Kennedy Muslim and Burhanuddin Muhtadi – Indonesia's new president might have squandered an opportunity to start with a lean, efficient Cabinet instead of appeasing supporters and partners to form the largest Cabinet since Sukarno.
As a presidential candidate and even after securing the presidency, Indonesia's new President Prabowo Subianto often promised the electorate that he would set up a "zaken cabinet" (meaning picking the right person for the right position based on professionalism and technocratic competence). Yet, his new and hefty 48-minister Cabinet reeks of political horse-trading. There are 48 ministries up from the previous 34, five state agencies, and other new agencies to support the Cabinet. At 109 ministers (including vice ministers), Prabowo's is the largest cabinet since the era of Sukarno.
This is a lost opportunity, as Prabowo has significant political resources and public support. He did not have to accommodate that many political actors in his new government.
First, Prabowo remains the chairman and fully in control of his Gerindra party, which leads the Advanced Indonesia Coalition (Koalisi Indonesia Maju). KIM includes four parties with significant seat-shares in Parliament.
Moreover, in February, Prabowo had won the direct presidential elections (PE) with the greatest margin in history. On the eve of his inauguration, popular confidence in Prabowo was strong. The authors' survey outfit, Indikator, in recent nation-wide surveys found high public confidence in Prabowo's presidency. When asked, "How confident are you that Prabowo is able to lead Indonesia into a better future?", the level of public confidence was 83.4 per cent, significantly higher than public confidence towards Joko Widodo (Jokowi) at the start of his second term in 2020, which was 68.3 per cent (Figure 1). In fact, Jokowi won the presidency in 2014 and 2019 with lower public confidence levels than Prabowo.
Such high public confidence reflects the resounding support Prabowo enjoyed especially after he picked then Solo mayor Gibran Rakabuming Raka, Jokowi's eldest son, as his running mate last year. This strategic decision allowed Prabowo to effectively shake off the political polarisation in Indonesian politics during the 2014 and 2019 PEs, when Jokowi's and Prabowo's supporters were pitted against each other. A post-inauguration survey by a different survey company indicates that Prabowo's popularity now is just over 90 per cent, higher than that of Jokowi's upon leaving office.
Interestingly, a Kompas survey found that confidence in the new president and Prabowo's approval ratings (84.1 per cent) are notably higher than his vice president Gibran's (71 per cent). This gap and Gibran's lower rating are likely due to the strong criticism directed against Jokowi near the end of his presidency, and the controversy surrounding his family's alleged gratification and abuse of power.
Figure 1. Confidence in Widodo and Prabowo Compared (%) (see original document)
Such a high level of public confidence at the start of one's presidency can be a double-edged sword. On the one hand, for Prabowo, it can serve as significant political capital when coupled with the super-majority he has accumulated in Parliament (DPR). On the other, public optimism can be short-lived if he cannot meet the public's expectations, and if his coalition and new Cabinet fail to deliver on its policy agenda within the first year.
Many democracy activists and observers have warned against the politics of accommodation by Prabowo courting all of Indonesia's major political parties into his 'big tent' coalition. Only the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI-P) and the National Democrats (NasDem) are not represented in the Cabinet. While a super-majority coalition ensures the smooth passing of priority bills and approval of new government programmes in the DPR, Prabowo will eventually face an inevitable trade-off between political stability and governing effectiveness.
From observing past administrations, high public confidence levels and approval ratings usually drop when any new administration takes difficult but necessary policy steps, such as cutting fuel subsidies. For Prabowo, one potential compromise could be to cut such subsidies to fund crucial social assistance programmes, including his "free nutritious meals" promise, which will be among his administration's flagship policies. He has already warned his ministers that they need to support this programme or resign.
The perennial issue of sectoral ego between state ministries in Indonesian bureaucracy can also hamper effective governance. Former president Jokowi often complained about red-tape bureaucracy when it came to coordinating between ministries and agencies even under his Cabinet overseeing 34 ministries. We can only imagine how this challenge would be compounded given Prabowo's 48 ministers and ministries.
In addition, the politics of accommodation means Prabowo might have overlooked the questionable integrity of some of Jokowi's ministers, in seeking political buy-in. Seventeen of Prabowo's 48 ministers and 56 vice ministers are holdovers from Jokowi's time. Many are well respected, such as returning Minister of Finance Sri Mulyani Indrawati. A few, however, have been implicated or mentioned in connection with corruption cases, such as Coordinating Minister for Economic Affairs Airlangga Hartarto, former Golkar youth leader and minister for youth and sports Dito Ariotedjo, and vice law and human rights minister Eddy Hiariej.
With his high approval ratings, Prabowo could have established a more efficient zaken cabinet rather than a potentially cumbersome and clearly politically motivated one aimed at appeasing his supporters. Ironically, this politics of accommodation might contribute to a briefer honeymoon period for the new president.
[Kennedy Muslim is a Senior Researcher and Analyst at Indikator Politik Indonesia. Burhanuddin Muhtadi is a Visiting Senior Fellow in the Indonesia Studies Programme, ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute, and Senior Lecturer at Islamic State University (UIN) Syarif Hidayatullah.]
Source: https://fulcrum.sg/president-prabowos-politics-of-accommodation-might-mean-a-short-honeymoon