Erin Maulday – Australians should not be alarmed about the Indonesia-Russia military hardware deal worth $1.2billion, signed in Jakarta on September 6 between Indonesian President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono and Russian President Vladimir Putin. Instead, we need to understand the circumstances of the deal, and then look at the options for increased military engagement between Australia and Indonesia.
It is true that the new hardware has the potential to alter the strategic power balance in the region. The deal contains provisions for the purchase of two submarines, 22 helicopters and 20 tanks. In conjunction with previously ordered Russian fighter jets, all services of the Indonesian Armed Forces are set to benefit.
But the deal reflects also a change in the way the Indonesian Government considers its military's key role as external defence providers. This is a good thing.
Traditionally, the Indonesian Armed Forces has not operated in the same way that one expects of the Australian Defence Force. Instead, the Indonesian Armed Forces have operated more as a security force, and with good reason.
In its short history of independence, Indonesia has regularly experienced internal conflict. Aceh, East Timor and Papua are well-known examples.
A communist purge in the mid-1960s, resulting in the death of hundreds of thousands, and more recent sectarian violence in the Moluccas Islands between Christians and Muslims, are less well-known examples which have seen the armed forces employed to full effect as an internal security force.
Indonesia is an emerging democracy undergoing its most stable period of government since the fall of Suharto in 1998. And yet its military is still lagging behind in terms of what might be expected from a credible and professional defence force.
Recently, there have been signs that the Indonesian Government is looking to change this situation. The Indonesian Armed Forces Law (2004) and Indonesia's current United Nations deployment to Lebanon of an 850-strong armoured battalion are two examples of a cmmitment to become more like a professional defence force.
The Government also recognises that it needs to have a stronger conventional navy to conduct effective maritime patrols in its archipelago. Indonesia's navy is relatively old, poorly maintained, and compares badly with neighbours Singapore and Malaysia. This places Indonesia at a disadvantage when trying to play a role as an equal partner in the security of the piracy-prone Malacca Straits, which separate parts of Indonesia and Malaysia.
Indonesia's air force is suffering also, with the Government conscious of the need to own effective assets that can deter any possible external aggression.
But there is still a long way to go before we can begin calling Indonesia's military a "conventional" armed force. One feature that seems unlikely to change soon is the "territorial" command system, which sees the majority of Indonesia's army stationed in garrisons throughout the country providing domestic security. It is basically the equivalent of stationing an army base in every Australian state and territory to provide security in specific regions.
Why then has Indonesia chosen Russian military hardware over Western options? The answer has far more to do with economics than politics.
In the past, Indonesia has experienced military embargoes from the United States, which has prevented it from servicing it US military hardware. Most recently this occurred during the crisis in East Timor in 1999. There is a real fear from some countries such as Britain, that Western-made military equipment could be used in future internal security conflicts if violence was to flare up again in places such as Aceh or Papua. In addition, military hardware is expensive, especially for the big-ticket items. Indonesia is a country still finding its economic feet after the disastrous Asian economic crisis of the late 1990s. To buy expensive military hardware, Indonesia needs generous financial support, something Western nations are often reticent to provide.
Enter Russia, with its good quality military offerings, and very favourable repayment conditions a natural choice to the uncertainty of financial expense of dealing with the US. But is Russia trying to increase its strategic influence in the region as a result of this recent deal and others before it? To a certain extent the answer is yes. However, this is really an economic decision for Russia. Selling to Indonesia helps keep Russia's own defence industry in business while increasing the future trade opportunities with countries such as Indonesia.
When Putin arrived in Jakarta for the signing, he was reportedly accompanied by a number of Russian business tycoons. A deal between Indonesian mining company Aneka Tambang and Russian aluminium giant United Company Rusal worth up to $US1.5billion ($A1.8 nillion) has since been reported in the press.
So from a military perspective, how should Australia react? We should see this as a chance to increase military links above and beyond pre-East Timor crisis levels. We should encourage the Indonesian Armed Forces to continue their reform from an internal-looking security force, to a leaner and more professional externally focused force.
We should seek to increase naval ties. Perhaps the Royal Australian Navy could conduct a large maritime exercise soon after Indonesia's new submarines come into service. We should also increase our air-force engagement by conducting joint exercises.
And we should increase our land-force engagement, not just with Special Forces, but with conventional ground forces as well.
We cannot afford to see the Indonesian Armed Forces as a threat any more. They should be viewed as a regional military partner. Increasing engagement reduces suspicion. Our police and security engagement after the first Bali bombings is a testament to this approach. What we need to see now is a similar approach in our defence force ties.
[Erin Maulday is a Canberra writer with an interest in Asia-Pacific Defence and Security issues.]