Sidney Jones – The war on terror is well under way in Southeast Asia, leading to concern among many civil rights leaders. Over the last two decades, the Philippines, Thailand and Indonesia have removed authoritarian leaders, curbed the power of the politicised military and expanded civil liberties. Those gains cannot be easily reversed, but they can be eroded and there are fears the war on terror will do just that.
On November 3, in the wake of the Bali bombings which killed more than 190 people, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations issued a declaration on terrorism, saying: "We resolve to intensify our efforts, collectively and individually, to prevent, counter and suppress the activities of terrorist groups in the region." The Asean governments commended Indonesia and the Philippines for their determination to step up their efforts.
Just before the Asean summit, Malaysia announced it would host the Asean Regional Training Centre for Counter-Terrorism. Governments in the region are making political, legal and institutional commitments to fighting terror, but many non-governmental leaders remain concerned that terrorism is a poorly defined act, and anti-terror initiatives can be used to serve other political agendas. Human rights organisations, in particular, have been concerned since the September 11 attacks that the war on terror would bring restrictions on hard -won civil liberties.
To date, no government in the region has been as indifferent to international human rights standards in its pursuit of anti-terror goals as the United States. No government in the region has had Washington's inclination to round up suspects for minor immigration infractions or subject young men to lengthy interviews by internal security officials because of their national origin or Islamic background. And none, fortunately, has had the capacity to establish a Guantanamo-like detention centre where no national laws apply.
But Southeast Asians are right to feel uneasy. They fear, based on the experience of the recent past, that new anti-terrorism measures will lead to arbitrary detention; the military will be strengthened at the expense of civilian institutions; and that protection of the rights of migrants and asylum seekers will be undermined. In countries making the transition from authoritarian rule, the notion of giving more power to security forces is anathema.
Indonesian and Malaysian human rights activists are perhaps the most worried on this count. Many Indonesians fear a new anti-terrorism "decree in lieu of legislation" adopted last month will permit sweeping arrests of politically radical but non-violent Muslims or of supporters of independence in Aceh and Papua. The decree is considerably less draconian than the Internal Security Act in Malaysia or Singapore. Nevertheless, Indonesia has a troubled history of using broadly worded legislation to go after what an army officer once referred to as "the extreme left, the extreme right, and the extreme centre" – or, respectively, communists, radical Muslims and non-governmental organisations.
Given the openness of post-Suharto Indonesia, a massive witch-hunt is probably not possible. At the same time, the new decree allows looser rules of evidence than the Indonesian criminal code, including the use of intelligence reports as a basis for arrests. While those reports have to be reviewed by a judge, the Indonesian court system is so weak and corrupt that judicial review hardly constitutes a meaningful safeguard.
In Malaysia, where Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad has used the Internal Security Act against political opponents, there is concern that the war on terror has given the government new justification for a law that many reformers had hoped to see abolished. Brutality and injustice can also undermine the fight against terrorism.
In the bombings that Jemaah Islamiah were alleged to have carried out across Indonesia on Christmas Eve 2000, one group arrested in North Sumatra were badly tortured and confessed to whatever the police wanted.
No one questions the need for accurate intelligence and the need to take measures to prevent acts of terror. The problem is when extraordinary powers are given to institutions with a history of abuse.
There are also fears that civilian police will lose out to military and specialised intelligence agencies. The most visible manifestation of this was the US troop presence in the southern Philippines, "training" combat soldiers to fight the Abu Sayyaf in Mindanao.
The greatest concern about upsetting the delicate civilian-military balance, however, comes from Indonesia, where the police and military are engaged in a battle for turf, resources and influence. The Indonesian police are unquestionably poorly trained, corrupt and intensely disliked. But if Indonesians want civilians to be in charge of internal security, there is no choice other than to build up the police and keep nudging the military towards external defence.
With Washington seeking to reopen officer training programmes in the Indonesian military, and the Australian government wanting to restore ties with army special forces, the danger is that in the rush to find allies, the international community may ease the pressure on the Indonesian military to reform.
Another issue is the impact on migrant workers. In July, the world saw a humanitarian disaster unfold as Malaysia cracked down on undocumented migrants, most of them Indonesians and Filipinos. The crackdown may have been related in part to a well-founded fear of radical Muslim groups from the Philippines and Indonesia using Malaysia as a base of activities. A new amendment to the immigration law, passed in March, increased penalties for undocumented workers, but gave the migrants an amnesty from prosecution until August 1, so they could return home and get proper papers. In the disaster that followed, thousands of people returned to Indonesia with virtually no preparations having been made at transit points to house or feed them, let alone prepare the necessary documents. Dozens died and extortion of desperate migrants by unscrupulous officials was rampant.
Preventing infiltration by Muslim extremists was not the only reason for Malaysia's crackdown, but it suggests the war on terror has the potential to affect the well-being not just of political activists who may get caught up in security sweeps, but of a much larger section of the population.
In safeguards against terrorism, it is necessary to understand that draconian measures serve the interests of radicals, not moderates. In the long run, ending corruption and strengthening the courts are better weapons in this war than sweeping anti-terror decrees.
[Sidney Jones is the Indonesia project director of the International Crisis Group.]