum of social and political elements in Indonesia. These included former ambassadors, academics, and religious organisations, including the semi-official Indonesian Assembly of Ulamas (MUI). The 98 member Civil Society Coalition of NGOs, social organizations, trade unions and others also demanded that Indonesia withdraw from the BoP. Some Islamic organisations, such as Nahdatul Ulama (NU), did support BoP membership, although this generated internal controversy in the NU with more than 100 prominent NU members issuing statement in opposition to the leadership's position.
Following the controversy President Prabowo called major Islamic organisations to a meeting where he promised that Indonesia would withdraw from the BoP if the cause of Palestinian statehood was not advanced. After this meeting, both the MUI and another mass organisation, Muhammidiyah, moderated their position to one of conditional support. At the same meeting these organisations were promised a new building in the centre of Jakarta.
The controversy escalated again after Israel and the United States started bombing Iran. Most significantly the MUI, despite its post meeting moderation, issued a strong statement condemning the attacks and once again urged the government to "immediately withdraw Indonesia's membership from the Peace Council". There was a wide round of similar calls from other public figures and civil society. After some hesitation, the government announced it has suspended its participation in BoP, though not fully withdrawing. Later the government also said it would not be sending soldiers to Gaza under while the current conditions continued.
The decision to join BoP was preceded by a speech from president Prabowo in 2025 where he strongly praised President Trump's political leadership. The President later repeated similar sentiments in Washington at the February meeting formally establishing the BoP stating ""under President Trump's leadership, this vision of real peace will be achieved." Prabowo's clearly stated position on the Palestine question at that time was that peace can only be ensured if Israel's security can be assured as part of achieving a two-state solution where Palestinian sovereignty would also be recognised. The very explicit statement regarding Israel's security, circulated on social media in a clipped form, also generated controversy when it was made.
With the starting of the US and Israeli attacks on Iran, there was further wave of criticism because of Indonesia's muted response on February 28, 2026. In it, Indonesia expressed "deep regret" over the failure of negotiations but no condemnation or a call to a halt to the bombing. There was also criticism of a lack of any immediate statement of condolences after the assassination of Iran's Supreme Leader, Ali Khameni. The President did deliver such a letter on March 4. He also offered to mediate between Iran and the United States, but the offer has not been taken up. Criticism continued and already on March 3 the Chairperson of the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDIP), Megawati Sukarnoputri, both stated her condolences on the killing of Khameni. She also stated "Indonesian nation stands with the people of Iran in rejecting and strongly condemning all forms of unilateral military aggression that violate state sovereignty". On March 9, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs explicitly called on the US and Israel to cease their attacks against Iran.
The back and forth of criticism and response n this issue reflects a debate in the country over whether Indonesia is in the process of abandoning a policy of "free and active" non-alignment which has been how the country's foreign policy has been official described over the last several decades. The President has regularly re-affirmed this policy and also Indonesia's ongoing decision not to join any military pacts.
In recent history, there have been some ambiguities in this policy. Unlike Malaysia, Indonesia did not close its airspace to the United States war planes bombing Iraq in 2001. More recently, when the United States was campaigning to win recognition of for Juan Guaido as Venezuelan President, unlike other Global South members of the UN Security Council who voted against a US resolution, Indonesia abstained. When the United States attacked Venezuela this year and took President Maduro and his wife to the US, Indonesia made no strong condemnation expressing concern at the level of principle and urging de-escalation by both sides, even in a situation of a one-sided attack.
However, the most recent decision to join the BoP, the praise of President Trump's leadership and the hesitancy over taking a strong position against the US and Israeli action against Iran has led to a definite a view among many in Indonesia that a more substantial change in orientation has taken place, although the government rejects this. Closely connected to this is also strong and very broad criticism from civil society and others, viral on social media, of the recent Agreement on Reciprocal Trade (ART), officially signed on February 19–20, 2026, in Washington, D.C. The criticisms claim that Indonesia basically surrendered to the United States giving the US tariff free entry to the Indonesian market and many other concessions. Connected to the sense of increasing political alignment with the US was the agreement's provisions pressuring Indonesia to align with any US sanctions on Third countries. Indonesia is not required to automatically copy every U.S. sanction verbatim or break existing diplomatic/trade ties, so the government emphasises there is an "escape clause", but the agreement creates a binding mechanism for the U.S. to notify Indonesia and expect "equivalent restrictive effect" measures. This effectively pressures Indonesia to restrict trade, investment, or transactions with countries/entities sanctioned by the US for political reasons (e.g., certain Chinese, Russian, Iranian, or Venezuelan-linked persons or firms).
Link to original article in Chinese: https://www.zaobao.com.sg/forum/views/story20260326-8788055
Source: https://maxlaneonline.substack.com/p/is-indonesia-changing-the-directio