Rizky Ihsan – On 22 January 2026, Jakarta made a surprising move to join the 'Board of Peace' (BoP) initiative led by United States President Donald Trump.
The international body, initially pitched as a platform to manage the post-Gaza conflict, quickly became controversial for two reasons: Indonesia's long-standing commitment to Palestinian independence, and the fact that the membership is linked to a US$1 billion contribution (around Rp 16.8 trillion).
Reactions were polarised. Advocates maintain that joining the international body is a pragmatic decision for Jakarta, while critics argue it risks diluting Indonesia's normative foreign policy principles.
However, the decision needs to be viewed in a wider context.
One logic, two arenas
Indonesia's entry into the BoP reflects what I describe as a 'one logic, two arenas' approach – a political instinct to achieve political consolidation by minimising opposition and maximising inclusion, both at home and abroad. Although the decision may seem unexpected, it is consistent with Prabowo's principle that 'a thousand friends are too few; one enemy is too many.'
It also mirrors his domestic preference for large coalitions and reframing divisive issues as peace initiatives. Domestically, Prabowo's approach favours political consolidation. His gotong royong (mutual self-help) vision has resulted in a broad coalition led by his Gerindra Party and the Advance Indonesia Coalition (KIM, Koalisi Indonesia Maju), which now holds a dominant position in the national legislature, the DPR.
Almost all political parties are part of the ruling coalition. The only outsider is the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI-P), which has declared itself a 'balancer' while steering clear of being labelled an 'oppositional' force.
Prabowo's remarks suggest a similar, realist view of international politics, stating that "if we want to be truly non-bloc ... we are on our own." While this does not imply a complete abandonment of Indonesia's longstanding bebas aktif (independent and active) policy principle, it does indicate a shift toward a more transactional strategy centred on proximity and access.
Prabowo is known for his personal interest in foreign affairs. He appears to favour a personalised style of foreign policymaking, relying on a small circle of loyalists. Compared to President Joko 'Jokowi' Widodo, Prabowo has taken a far more centralised, presidential approach to foreign affairs, often sidelining Indonesia's conventional diplomatic corps, Kemlu.
Abroad, the same political instinct is evident, with Prabowo visiting 30 countries in just over a year of his presidency. Under his leadership, Indonesia has cooperated with the US, China, India, Pakistan, Russia, and the Gulf states across sectors, including economics, trade, security, and infrastructure programs.
These moves demonstrate a preference for reducing friction by collaborating with multiple partners simultaneously, rather than prioritising alignment.
While some have described his approach as lacking clear priorities, he would see it as strengthening Indonesia's international networks.
But even if the decision is tactical in the short term, it poses a significant long-term risk to Indonesia's credibility, institutional coherence, and domestic stability.
Short-term gains
On 2 April 2025, President Trump announced the implementation of 'Liberation Day' tariffs for US trade partners worldwide, to reduce US trade deficits and help revive its industry.
Indonesia, seen as benefitting from its trade surplus with the US, was initially sanctioned with 32 per cent tariffs, before the rate was eventually reduced to 19 per cent after negotiation.
However, in December 2025, Washington reportedly accused Jakarta of 'backtracking' on the earlier deal to abolish non-tariff barriers to US products. The negotiation is still ongoing, and neither party has yet signed an agreement.
President Trump has been using the tariff threats to pressure other countries to join the BoP. France, for example, has been threatened with 200 per cent tariffs on wine if it doesn't sign up. Many world leaders have said that they were 'compelled to sign up rather than risk Trump's wrath.' This indicates how the Board can serve as a source of transactional leverage.
While there is no record of such an ultimatum to Jakarta, Indonesia's vulnerability provides strong incentives to avoid more confrontation with Washington. For Prabowo, the Board provides a high-visibility avenue to the US that can lower frictions during trade negotiations and help position him as a "foreign policy president."
In short, the anticipated gains are more transactional and less institutional.
Long-term liabilities
While joining the BoP offers short-term access to the US for Indonesia, the longer-term risks are more substantial.
First, participation locks Jakarta into Trump's theatre. Based on the charter, the BoP is a Trump-centred platform that has grants the chair significant discretion to 'create, modify, or dissolve' the platform as he deems necessary. As such, it could evolve rapidly. Should the initiative change its purpose, Indonesia risks being drawn into controversies.
Second, Jakarta risks its long-standing international reputation. As the world's largest Muslim-majority country and a notable voice of the Global South, Indonesia has cultivated moral authority through its consistent advocacy of Palestinian self-determination and anti-colonial principles. Participation in a platform perceived as promoting unilateralism risks diminishing its diplomatic capital.
The Palestine dimension is where the BoP causes the highest reputational costs for Indonesia.
Joining an America-led, leader-centric platform could raise questions about whether it is legitimising a process over which it has no authority. Even if Jakarta intends to be 'inside the room' to shape the path of post-Gaza governance, participation does not ensure influence in a context defined by huge power asymmetries and unpredictable, shifting priorities.
Third, the initiative risks Indonesia reverting to yet another leader-centric approach. The creation of an ad hoc, Trump-driven platform places Kemlu in a reactive stance, tasked with legitimising presidential initiatives rather than creating them.
Over time, bureaucratic coordination and continuity in Indonesia's foreign policy is at serious risk.
Potential domestic backlash
Finally, the decision entails significant domestic audience costs. While Islamic-based organisations may support the President's decision to join the Board for now, public attention on Palestine remains highly elastic. Should the BoP fail to produce tangible results, domestic backlash may follow, especially ahead of future electoral cycles.
What may appear to be short-term gain from joining the BoP may result in long term pain. Participation in the Board might provide access and visibility, but it also risks forcing Indonesia to choose between proximity to unpredictable power and Indonesia's own credibility as an independent actor.
When viewed through the lens of 'one logic, two arenas,' the decision shows a governing instinct that may work domestically, but is far less reliable in world affairs.
The danger for Jakarta is that a policy designed to consolidate power domestically may instead result in reputational, institutional, and audience-cost liabilities.