Rafiqa Qurrata A'yun – 10 November is Indonesia's Heroes' Day, and President Prabowo Subianto is a few steps closer to declaring his former father-in-law, the late autocrat president Soeharto, a national hero.
It seems the government's Council for Titles, Medals, and Honours, chaired by Minister of Culture Fadli Zon, may reframe Soeharto's legacy as a corrupt, autocratic ruler with a more positive image by awarding him the hero title.
Under Article 33 of Law No. 20 of 2009 on the Titles, Medals and Honours, a recipient of this title is entitled to "honour and appreciation" (penghormatan dan penghargaan) from the state. These can include facilities and recurring state funds allocated to the hero's heirs.
If it happens, making Soeharto a national hero would be a critical event that could further undermine democratic reforms in Indonesia.
Anti-Soeharto sentiment has always been part and parcel of Reformasi (reformation) the period marking the end of the New Order era and the beginning of Indonesia's new democratic period. If Soeharto is now depicted as a hero, what is left of Reformasi?
It is worth noting that the main slogan popular during the 1998 reforms was to rid the country of entrenched practices of corruption, collusion, and nepotism (korupsi, kolusi dan nepotisme, KKN). All of these were closely associated with the central figure of Soeharto, his family and cronies.
Nevertheless, Soeharto was never convicted of corruption due to his health condition, nor were his children, whose businesses benefited enormously from their father's regime. A corruption case involving his youngest son, Tommy Soeharto, was terminated at a preliminary stage.
Apart from deeply rooted corruption, another rationale for rejecting the hero nomination is the substantial history of human rights violations under Soeharto's rule. A former military figure, he leveraged the armed forces to bolster his political and economic power, including suppressing opposition through the use of violence.
The question is, why does naming Soeharto as a hero matter for Prabowo?
The politics of glorifying Soeharto
This is not the first attempt to bestow the national hero title on Soeharto.
In 2008, the Prosperous Justice Party (Partai Keadilan Sejahtera, PKS) used it as a gimmick in a television campaign ad for the National Heroes Day, in a clear attempt to gain the support of Soeharto's supporters. However, this strategy quickly provoked public backlash.
In 2010, the Governor of Central Java, Bibit Waluyo, a retired army general, and the regent of Karanganyar, Rina Iriani, submitted an official proposal for a hero title for Soeharto. While strongly supported by the Golkar Party, the proposal was unsuccessful.
In 2019, the then Vice-Chairman of the Council for Titles, Medals, and Honours, Jimly Asshiddiqie, stated that Soeharto was not on the list of national heroes because he had passed away only recently and 'his grave is still wet'.
Despite these challenges, the path to declaring Soeharto a hero became much smoother on 25 September 2024, when the People's Consultative Assembly (Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat, MPR) removed Soeharto's name from its 1998 Decision (Ketetapan MPR) No. 11 on the Implementation of a Clean State Free from Corruption, Collusion, and Nepotism. This was an apparent attempt to clear his name. The reason for it, according to the MPR Chair and Golkar politician Bambang Soesatyo, was that Soeharto had passed away.
A few weeks after the MPR manoeuvre, another Golkar Party politician submitted a proposal to the Central Java government and the Ministry of Social Affairs, nominating Soeharto as a candidate for national hero. This proposal was then sent to the Chairman of the Council for Titles, Medals, and Honours on 21 October 2025.
Many believe it is now only a matter of time before President Prabowo issues a presidential decision decree to name Soeharto a national hero. Indeed, Minister of Social Affairs Saifullah Yusuf and former Coordinating Minister of Politics, Law and Security Affairs, Mahfud MD, have both stated that the legal requirements for the controversial proposal have now been fulfilled.
Why Soeharto may become a hero now
This case serves as a critical test of civil society's capacity to challenge anti-democratic forces.
For a long time – in fact, ever since the idea of naming Soeharto a hero entered public discourse – various civil society organisations (CSOs) have actively opposed the proposal.
An alliance of CSOs organised as Gerakan Masyarakat Sipil Adili Soeharto (GEMAS) has sent objection letters to the Council for Titles, Medals, and Honours, the House of Representatives (DPR), and other stakeholders, as well as initiating public petitions and staging mass protests.
As this movement continues, it is essential to reflect on what contributed to the failed attempts to name Soeharto a hero in 2010, 2015, and 2016.
A series of campaigns led by CSOs that highlight the New Order's corrupt history and human rights violations helped halt the proposal in the past. In addition, the previous failures may also have resulted from the lack of interest from then-presidents Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono and Joko Widodo in promoting the hero title for Soeharto, as it did not directly benefit their consolidation of power.
However, the current context could be different. Given Prabowo's personal ties to Soeharto's family, and his recent efforts to reshape national history, it might well happen now.
Some commentators have noted Prabowo's strong interest in his preferred version of historical events, including his attempts to whitewash the New Order. National hero status for Soeharto could justify impunity for crimes committed under the New Order military dictatorship, with which Prabowo has long been strongly associated.
Broader public rejection is therefore essential. Granting Soeharto the status of a hero is clearly against the public interest.
But if the hero title is granted to Soeharto, it is further evidence that New Order networks never fully lost power, and that the meaningful reform has probably never really existed in Indonesia. It will be just another attempt by for elites to use democratic norms such as laws and institutions to normalise, if not glorify, authoritarian rule.