John Aglionby – When Jakarta declared martial law in Aceh in May and launched it latest offensive to crush the separatist Free Aceh Movement (GAM) rebels following the collapse of a five-month ceasefire, six months was deemed sufficient time to end the 27-year-long insurgency on the northern tip of Sumatra.

But within days of the theatrical "shock and awe" opening salvo, some of Indonesia's top brass were venturing an additional six months would be needed. By the end of the first month no one in Jakarta was talking about six months any longer.

But they declined to, and 100 days in continue to decline to, discuss how much time will be needed. In fact ministers and the martial law administrator, Major General Endang Suwarya, decline to discuss much about the "integrated operation", as the offensive is euphemistically described, beyond its broadest goals.

This nirvana involves crushing GAM, restoring peace, security, law and order, rebuilding local government and kick starting the economy.

If there is a road map explaining how to get there it has yet to be made public. Indeed it does not seem to have even been circulated amongst the relevant government and military agencies because the current Aceh policy is striking by its conspicuous lack of unanimity, clarity and direction.

A classic example of this is the definition of crushing GAM. The senior security minister, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, has repeatedly said the military operation will continue until GAM and its leadership have been eliminated. So far not one senior leader has been killed, captured or surrendered.

The military commander in Aceh, Major General Bambang Darmono, in contrast, readily admits further negotiation with GAM is almost certain to be necessary to bring closure to the conflict.

Who is telling the truth? General Bambang, probably. But if so, who will Jakarta negotiate with? The last batch of five negotiators is currently on trial for treason relating to charges that appear rather spurious – even though the government guaranteed their security in writing. In such circumstances there is unlikely to be a queue forming to volunteer to be their replacements.

Jakarta is clearly hoping that if their backs are driven hard enough against the wall, the GAM leadership will beg to negotiate just to preserve their movement in any form. But GAM does not have a history of being willing to compromise; many of its leaders believe Indonesia will eventually collapse and as long as they are still alive they will be able to pick up the pieces. The one time the movement did compromise, at the last-ditch talks to save the ceasefire, Jakarta responded with even tougher demands. Hardly the foundation for lasting trust and goodwill.

If Minister Bambang is lying, why does he feel unable to tell the truth? The obvious answer is that he does not want to give GAM false hope. But if that is the case, why is his military commander on the ground not singing from the same song sheet? And why has Minister Bambang asked the intermediaries who brokered the last ceasefire, the Geneva-based Henry Dunant Centre, to remain in the country if their services are no longer required? Without the articulation of common medium to long-term goals, the short-term developments appear disjointed and, at times, at odds with the grand strategic aims.

Such confusion at the top becomes greatly magnified by the time it reaches the ground in Aceh. No one has any idea what the short-term, let alone the long-term, holds. A sense of hopeless and helpless resignation seems to pervade the street corners, coffee shops and cafes throughout the province – from the most pro-Jakarta businessmen eagerly saluting the Indonesian flag at Independence Day rallies to the legions of subsistence farmers struggling to make a living.

Perhaps this analysis is being harsh on Jakarta. Perhaps in three months, at the end of the first six months of military operations, GAM will be just an insignificant rump and the wheels of government and the local economy will be turning smoothly.

But with police and senior local government officials admitting the rebuilding of the government has yet to begin effectively in many sub-districts, the most essential building blocks to win hearts and minds are not yet even in place. Much of the cement to stick them together – such as a thriving civil society, international aid organisations, a free press – has also been crushed.

Even if they were all in place, the ubiquitous hostility and suspicion will not dissipate quickly, particularly as there has still been no concerted effort to address the grievances built up over the first 26 years of the conflict or the preceding decades that sparked the insurgency.

With such a muddled strategy and unfocused tactics the likelihood of a speedy resolution to the conflict is extremely remote.

GAM is certainly losing support in some areas – although the restrictions on foreign journalists are so limiting it is impossible to get an accurate picture of the whole province. But this does not mean the Acehnese are automatically falling in love with the beautiful strangers from Jakarta, to quote the Madonna song playing recently on the radio station set up by the Indonesian military.

Another line from the same song still resonates more loudly with most Acehnese: "You're the devil in disguise".