[Soeharto File: Sisi Gelap Sejarah Indonesia (Soeharto File: The dark side of Indonesia's history) Asvi Warman Adam Ombak, Yogyakarta, March 2006 245 pp.]

Zamaahsari A. Ramzah, Yogyakarta – Asvi Warman Adam's Soeharto File: Sisi Gelap Sejarah Indonesia (Soeharto File: The dark side of Indonesia's history) is meant neither to benefit from the success gleaned by Antonie C.A. Dake's Sukarno File: Kronologi Suatu Keruntuhan (Sukarno File: Chronology of a fall) or to counter Dake's book, which contains much controversy in accusing Sukarno of being involved in the bloody incident known as the September 30, 1965 Movement, or G30S.

Asvi's book is meant to reveal the involvement of another actor behind this incident, which has claimed the greatest number of lives in Indonesia's history of political violence.

The writer does not deny the involvement of a foreign party – the US's Central Intelligence Agency – nor of the Indonesian military as a result of the rivalry within the armed forces. This latter element also includes the involvement of Sukarno, as many observers and historians have long believed.

The "other actor", according to Asvi, is Soeharto. To prove the correctness of his analysis, the writer views this matter by approaching it via the transition of power from Sukarno to Soeharto, which he believes was not a natural succession.

First, this transition began with the attempted G30S coup d'etat and second, it ended with the issuance in 1966 of the March 11 Presidential Executive Order, which is better known as its Bahasa Indonesia acronym of Supersemar.

Y. Pohan (1988) has summed up the events that occurred between Oct. 1, 1965 and March 11, 1966 as a "crawling coup", while Saskia Eleonora Wieringa (1999) refers to the Oct. 1, 1965 incident as the "first coup" and the March 11, 1966 event as the second coup.

On the other hand, Peter Dale-Scott views this event as a three-stage coup: First came the September 30 Movement, a "false coup"; second, the revenge, which took the form of the massacre of members of the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) and third, the eradication of the remnants of Sukarno's power.

Asvi is highly convinced that Soeharto was involved in the first two major events, namely the G30S coup in 1965 and the Supersemar coup in 1966.

It was very clear that Soeharto was involved in the second "coup". Although Soeharto argued that he had not forced Sukarno's hand, in actuality his lieutenants and three generals made Sukarno issue the Supersemar at gunpoint. Aside from this, on the morning of March 11, 1965, unidentified troops were found deployed around the presidential palace so that Sukarno decided to leave for Bogor.

Perhaps Soeharto was not the one who conceived the idea for the first coup, but he at least had some preliminary knowledge about the plan, as well as about the existence of the Council of Generals. The greatest benefit from this failed "coup attempt" went to General Soeharto.

Sukarno was most disadvantaged by this coup, because he fell short of condemning the PKI and so left an impression that he was implicated in this incident. Furthermore, the cabinet Sukarno formed following the Oct. 1, 1965 incident still accommodated some representatives from the PKI (p. 80).

While Soeharto is an excellent strategist, Asvi believes he is not a grand master that can devise his moves far in advance. In most cases, Soeharto was lucky in that he was able to capitalize on an opportunity.

In short, it was a play without a theatrical director or a well-written script. Soeharto was not the puppeteer; instead, he was an actor skilled at improvisation (p. 18).

Tornquist (1984) and Saskia (1999) have said exactly the same things about Soeharto.

Tornquist believes it was very likely that Soeharto was watching the events unfolding before him, waiting for the right moment to overtake both Sukarno and Gen. Nasution. Meanwhile, Saskia believes that when Soeharto eventually moved to act, he did so firmly and swiftly, implementing his scheme to depose Sukarno while making his way up to the top seat of the country.

As for Soeharto's involvement in the first coup, this became increasingly obvious a few days after the incident. Aside from controlling the state radio station, Radio Republik Indonesia (RRI), Soeharto and his army officers controlled the mass media. Prominent pro-Sukarno newspapers like Warta Bhakti, which they believed would oppose them, was banned.

Then the army launched its propaganda through the military press, such as Angkatan Bersenjata and Berita Yudha, to sow enmity against the PKI. They reported, for example, that the seven G30S victims dumped into a well at Lubang Buaya had been mutilated. They said the bodies of the six generals and one lieutenant had been cut open by hundreds of razors, that their genitals had been cut off and their eyes cut out.

This report later turned out to be untrue. A forensic report drawn up by a doctor who had conducted a post-mortem on the victims' bodies showed he did not find any evidence of mutilation (p. 54).

Aside from uncovering Soeharto's involvement in the G30S and Supersemar incidents, Soeharto File also exposes the political sins and gross human rights violations committed during Soeharto's New Order era.

Among these are: the banishment of political detainees to Buru Island (1969-1979); killings in Irian Jaya, East Timor, Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam, Lampung and Jakarta's Tanjung Priok; the July 27, 1996 attack on the headquarters of PDI-P and the Trisakti incident and Semanggi affair of 1998.

Regarding Soeharto's alleged practices of corruption, collusion and nepotism (KKN), Asvi proposes moving Soeharto abroad in order to make it easier to investigate into the wealth he collected and the crimes he committed when he was in power – Soeharto can be tried in absentia. A similar method has been adopted by many other countries: in the Philippines against Ferdinand Marcos; in Iran against Shah Reza Pahlevi; in Haiti against Duvalier; in Nicaragua against Somoza and in Congo against Mobutu.

Asvi even lists 10 reasons why Soeharto must be tried in a court of law. In addition, according to Ben Anderson, Soeharto had caused the Unnatural deaths of over 800,000 Indonesians during his rule.

Regardless of the "merit" that Soeharto recorded when he was in power, he indeed deserves to be tried for various gross violations of human rights.

[The writer is a student of the School of Social and Political Sciences at Muhammadiyah University, Yogyakarta.]