On 6 and 7 June, the Indonesian government went ahead with controversial plans to register East Timorese refugees in West Timor and determine whether they wished to remain in Indonesia or return to East Timor. With militias still in control of the refugee camps and security conditions preventing the direct involvement of the international community, the process was a dangerous sham which has done nothing to contribute to the safe repatriation or re-settlement of the refugees.
The final figures for the registration showed that 295,751 refugees were registered of which 113,794 were over the age of 17 years. Of those over 17, 98.02 per cent opted to remain in Indonesia. These figures – both for the total number of refugees and the proportion wishing to remain in Indonesia – are far too high and clearly do not reflect the refugees' real wishes and long-term intentions. Local NGOs estimate that around 65 per cent of the refugees would prefer to return to East Timor at some stage.
The fact that the international community allowed the Indonesian government to go ahead with the registration is highly regrettable. Serious questions have to be asked about why the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) funded almost half the costs (using money provided by the European Union) and why the UN Transitional Administration for East Timor (UNTAET) and the International Organisation for Migration (IOM) lent credibility to the process by sending observers. Their involvement begs the question as to who will challenge the Indonesian authorities' handling of the refugee crisis and who is actually looking after the interests of the refugees. Almost two years after the East Timorese were forced into West Timor, it appears that the answer is nobody.
International diplomatic and media attention on the refugee crisis has waxed and waned since September 1999 when over 250,000 East Timorese were forcibly driven to West Timor following the post-ballot violence in East Timor. There was some renewal of interest after the murder of three UNHCR workers in Atambua, West Timor in September 2000, which resulted in the withdrawal of all international aid organisations and UN agencies. However, consistent and significant lobbying on behalf of the refugees has never materialised in either an international or East Timorese context.
Ironically, more international outrage was expressed over the light sentences handed out to those charged in connection with the UNHCR killings than was expressed over the plight of the tens of thousands of refugees who had been without significant humanitarian assistance for nine months. Never mind the fact that there has been no justice for the West Timorese also killed by militia in and around Atambua at the time of the UNHCR killings.
Indonesia presses ahead regardless
In this vacuum of international concern, the Indonesian government forged ahead with its own solution to the problem with very little resistance from any quarter. The registration process it conducted was deeply flawed. In particular, it did not address the rampant militia intimidation, corruption and aggression that would prevent the refugees making a free and informed choice.
In November 2000, a UN Security Council mission to East Timor recommended that a team of experts should assess the security situation in West Timor and that the registration process should not start until the team had verified that it could be carried out safely. That security assessment was only started on 8 July, after the registration was completed.
The official participation of organisations such as UNTAS (a pro-integration political organisation associated with the militias) in publicising the registration undermined the neutrality of the process and should have been prohibited at all stages. The fact that the actual outcome almost matched an UNTAS prediction that 95 per cent of refugees would indicate a wish to remain in Indonesia is a clear indication that the whole process was tightly controlled by the pro-Indonesia forces.
The criterion that refugees had to register with their "heads of families" nullified any illusion that the process would provide a comprehensive and accurate survey of refugees' intentions, bearing in mind that the majority of families in West Timor are headed by males, who are either militia or associated with the Indonesian military (TNI) or under their influence. Many refugees were swept into West Timor from villages dominated by militia leaders and are still helplessly under the authority of those leaders. Whole families and communities would have had no option but to register according to the dictates of the militias or face violent retribution.
Only 12 international observers were present to cover 507 registration stations, 1,600 registration officials, 80 field supervisors and no less than 4,504 security personnel from the TNI and police. Even if the proposed number of 34 international observers had arrived and participated, they would never have had the capacity to comprehensively monitor the entire process. Several local NGOs with long experience of dealing with the refugee crisis were not given accreditation.
The fact that in the event the registration on 6 and 7 June was conducted in an orderly fashion and without any overt displays of violence or intimidation is largely irrelevant. The power and influence of the militias is far more insidious and operates at various levels above and below the surface. As the relative calm of the August 1999 East Timor ballot day demonstrated, the military and militias are able to turn the violence off and on at will. The atmosphere on the registration days says nothing about prior or subsequent intimidation and violence, which would have had a profound influence on the refugees' decisions. In stating that the "people had been able to express their wishes freely without fear, threat or intimidation" (see OCHA Consolidated Situation Report for Indonesia, No. 29 for 15-22 June 2001), UNTAET and IOM were at best extremely naove and at worst complicit in the violation of the refugees" rights.
