Lincoln Wright – Two star witnesses behind the allegation that Defence knew beforehand of the murder of five Australian journalists at Balibo in 1975 now maintain they never saw an intelligence intercept warning that Indonesian forces were planning the killings.

Ian Cunliffe and George Brownbill, who worked for the Hope Royal Commission in the 1970s, have denied they saw a translation of a prior order to kill the journalists from Indonesian General Benny Murdani to his commander in the field, Colonel Kalbuadi Dading.

They claim they only saw an intelligence report of the killings "after" they occurred in the early hours of October 16, when Indonesian special forces, under the command of Yufus Yuniah, stormed Balibo and murdered the Australian media party.

The clarification of what Mr Cunliffe and Mr Brownbill actually saw, contained in two new letters to Quadrant magazine, is expected to have a big influence over intelligence watchdog Bill Blick's investigation into the Balibo affair.

Mr Blick, the Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security, is now aware of the latest development in the case and his report, now largely complete, has been passed for comment to the Defence Signals Directorate, the intelligence agency at the heart of the dispute over Balibo.

The allegation that Australia had prior knowledge of the Balibo murders but failed to act has been based on mostly unnamed intelligence sources, and until now the testimony provided by Mr Cunliffe and Mr Brownbill was regarded as crucial.

The different charge that Australian intelligence knew after the fact that the murders had taken place, but that it covered them up, is more generally accepted, and Mr Cunliffe and Mr Brownbill stand by that claim.

The testimony had been used by Professor Des Ball and journalist Hamish McDonald in their book, Death in Balibo, Lies in Canberra to argue that Australian officialdom not only knew of the killings after they had occurred, but also beforehand. Their testimony had also been used by Dr Paul Monk, a former intelligence analyst, who had written a piece for Quadrant speculating about the intercept, which he called 'M-15'.

The implication of Death in Balibo, Lies in Canberra was that Australia might have had time to contact Indonesia and stop the murders, but that did not happen because Defence wanted to keep secret its electronic listening activities.

The authors of the book had described this "missing" intercept about General Murdani's intentions as 'one of the most tightly guarded secrets in the history of the Australian intelligence community'.

But Mr Cunliffe has told Quadrant he did not know of any such intercept "supporting the proposition that Benny Murdani told a Colonel Dading on or about 15th October 1975 to kill the journalists then at Balibo".

"I gave evidence to the second Sherman Inquiry into these matters ... But my evidence to Sherman was not about the alleged intercept which Monk calls 'M-15'. I know nothing of M-15 except what I read in Dr Monk's article," Mr Cunliffe said.

In his letter, Mr Brownbill told the magazine much the same thing, and that his testimony to the second Sherman Inquiry did not support the argument of Death in Balibo that Australia had prior knowledge.

Mr Blick was asked in January by the then defence minster John Moore to investigate claims that intelligence material relating to Balibo may have been mishandled.

Mr Cunliffe and Mr Brownbill had visited Australia's secret listening station at Shoal Bay, near Darwin, in 1977 where they were shown a translated interception of a communication between Indonesian soldiers about the Balibo murders. That intercepted message apparently said, "Among the dead are four [sic] white men. What are we going to do with the bodies?"