After several months, Indonesia's military is re-emerging from the shadows. On June 13, the head of Indonesia's armed forces (TNI), Admiral Widodo Adisucipto, warned that the country was sliding further into chaos and that the government's first concern was to prevent the nation's disintegration. Widodo's statement typifies the military's concern about Indonesia's territorial integrity and its dissatisfaction with President Abdurrahman Wahid's efforts to solve the problem. The armed forces are still backing Wahid – he is still the best of a number of bad choices – but his options are severely constrained if he wants to stay in power.
The military high command appears to be bracing itself in preparation for a conflict with President Wahid. A TNI spokesman told Antara news agency June 9 that a reshuffle of the top echelons was in the works. Considering that Wahid has already inserted his own loyalists into the top ranks, further reshuffling suggests that the military wants to undo the damage. The process has already begun; the Straits Times reported that Lt. Gen. Agus Wirahadikusumah will lose his post as the chief of the army's Strategic Reserve Command (Kostrad). Agus was installed on March 29 and is regarded as a close aide of Wahid and a vocal military reformer.
This reshuffling comes on the heels of a series of very public warnings from the armed forces. Since the middle of May, military figures have continually expressed impatience about resolving the economic turmoil, social instability and rampant separatism that is tearing the archipelago nation apart. Hinting at solutions, the army has begun referring to the People's Consultative Assembly (MPR) as the highest power in the land – rather than the president.
the Indonesian Defense Force, brought up the idea of continued, and perhaps increased, military representation in the People's Consultative Assembly – quite startling in light of the fact that recent military reforms mandate the military withdraw from politics by 2004. Most threatening were the General's references to the "democratization failure" in Pakistan, and the military takeover that rectified the problem, according to Agence France Presse.
This rhetoric represents a major shift from statements made as recently as April 20, when military leaders emerged from their annual meeting declaring their desire to stay out of politics. The trigger for this change most likely occurred during the May 12 cease-fire agreement between the government and separatists in the province of Aceh.
The cease-fire was a breakthrough in the decades-long conflict, but it gave the rebels a hint of legitimacy. Most of the military virulently opposes any accommodation of the separatists – seeing it as encouragement for other separatists and the beginning of the end of Indonesian unity. In fact, some observers blame the military for a recent series of assassinations of the Acehnese leadership.
Another reason for this newfound assertiveness is that the armed forces may have finally organized themselves after being politically routed by Wahid early in his term. Not long after taking office, the president brought in a number of new commanders and reshuffled many of the old. He replaced the head of the armed forces, a position traditionally held by the army, with an admiral and directed resources toward the navy.
This exacerbated tensions between army officers – mostly those loyal to ex-president Suharto – and the navy, which maintains an institutional unity and outlook rooted in the populist nationalist agenda of the late president Sukarno. But inter-service rivalries appear to have taken a back seat to greater concerns about the state of the nation.
The armed forces still back Wahid, more by default than by his own virtues. The military has few favorable options. A military takeover could stabilize Indonesia – after a period of massive bloodshed and anarchy. The military would not only need to suppress communal fighting in the Spice Islands and separatists in Aceh and Irian Jaya, it would have to fight in the heart of Indonesia, as student demonstrators and pro-democracy activists would inevitably take to the streets. This would stretch the army to its limits, with 250,000 regular troops trying to control a country of 200 million. In the meantime, the economy would collapse to near subsistence levels as the last remaining foreign investors fled.
The alternative, however, is to sit and watch as Indonesia tears itself apart. Wahid has been busy, but relatively ineffective in negotiating an end to the violence and in encouraging foreign investment. The rest of the government is consumed with political infighting, which may be Wahid's salvation.
The military is not yet willing to take over the country, and there is no other viable political figure to take Wahid's place. Military intervention will be complete, or not at all. Thus, for the moment, Wahid stays.
The armed forces have repeatedly stated that their first priority is the national unity and territorial integrity of Indonesia.
Wahid's decision to use negotiations, rather than repression, to reel in restive provinces threatens that unity – especially if that negotiation amounts to de facto independence. The military's patience is wearing thin, but it appears to have given Wahid one last chance to fix the situation.
Wahid, however, is stuck. He cannot negotiate with the provinces without offering them some form of independence or autonomy – which is unacceptable to the military. Fixing Indonesia's economy will quell some of the violence, but no companies will invest as long as social unrest continues. Wahid made it a point not to send troops against the separatists, but he now has little other choice. Soon Wahid will bow to the military, allowing it to take control of the provinces.