Phar Kim Beng, Hong Kong – As the international spotlight focuses its glare upon the Bali bombing trial in Jakarta and renewed separatist violence in Aceh, it is all too easy to assume that Indonesia is a hotbed of radical Islam. But this is to ignore the bigger picture, and the distinctive features of Islam as it is practiced in the world's most populous Muslim nation.
The conventional view of Islam in Southeast Asia stresses its peaceful and moderate aspects. Azyumardi Azra, rector of the State Institute for Islamic Studies (IAIN), says it is "simplistic" to think of Indonesian Islam as the same as Islam in the Middle East. Former president Abdulrahman Wahid added: "The difference between Islam in Saudi Arabia and Indonesia is that the former does not know the difference between Islam and its culture."
Indonesian Islam gained its presence in slow and peaceful penetration over the centuries. In the process, it integrated with folkloric beliefs and local customs. Because of the less rigid structure of Indonesian traditional society (including the active role of women in public life), it is also more tolerant and inclusive. The inheritance laws in Minangkabau in Sumatra, for instance, are matriarchal.
Although there are up to 100,000 Islamic schools (pesantren) in Indonesia, links with the West remain strong, especially among the leading elites. Nurcholish Majid, by far the most important intellectual in Indonesia, has a PhD from the University of Chicago, a distinction shared with Amien Rais, the current Speaker of the Indonesian parliament. Azyumardi Azra, who has considerable influence among Muslims in Indonesia, is himself a PhD holder from Columbia University in New York, with a dissertation on the network of ulama or religious scholars in Indonesia and the Middle East.
Facilitated by the role of IAIN, investments in universities and educational exchanges have also spawned a new Islamic elite that moves easily between the Muslim and Western worlds. Thus, while there are many versions of Islam with competing interpretations, it is invariably the liberal and tolerant version that remains the dominant one.
Indeed, Indonesian Islam is not necessarily in contradiction to democratic values that stress the importance of government accountability and transparency – a repudiation of the thesis peddled by Bernard Lewis of Princeton University that Islam and democracy cannot co-exist. To the extent that there is radical Islamic activism of the Wahhabi variety in Indonesia, it has been concentrated in Aceh, which is fighting a separatist war. The radical Islam of Aceh has not proliferated to other parts of Indonesia. If anything, its austere Islam has remained localized, this despite its ongoing conflict with Jakarta – a 27-year quarrel that is poised to be prolonged given the collapse of the recent peace initiative.
Granted that the general characteristic of Indonesian Islam is moderate, how then do we account for the increasing radicalization of political Islam in Indonesia?
As recently as April 27, a bomb exploded in Jakarta's international airport, injuring 11 people. Although no one claimed responsibility for the bombing, the blast came four days after Abu Bakar Ba'asyir – the alleged spiritual leader of the al-Qaeda-linked Islamic group Jemaah Islamiyah – went on trial for treason. It also followed the arrest of 18 members of the group, including three wanted in the October 12 Bali bombings that killed 202 people.
To be sure, political violence is neither novel nor new in Indonesia. It has a pedigree from the very beginning of modern Indonesia. Under its first president Sukarno, Indonesia was a major source of insecurity during the first half of the 1960s.
However, what differentiates the previous spasm of violence from the current one is the absence of any intense ideological rivalry. The emerging Islamic parties are involved in political violence almost by default, due to failure to control their party members.
Unlike Indonesian politics of the 1950s, which had the participation of Islamic parties, currently individuals are more important than the Islamic parties they seek to represent. And they can't exert complete control on their party machineries yet.
Hence, powerful individuals, rather than parties, continue to maneuver for office, with some of their members resorting to unsavory methods to advance their objectives. This is getting even more intense given the impending elections of next year.
The two most doctrinaire parties, PPP (Partai Persatuan Pembagunan), otherwise known as the United Development Party, and PBB (Partai Bulan Bintang), for instance, continue to focus on the Jakarta Charter, a proposition that was defeated in the 1945 constitution that held that Muslims must follow sharia or Islamic law. Yet both are not above the use of physical intimidation.
In fact, no party had a paramilitary wing in the 1950s. According to the findings of Greg Fealy, a lecturer in Southeast Asian politics and history at Australian National University: "Now every party, Islamic or otherwise, has an auxiliary organization, from well-trained cadres to ordinary hooligans."
Some even believe that groups such as Laskar Jihad, which has now been disbanded, existed with the patronage and support of the Indonesian military.
This speaks as much about the perilous state of the Indonesian government, which is unable to control the activities of radical Islamic parties or groups, as about the weak social structure of Indonesia.
In fact, the social structure of Indonesia remains very much shaped by transmigration and economic migrants. Today's Islamic radicals also grew up in the 1970s and 1980s, at the height of Suharto's New Order. They are currently motivated to taste power in the vacuum, which reinforces their aggressive tactics. Economic hardship and weak government enforcement have also strengthened their level of aggression and frustration.
Said Rizal Sukma, the director of studies at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Jakarta: "There are now 40 million people unemployed, with 1.3 million internally displaced refugees from ethnic and religious conflicts."
Furthermore, up to 70 percent of the entire Muslim population, currently estimated to be 212 million people, lives mainly in Java and Sumatra. The collective social and political pressures cannot be anything but acute. Indeed, to put it bluntly, the problem of radical Islam in Indonesia may not so much be religious as it is social and political. It is for this reason that almost all cases of political violence perpetrated in the name of Islam have been urban-based.
Nevertheless, the specter of radical Islam in Indonesia should be assessed in perspective. The largest mainstream Muslim organizations, the Nahdlatul Ulama and Muhammdiyah, have been overshadowed by media attention to radical groups. In keeping with the news momentum generated by the horrific attacks of September 11, 2001, followed by the bombings in Bali last October 12, the media have trained their sights on FPI (Front Pembela Islam), Laskar Jihad, the MMI (Majlis Mujahideen Indonesia), otherwise known as the Indonesian Council of Jihad Fighters, and JAMI (Jemaah al Ikhwan al Muslimin Indonesia).
These four Islamic groups share one characteristic: FPI's Habib Rizq Shihab, Laskar Jihad's Jafar Umar Thalib, MMI's Abu Bakar Ba'asyir and Habib al Habsyi of JAMI are all of Arab descent. These groups preach a literal interpretation of Islam and claim that Muslims should practice only "pure" Islam as practiced by the Prophet Mohammed and his companions.
Be that as it may, while all radical groups in Indonesia have some connections with theological or organizational groups elsewhere, including the Middle East, it is difficult to establish a connection with al-Qaeda. The International Crisis Group (ICG) in Jakarta has not found any links between al-Qaeda and these groups.
In fact, leaders of the FPI, Laskar Jihad and JAMI have criticized Osama bin Laden (only the MMI has withheld such criticism). If their disavowal of al-Qaeda is to be believed, their statements imply that radical as they may be, they are still trying to work within the local ambit of Indonesian politics, which remain convoluted and saddled with corruption.
At the same time, the Islamic parties are themselves unable to rein in the members of their overzealous members. This is especially true with the individuals leading the parties. As they too are no less ambitious, creating a pernicious dynamic where Islam is easily abused for the sake of power politics.