The report of the international observers – including UNTAET and IOM – is a disgraceful cop-out. Incredibly, the word "militia" is not used once throughout the entire six-page report. In a perversion of language, the observers prefer to use the term "refugee community leader". There is no reference to the general security situation in West Timor and its impact on the process. The observers were more concerned with technical issues such as whether the registration started on time and whether proper ink marking was used. The only worthwhile outcome of the mission was the finding that "the ballot should be viewed as a choice made by the refugees on the day, and not necessarily as an indication of their permanent intentions".
A rushed and deeply-flawed process
The process was driven in part by the wish to complete the registration and repatriation in time for refugees to register for the East Timorese elections on 30 August 2001. That may have been a laudable objective, but the overriding objective of the process should have been to ensure that the refugees were able to make a free and informed choice about where they wished to live. The Indonesian authorities should not have been permitted to impose a timetable for registration unrelated to the situation on the ground in West Timor. If anything, the East Timorese authorities should have considered postponing the elections until conditions in West Timor allowed for the registration, repatriation and re-settlement of the refugees according to international standards for the protection of refugees.
Apart from the major problem of militia violence and intimidation, the process was seriously flawed in failing to take account of the complexities of the refugees' circumstances and intentions.
Frank Brennan, Country Director of the Jesuit Refugee Service in East Timor wrote to Sergio de Mello, the head of UNTAET two months before the registration saying: "Asking the simple question whether people 'wish to return to East Timor or whether they wish to settle permanently in Indonesia" will provide little guidance about people's real intentions." After the registration, he said: "It is impossible to read any sense into the result of such a simplistic survey conducted with inadequate public education and security." He pointed out that many refugees actually wanted to wait and see what happens after the elections in East Timor. Others were still awaiting assurances regarding their homes and land. Some who wish to settle in Indonesia want to do so only if they can stay in West Timor; others want to stay so long as their salaries are paid by the Indonesian authorities. He went on: "Most East Timorese want to return home eventually. Most of those still in the camps want to stay in West Timor in the foreseeable future. We all knew that before the registration. The registration results will now be used by the Government of Indonesia, UNHCR and UNTAET to rationalise the abandonment of the majority of the people left in the camps on the basis that they have exercised a choice to stay. UNHCR described this registration as 'a necessary first step towards identifying and promoting durable solutions for East Timor refugees ..." It was nothing of the sort. It was a further step backwards after the international community's departure in September 2000 and will now be used as a step along the way of UNHCR's withdrawal from Timor before these people have pursued their preferred durable solution.
"Any registration of intention [to remain or return] in camps as insecure as those in West Timor is dangerous and imprudent unless the anonymity of the registrants can be assured. Even if anonymity be assured, there is a need for transparent, independent socialisation about the process, none of which was in evidence when I visited camps around Atambua two weeks before the registration. The international community should not have given any endorsement [let alone paid for] a registration process which could proceed in a closed environment where militia leaders and their political masters enjoy a campaign monopoly without independent scrutiny. In one camp, even I was seen as an apologist for UNTAET because I was giving both sides of the story.
There was little public understanding in the camps about the purpose or nature of the registration process. And yet UNHCR covered half the costs ... UNHCR would never have conducted such a process itself in camps where it had open and secure access. Pragmatism dictated the funding of a flawed process" (Frank Brennan SJ, "Bridging Diverse Issues and Converging Interests in the West Pacific", The Australian Studies Centre University of Indonesia International Seminar, Jakarta, 13 June 2001).
Confusion was also caused by the fact that the registration was publicised by many people – including the Indonesian task force responsible for its administration – as a vote. The outcome was described as the "result" and those who failed to indicate their intentions were said to have "abstained". Dis-information was spread by some militia that this was a re-run of the 1999 ballot in East Timor; the intention being to scare people into "voting" to stay in Indonesia in order to avoid a reprise of the 1999 violence and devastation.
The outcome of the process was also seriously distorted by people registering in more than one place and non-refugees registering in order to obtain food and aid from the Indonesian government. This explains the high figure for the total number of refugees. The government's budget for the registration included plans for an extensive TV and print media socialisation campaign, registration of refugees outside of West Timor, try out registration runs in Tuapukan and Haliwen camps and money for indelible ink to be used on registration day. None of this was done and UNHCR must hold the government properly to account for the expenditure of the money it was given.
