Jeffrey Robertson, Canberra – When an old and near-forgotten acquaintance arrives unexpected on your doorstep you're entitled to ask what he wants and why he wants it – two questions that were no doubt on the mind of new Indonesian President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono when Australian Prime Minister John Howard arrived in Indonesia on Thursday.

The primary reason for Howard's visit was to start the slow process of building a personal relationship with Yudhoyono that will form the basis of a longer-term aim: the negotiation of a new security agreement between Australia and Indonesia.

Australian Foreign Minister Alexander Downer, who described the original security pact as a "fairly meaningless document", first telegraphed the idea that Australia would be interested in negotiating a new security agreement with Indonesia last Sunday on morning television. By Tuesday, after just the right amount of time for the regional media to swallow and digest the idea, Howard was off to Jakarta to observe the swearing-in of Indonesia's new president.

Howard's presence at Yudhoyono's inauguration is novel in two aspects. First, it marks an unexpected shift in foreign policy by Howard, who only a few weeks earlier during the Australian election campaign stated that he would not hesitate to launch a preemptive strike if Australian interests in the region were threatened – a statement that has in the past received a less than lukewarm regional reception. Second, it represents a departure from the protocol of past Indonesian presidential inaugurations, which unlike their counterparts in the United States have traditionally been purely domestic affairs.

This change in ceremony caused a flurry of regional diplomatic activity. Not wanting inadvertently to cause offense, or be diplomatically outmaneuvered in currying favor with the next leader of Southeast Asia's most populous state, regional diplomats scurried to position a leader, dignitary or at least a special envoy within smiling distance of the inauguration ceremony.

Also at the ceremony were Malaysian Prime Minister Abdullah Badawi, the Sultan of Brunei and the leader of East Timor, as well as special envoys from the Netherlands, Thailand and Japan. Howard, along with a series of the other leaders, had a short meeting with Yudhoyono after his inauguration, but it's a fair bet that none had such a hot conversation starter for the informal discussion as did Howard.

The potential negotiation of a new security agreement has a somewhat checkered history in both Australia and Indonesia. The original security pact was signed in 1995 by then-Australian prime minister Paul Keating and Indonesian president Suharto. It contained provisions for consultation on matters affecting common security; the consideration of measures to address adverse challenges to either party; and the promotion of mutually beneficial cooperative activities.

From its start the security agreement sparked controversy among Australian political circles, lauded for its foresight in engaging Asia and criticized for the secretive nature in which it was negotiated. On the positive side, the agreement changed the public perception of Australian security from an understanding based on security from Asia to one based on security within Asia. On the negative side, the agreement raised questions about the nature of Australia's political system: the agreement had been negotiated in secret by a special envoy to prime minister Keating and was first announced fait accompli at a press conference bypassing the scrutiny of parliamentary debate.

In Indonesia, on the other hand, the security agreement initially stirred little interest. A select few, most notably retired General Hasnan Habib, decried the agreement, claiming it violated Indonesia's long-standing policy of non-alignment. But within four years, the security agreement was the center of public ire as Australia led the United Nations-sanctioned international force, the International Force in East Timor (Interfet), that would result in East Timor's independence. Since that time, there has been little public interest in negotiating a new agreement with Australia, given the increasingly negative perception of Australia's close association with the United States – from Afghanistan to Iraq.

This raises the question of whether the Australian and Indonesian people are ready for another security agreement – or is it another case of politicians putting the "security cart" before the horse?

Both Howard and Yudhoyono have strong electoral mandates that may enable them to overcome domestic resistance to a new security agreement. Yudhoyono, who beat out incumbent Megawati Sukarnoputri after capturing more than 60% of the vote in a runoff, comes into office with a mandate that matches Howard's remarkable election victory. However, neither politician mentioned plans to negotiate a new security agreement during the election period. If they had, their mandates might not have been so convincing.

Besides, an electoral mandate does not transform into foreign-policy success – particularly when the brand of foreign policy does not adequately reflect domestic policy initiatives.

Before negotiating a security agreement Yudhoyono must address the thorny issue of fundamentalist schools espousing hatred of the West, and Howard would do well to reinstate funding for Asian language programs in schools, cut by his government in its first term.

Both leaders have domestic tasks that have the potential to provide greater long-term security and understanding than another security agreement that, with the passage of time, may eventually prove to be just another "fairly meaningless document".

[Jeffrey Robertson is a political affairs analyst focusing on Australian relations with Northeast Asia. He currently resides in Canberra.]