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Major constraints on Aceh reconstruction

Source
Jakarta Post - October 26, 2006

Vanda Mutia Dewi, Jakarta – A recent report by Greenomics Indonesia revealed some very interesting facts about who exactly is to blame for the delays affecting the reconstruction process in Aceh.

The study found that legal and policy barriers were the most significant constraints slowing rebuilding work in Aceh, with the central government (including the House of Representatives) being responsible for 76.74 percent of the delays in this area and local administrations 23.26 percent. The most common problems concerned land titles and the finalization of local government spatial plans.

These delays clearly show that the Aceh-Nias Rehabilitation and Reconstruction Agency (BRR) is far from being the superbody it was originally planned. In reality, the BRR is a normal institution that has to follow the rules laid down by the central government.

At the center, the Offices of the President and Vice President were responsible for 16.28 percent of the delays at the legal and policy levels. Most of these delays were connected with land problems, the procurement of goods and services, special tax breaks for Aceh, flexibility as regards the disbursement of funds, and support for other policies and regulations.

However, to this must also be added the delays caused by the organ closest to these two offices, namely, the State/Cabinet Secretariats, which contributed to 6.98 percent of the delays.

This puts the Offices of the President and Vice President (taken together with the State/Cabinet Secretariats) ahead of the Finance Ministry, which was responsible for 18.60 percent of the delays, mostly due to inflexible disbursement procedures and lack of special rules designed to take the magnitude of the disaster into account.

The National Land Agency (BPN) was also found to have played a major role in the delays, with responsibility for 11.63 percent of these being laid at its door. Delays were also caused by the Forestry Ministry, House of Representatives, the National Development Planning Board (BAPPENAS) and the Justice and Human Rights Ministry.

Thus, it is clear that the BRR has been hampered in its work due to inadequate legal and policy support, mostly a result of inaction on the part of the central government. At the implementation level, the delays are once again closely connected with a lack of policy and legal support from the central government.

At the implementation level, the BRR was found to be responsible for 49.56 percent of the delays, and international institutions and NGOs 27.43 percent. These international institutions (bilateral, multilateral, UN and foreign NGOs) have shown themselves to be excessively bureaucratic and centralistic, with the result that they have contributed quite significantly to the slow pace of reconstruction.

Meanwhile, local governments in Aceh accounted for 23.01 percent of the delays, mainly due to a lack of support from local chief executives and a lack of coordination.

Based on the above, it may be concluded that the BRR still faces critical constraints at the implementation level, and shown themselves to be excessively bureaucratic and centralistic, with the result that they have contributed quite significantly to the slow pace of reconstruction.

Meanwhile, local governments in Aceh accounted for 23.01 percent of the delays, mainly due to a lack of support from local chief executives and a lack of coordination.

Based on the above, it may be concluded that the BRR still faces critical constraints at the implementation level, and suffers from a lack of adequate support from the center to enable it to do its job.

However, there are also internal constraints within the BRR. Of the delays in implementation caused by the BRR, 71.88 percent were connected with the BRR's six main deputies.

In light of the above, the BRR should not hesitate to overhaul its management system, including its personnel, with the principal objective of ensuring effectiveness, credibility and trust.

The envisaged new system of management should be capable of responding in a timely fashion to the increasingly complex problems in the field.

If we calculate the level of delays at the legal and policy levels, and also at the implementation level (total constraints on reconstruction), then the level of constraints emanating from the BRR take first place at 31.43 percent. Meanwhile, components of the central government come in second place at 28.57 percent, made up of the contributions of eightcomponents". Finally, in third and fourth place are the international institutions and Aceh local government, which contributed 22.86 percent and 17.14 percent, respectively.

It should be remembered that the public at large will put most of the blame on the BRR, as this is the body that bears the most responsibility for the success of the reconstruction work. If the work is successful, then there is no doubt that the BRR will receive endless praise and kudos, including from the President and Vice President.

Thus, whether it likes it or not, the BRR must do everything in its power to overcome the total constraints on reconstruction by publishing regular performance reports.

In this way, the public will be informed who is actually responsible for slowing down the reconstruction work in Aceh, even if the delays emanate from the Office of the President or Vice President. This is part of what we mean by democratizing reconstruction – something that has never happened before in Indonesia.

However, what the BRR has been doing to date has been highly counterproductive, namely, providing excessive exposure for its successes, particularly through the media. In reality, the conditions on the ground do not provide adequate justification for these sort of public relations stunts.

Accordingly, the impression arises that there is a campaign underway to unjustifiably boost the image of the BRR – something that is causing a lot of unease and resentment among the people of Aceh, particularly those who suffered in the tsunami and politicians who are concerned about the pace of reconstruction.

[The writer is national coordinator of Greenomics Indonesia. She can be reached at vandamutia@greenomics.org.]

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