Sidney Jones, Indonesia project director of Brussels-based analysts International Crisis Group suggests that the Jakarta government has an electoral interest in stirring up a nationalist backlash against foreign involvement in peace talks with separatists in Aceh.

She argues that Indonesia's hardline military operations will alienate civilians in the troubled province and push them towards the guerrillas. Jones, who has 20 years experience of working in and on Indonesia, previously worked for Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch.

On May 19, Aceh's fragile peace process collapsed, and the Indonesian government declared a state of emergency in the rebellious province.

Little over a month later, military operations have resulted in hundreds of deaths, hundreds of arrests, intimidation of government critics, controls on the press, and restrictions on access.

The Indonesian government appears to have lost sight completely of winning over an alienated population, and a return to the negotiating table is unlikely any time soon.

In the Indonesian government's eyes, negotiations were a disaster and simply succeeded in strengthening the Free Aceh movement, the guerrilla group known by its Indonesian acronym, GAM. Jakarta politicians are using the military operations to appeal to a strongly nationalist streak in the Indonesian populations, and as a result, there is strong public support for crushing the rebels.

It is not clear that either side is willing to make the compromises necessary to resume peace talks. Both sides bear responsibility for the failure of the Cessation of Hostilities Agreement that was signed last December 9.

The agreement left many issues unresolved, and each side disseminated its own interpretation of what the political endgame would be. GAM said it was independence, the government said it was autonomy under Indonesian sovereignty.

There were disagreements over how GAM would disarm, and how the Indonesian army would "relocate". The two sides had radically different interpretations of a reference in the agreement to a free election in Aceh in 2004.

To the government, it meant that GAM would take part in national elections under existing election laws which do not allow regionally-based parties, while to GAM it meant a referendum on Aceh's political status.

GAM used the dramatic reduction in violence during the first two months of the ceasefire to regroup, rearm and recruit new members, and in response, the army began to actively undermine the agreement.

A last-minute effort in Tokyo to salvage the agreement failed, and the Indonesian military, consciously using the US-led war in Iraq as a model, launched long-planned operations within days.

The distrust generated between the two sides would make it hard enough to resume negotiations, but there are additional obstacles.

The Indonesian military may be using the operations as a springboard to greatly increased political influence as the 2004 national elections approach.

If it succeeds in controlling information domestically, and portraying the counterinsurgency effort as a success, it may be hoping to get parliamentary support for winning back control over internal security from the police.

Military-police rivalry has become a dangerous staple of Indonesian politics. The professionalism of the police investigations into the Bali bombings in October 2002 seemed to be helping the demilitarisation of internal security; but the Aceh operations can be seen as an assault on that process.

All indications so far are that the Indonesian public, except for most Acehnese and a small but vocal group of activists and intellectuals, remains solidly behind the use of force.

This may change, but as the country approaches its first direct presidential election ever next year, having a popular issue around which to mobilise nationalist support is crucial.

Not a single politician with presidential aspirations has raised serious criticism or concerns about the conduct of the military in Aceh. On the contrary, they have disparaged the negotiations and questioned international involvement in the conflict.

They have pointed to the involvement of a Geneva-based organisation, the Henri Dunant Centre, which participated from the start by facilitating the talks. Jakarta politicians have also questioned the motivations of the United States, Japan, and the European Union, which gave the most visible international backing to peace talks.

The fact that the GAM leadership in exile is based in Sweden has only fuelled the nationalist backlash against foreign meddling.

All of this bodes ill for any early resumption of negotiations. But if and when the political climate improves, the December 9 agreement could still provide the basic framework for discussion under certain conditions.

- Both sides must be willing to offer a different set of negotiators. Given the mutual suspicions and allegations of bad faith, it is hard to see how the same teams used to negotiate the December 9 agreement could be effective in a new round.

- Rather than a non-governmental organisation as mediator, the facilitator of talks should be a government, with the ability to enforce sanctions against violators of the agreement. 7 Both sides show more willingness to compromise on some of the fundamental issues.

Heavy international pressure on Indonesia at present to return to negotiations could be counterproductive.

Any lobbying from the United States and Britain in particular is going to fall on deaf ears, as many Indonesians, including powerful members of the political elite, say that Indonesia is on far stronger ground using military force in Aceh than the coalition forces were in Iraq. The European Union's position is weakened by public anger – manipulated or genuine – at Sweden for harbouring the GAM leadership.

Japan is the one country involved in the earlier negotiations to have retained strong credibility with the Indonesian government, and if negotiations become possible at a later date, Tokyo is likely to play a key role.

Without losing sight of opportunities for renewed negotiations, the international effort should be to keep the operations under as much scrutiny as possible; request regular visits to Aceh even if that means accompaniment by a government escort; support local efforts to document the conduct of operations; provide humanitarian support and ensure transparency of relief operations; and work in any way possible toward the development of stronger civilian institutions in Aceh, including in the justice sector.

The Indonesian government speaks of encouraging Acehnese to return to the embrace of the motherland. This embrace is more like an iron grip, and it may be creating a second and third generation of GAM rebels.