International community must now act
It is now incumbent on the international community to hold the Indonesian Government to account for all its decisions regarding the refugees and the results of the registration. Once re-settlement commences, it will be much harder to monitor the ongoing welfare of the refugees especially if they are taken to other parts of Indonesia against their will. There is increasing concern about what has happened to those who opted to return to East Timor. If the Indonesian government has neither the means nor the will to proceed with the re-settlement and repatriation then all other efforts must continue to ensure freedom of choice for all those who remain in West Timor. The myriad of reasons for the ongoing refugee problem remain and must be addressed.
There are signs that Jakarta wants to deal with the crisis, but is powerless to confront the militias who are holding the upper hand. The Indonesian Government is also unable to confront the problem of disgruntled TNI elements, which refuse to accept the loss of East Timor and are determined to prolong the refugee crisis as a source of instability and possible means of revenge against the East Timorese. In April, the OCHA stated: "TNI spokesman Rear Marshal Graito Usodo said that a certain elite group is still attempting to motivate former militiamen of the pro-integration group to reoccupy East Timor. He did not elaborate." (OCHA report No. 20, 20 April 2001) While the militias and TNI elements are succeeding in their long-term objective of keeping the refugees in the camps, the Government appears to be concerned about the social and economic consequences of large numbers of refugees remaining in Indonesia. Security minister, Agum Gumelar has said that he hopes tens of thousands of the East Timorese refugees will return home (Jakarta Post, 21 June 2001), while minister of resettlement and infrastructure, Erna Witoelar, has admitted that Indonesia is unable to shoulder the burden of all the refugees who have said they want to stay (Jakarta Post, 18 June 2001). The Governor of East Nusa Tenggara province, which includes West Timor, said that the province could accommodate only 6,000 refugees (OCHA, 15-22 June 2001).
Indonesia also has to cope with the massive problem of an estimated 1.25 million internally displaced persons in other provinces, such as Maluku (Jakarta Post, 12 July).
The problem of salaries and pensions remains an issue that affects up to 20,000 East Timorese refugees in West Timor. Negotiations during bilateral talks held in Denpasar, Bali in May between UNTAET and the Indonesian government made some progress regarding a planned severance or compensation fund for former state employees. In this connection, a consolidated appeal for West Timor refugees will probably be launched by Indonesia and the United Nations in July. However, a timetable for the scheme needs to be clearly defined and implemented as soon as possible.
Continuing disinformation regarding the security situation in East Timor and general confusion about the upcoming election and predicted violence are still major factors for non-return. Contact with family members and friends who have already returned to East Timor remains the most trusted manner in which refugees receive reliable information. "Border Reunions" should be restarted in order for information from both sides of the border to be disseminated from and to communities who trust one another in the same manner that "Go and See" visits and/or border meetings should be instigated at a grassroots level. A community approach to reconciliation and reintegration will be a much more effective way of fostering trust and successful return. Some local and international NGOs have been carrying out effective work in this area but do not have the capacity to bear this burden in full.
In this respect, there must be a more co-ordinated approach to reconciliation. High level delegations and visits do not impact at the grassroots level and can lead to more confusion and distrust amongst the ordinary refugee population. Reconciliation talks with militia leaders, although important for the future stability of East Timor, do nothing to encourage refugee return. They merely consolidate and legitimise the power militia leaders have in the refugee camps and increase the distrust refugees have of the UN, whom they see negotiating with the very people keeping them in West Timor.
UNTAET and the East Timorese leadership must take affirmative action to ensure the best possible conditions for return. Although foreign minister, Josi Ramos-Horta, publicly criticised the registration process as "an absolute farce" (AP, 8 June 2001), it is time for more than words. Motivated by financial and some international pressure, the Indonesia government has been the only body to take decisive action on the refugee problem in the last nine months; the registration being its solution. Not one of East Timor's new political parties has spoken about the potential refugee voters who are not being allowed the opportunity to participate in their country's future. If neither the international community nor the East Timorese show an interest, then who will hold the Indonesian government to account? If tens of thousands of refugees are forcibly resettled to other parts of Indonesia, who will take responsibility for their plight? Judging from recent history on West Timor, the answer, again, is nobody.