Michael Leach – When I wrote on Monday that disarming the increasingly threatening and erratic Major Alfredo Reinado had become a critical priority for national unity in East Timor, there was little indication that these concerns could be so dramatically realised within hours. Monday morning's tragic events were the precipitous endpoint of an ill-defined "negotiation" with an erratic but charismatic fugitive wanted for serious crimes arising from the 2006 crisis.
Jose Ramos Horta, the hero of the diplomatic front in the resistance struggle, now fights for his life in a Darwin hospital. Once again the culture of the gun and covert resistance threatens to overwhelm a nascent culture of democratic opposition. This culture is a hybrid legacy of Timor's desperate clandestine struggle against Indonesian occupation, but also of the Indonesian military habit of elevating military thugs to local warlord status, and awarding them a semi-legitimate "second function" as political figures.
In the short-term, it is likely that Monday's events will cause further instability as Reinado's hard-core supporters struggle to come to grips with a changed reality. However, in the mid-term they may prove a circuit-breaker. Having attacked two national heroes, and grievously wounded one, the context of Reinado's death will severely limit the capacity of his supporters to make him a political martyr. The rumours now circling in Dili that he is "not dead", or the absurd exculpatory rumour that two coordinated, unscheduled armed intrusions at 6am were a "negotiation" strategy gone wrong, attest to the difficulty of spinning these events in a politically useful way.
The position of Reinado's gang, which includes the petitioners' leader Salsinha, apparently implicated in the attack on Prime Minister Xanana Gusmao, is now politically untenable. It is likely that large numbers of the petitioners will seek to distance themselves quickly from their discredited erstwhile leader. It should be recalled that Reinado was not originally one of the petitioners, but the leader of a separate breakaway group of military police.
He has since aligned with them to provide a fig leaf to his own case, which ultimately consisted of little more than a refusal to face justice outside his own terms. As others have noted, this stance greatly complicated the resolution of the petitioners' grievances.
It is well know that as president, Gusmao strongly opposed the original sacking of the petitioners. With Reinado gone, the Prime Minister's credibility with this group should aid him in resolving their complaints. Indeed, it seems likely that a smaller group of petitioners had recently broken away to make a deal, isolating Reinado from some of his support base and perhaps setting him on his final path of destruction. Sadly, the Government's strategy did not include disarming a dangerous renegade as first priority.
Some have noted, with irony, that Ramos Horta was leading the negotiations. This is an unfair view as the new alliance Government contained some key figures sympathetic to Reinado. Ramos Horta's hand was somewhat forced in order to maintain unity in the new Government.
It is also true that the Australian Defence Force attack on Reinado's base ended up a public relations problem for the new Government, with its capacity to discredit the International Stabilisation Force presence in the eyes of many Timorese.
Sensitivity is demanded in the conduct of the Australian military. Its presence is clearly essential, but there are questions of public perception. Once renegade groups are disarmed, the Federal Government must ask whether a standing army in Dili is the best model for East Timor, especially as unclear divisions between army and police were central to the 2006 crisis.
The increased Australian police presence signalled by Rudd is a welcome move. In the long run, a reserve defence force presence, behind a police-fronted mission may be preferable.
Finally, long-standing divisions within the political elite, and the failure to sustain a unifying vision beyond the independence struggle lies behind much of the strife. As Ramos Horta lies wounded, it is clearly time to for the political elite to heal their rifts and unite with younger leaders to consign the culture of the gunmen to history.
[Michael Leach, a research fellow at Deakin University, visited the eastern region of Timor-Leste last month to research relationships between modern and traditional authorities.]